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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The pace of international economic activity and the developing inter-
dependence ofm
John H. Jackson
national economies is head spinning.
You are living the global economy from the minute you are woken up by your
Japanese-brand radio alarm made in Malaysia. On with your Italian suit made
from Australian wool and drink a cup of Colombian coffee while watching
American news on television; then get into your German car (assembled in
Slovakia) to come to your office in a multinational firm whose headquarters
were designed by a Chinese architect. There, your office equipment comes from
Korea, Taiwan, the United States, Europe - or sometimes all of these combined
in the one machine. You might have lunch in a Mexican restaurant run by
Moroccans, and go back for a tele-conference meeting that links up half-a-dozen
national telecommunication systems.
I don't think I need to take you all the way back through the Finnish sauna to
your Japanese futon bed. The point is clear. And it becomes clearer every day,
as interdependence between economies increases.
Renato Ruggiero
1 . The Development of International Trade Agreements
The world's economy is becoming more and more integrated. For the past 50 years,
the number of transactions in the international economic and political spheres have
John H. Jackson, Reflections on International Economic Law, 17 U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. 17 (1996).
World Trade Organization, Members of the WTO multilateral trading system must respect it and use
it properly — says director-general Ruggiero (Address delivered by WTO Director-General Renato
Ruggiero to the Herbert Quandt Foundation on June 22, 1995) (visited July 12, 1997) <http://www.wto.
org/archives/3_17.htm>.
Gilbert R. Winham, The Evolution of International Trade Agreements 1 14 (1992).
increased steadily. The enormous expansion of trade and commercial relations between
different countries has lead to a situation today which could be described as
"international commercial global village."
Since 1945 there have been several initiatives aimed at abolishing or lowering
border tariffs in order to facilitate the mutual exchange of commodities at the
international level. The first, and probably one of the most ambitious treaties was the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Created in the year 1947, the GATT
attempted to facilitate tariff reductions between the participating countries.
7
Even though
o
the application of the GATT was based only on a Protocol of Provisional Application
,
4
John H. Jackson et al., Implementing the Tokyo Round: Legal Aspects of Changing International
Economic Rules, 81 Mich. L. Rev. 267 (1982).
Frank W. Swacker et al., World Trade Without Barriers (Vol.1): The World Trade Organization
(WTO) and Dispute Resolution 103 (1995) [hereinafter World Trade Without Barriers (Vol. 1)]
.
For a general perspective on the further development of international trade law, see Carsten Thomas
Ebenroth, Visionen fur das intemationale Wirtschaftsrecht [Visions concerning International Economic
Law], 1995 Recht der internationalen Wirtschaft [RIW] 1.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S.,
No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT 1947]. The official amended text is found in 4 GATT
B.I.S.D. at 1 (1969). In this thesis the term GATT is used to refer to the broader GATT trading system
including various institutions and procedures established pursuant to the General Agreement.
See Kenneth W. Dam, The GATT: Legal and International Economic Organization (1970); Robert E.
Hudec, The GATT Legal System and World Trade Diplomacy (2d ed., 1989); John H. Jackson, World
Trade and the Law ofGATT (1969); John H. Jackson, Restructuring the GATT System (1990).
The notions "members" or "member states" were not used in the GATT 1947, as the treaty was
supposed to be bound into the organizational structure of the International Trade Organization (ITO)
which never came into existence. This is why the GATT 1947 itself never had the status of an
International Organization or consequently an institutional framework. "The only recognized body
consists of representatives of the contracting parties. [And only a]n editorial device permits ... a
distinction between the contracting parties jointly and those parties acting merely in their individual
capacities: the former are mandatorily referred to as the . . . 'CONTRACTING PARTIES' (Article
XXV)." Dam, supra note 6, at 10-14, 21-22, 335-36. The CONTRACTING PARTIES were responsible
for making decisions concerning the Agreement. GATT 1947 Art XXV.
g
Protocol of Provisional Application of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, Annex; 55 U.N.T.S. 308.
3its effect on the world wide commerce was immense.9 The World Trade Organization 10
(WTO), as the "successor" to the GATT, is expected to be even more successful in
terms of economic impact. After seven years of negotiations between 1 1 7 nations, the
n i a
Uruguay Round ended with the approval of the Final Act on April 15, 1994, thereby
9
In 1986 over four-fifths of world trade took place within the GATT. Trade Policies for a Better
Future: The "Leutwiler Report", the GATT and the Uruguay Round 67 (Kluwer Academic Publishers
publ., 1987).
10
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, April 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994)
[hereinafter WTO Agreement].
See John Croome, The Results of the Uruguay Round: A Guide (1996); William F. Davey, The
WTO/GATT World Trading System: An Overview, in Handbook of GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement,
Part One 7 (William Davey et al. eds., 1996) [hereinafter Handbook (Part One)]; John H. Jackson,
Managing the Trading System: The World Trade Organization and the Post-Uruguay Round GATT
Agenda, in Managing the World Economy 131 (Peter B. Kenen ed., 1994); The World Trade
Organization: The Multilateral Trade Framework (Terence P. Stewart ed., 1996) [hereinafter Stewart, The
WTO].
For actual developments within the framework of the WTO, see its website at World Trade
Organization (visited July 12, 1997) <http://www.wto.org>.
The notion "successor" used in this context is not to be considered in its legal sense as implied by
Art. 30 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1 155 U.N.T.S. 331, 339, but in a
more political sense meaning that the WTO came into existence as a result of the last GATT negotiation
round. For an analysis concerning the legal relation between the "old" GATT 1947 and the WTO, see
Gabrielle Marceau, Transition from GATT to WTO: A Most Pragmatic Operation, 29:4 J. World Trade
147 (1995), and Patrick M. Moore, The Decisions Bridging the GATT 1947 and the WTO Agreement, 90
Am. J. Int'l L. 317 (1996). In a nutshell, the WTO "represents a new organization open to those who agree
to abide by the entire Uruguay Round package . . . Those countries that are not in a position to accept the
entire package, will remain within the old GATT framework." The Uruguay Round: Global Agreement —
Global Benefits 27 (Office for Official Publications of the European Communities ed., 1994). See also
Paul Demaret, The Metamorphoses of the GATT: From the Havana Charter to the World Trade
Organization, 34 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 123 (1995).
See The Uruguay Round: Global Agreement - Global Benefits, supra note 1 1, at 8-9.
The several negotiations initiated under the auspices of GATT 1947 took place in so-called rounds.
The last one, the Uruguay Round, started in 1986. For a short description of the pre-Uruguay Rounds see
A Brief History of the GATT, in Trade Policies for a Better Future: The "Leutwiler Report", the GATT
and the Uruguay Round, supra note 9, at 160-64.
creating the WTO. It was said that this act "represents the most important change in the
jurisprudence of the global economy in the second half of the twentieth century." 16 Some
figures might show the widespread acceptance amongst different countries that the
GATT and the WTO have found. Although only 23 states signed the GATT 1947
initially, it had 105 contracting parties by the end of 1992.
18 When the WTO came into
force on January 1, 1995, 76 countries were "eligible to become members on the first
day".
19
Currently, the WTO has 130 members, with 29 additional countries (among them
China and the Russian Federation) having submitted applications to join the new world
trade body.
20
Analysts estimate the Uruguay Round Agreements will lower global tariffs
21 22
by over $740 billion while increasing world exports by $755 billion and raising the
14
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr.
15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1 143 (1994) [hereinafter Uruguay Round Final Act].
For an overview of the negotiation process during the Uruguay Round, see The GATT Uruguay
Round: A Negotiating History (1986-1992) (Terence P. Stewart ed., 1994) (3 vols.); John Croome,
Reshaping the World Trading System: A History of the Uruguay Round (1995).
15
16
The WTO Agreement is one of the five agreements contained in the Final Act. See infra n. 61.
Philip M. Nichols, GATT Doctrine, 36 Va. J. IntM L. 379, 380 (1996).
One author criticizes that most books and articles on trade and trade policy regard trade only from
a utilitarian perspective, whereas he generally questions the right of the government to regulate trade at all
because, in his opinion, this might constitute a violation of individual rights. Robert W. McGee, The Fatal
Flaw in NAFTA, GATT and all other Trade Agreements, 14 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 549 (1994).
18
GATT, Focus: GATT Newsletter, Sept. 1992, at 2 (Information and Media Relations Division of
GATT publ.).
19 GATT Activities 1994-1995 5 (World Trade Organization ed., 1996).
20
The figures are based on information gathered at World Trade Organization, WTO Membership
(visited April 11, 1997) <http://www.wto.org/wto/memtab2_wpf.html> (this website shows a complete
list of current members and governments having applied for membership).
21
David A. Sanger, Senate Approves Pact to Ease Trade Curbs: A Victory for Clinton, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 2, 1994, at A 1 &A22.
22
The World is Born, Focus: GATT Newsletter, May 1994, at 1 (Information and Media Relations
Division ofGATT publ.).
world income yearly by $510 billion. The developed countries will reduce their tariffs
24
by 40 per cent. "[Mjore than ninety percent of the world's trade in goods is conducted
in the shadows of the trade agreements that constitute part of the [WTO]'s organic
documents." For the United States, the Council of Economic Advisers estimates that
national income will increase by $100 to 200 billion by the tenth year of the new
agreement.
Efforts to foster international trade were not only made on a global, but also on a
27
regional level. "[A]ttempts at regional economic integration have been numerous, with
28
the failures far outnumbering the successes." Nevertheless, nations everywhere on the
world have concluded agreements to form free trade areas or customs unions , and they
3 A $510 Billion Boost to World Income, Focus: GATT Newsletter, Nov. 1994, at 2 (Information
and Media Relations Division of GATT publ.). This number is much higher than the Secretariat's prior
estimate that the world income would rise by $230 billion as a result of the new agreements. The World is
Bom, supra note 22, at 6.
24 A $ 5 10 Billion Boost to World Income, supra note 23, at 6.
25
Philip M. Nichols, supra note 16, at 381 (citing Trade Body Launched, Fin. Times, Jan. 5, 1995, at
!)•
26
Bob Beneson, With Health Care Receding, GATT Pact Gains Urgency, 52. Cong. Q. 2661, 2664
(1994). Doubting the validity of these figures, one author notes that the "[elstimates of how much GATT
would benefit the American economy . . . vary widely that they are almost useless." David E. Sanger,
Clinton Pledges to Push for Vote on Trade Accord, N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1994, at Al.
27
See Dickson Yeboah, Regional Economic Integration, 17:1 World Competition 33 (1993). For
political and social implications of regional trade agreements, see Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of
Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order 130-35 (1996).
28
John P. Fitzpatrick, The Future of the North American Free Trade Agreement: A Comparative
Analysis of the Role of Regional Economic Institutions and the Harmonization of Law in North America
and Western Europe, 19 Hous. J. Int'l L. 1, 5 (1996) (citations omitted). See also Winham, supra note 3, at
118.
29
The negotiating parties in a free trade area "agree to remove barriers to trade with each other, while
each maintains its own differing schedule of tariffs applying to all other nations"; in a customs union, not
only the trade barriers between the member states have been eliminated, but also goods imported from
non-member countries are subject to just one uniform tariff regime. World Trade Without Barriers (Vol.
1), supra note 5, at 26 & 48.
continue to do so. Amongst these agreements are the European Union (EU), the
Andean Group, the Caribbean Free-Trade Agreement (CARIFTA), and the African
Common Market , for instance. One of the most recent treaties, concluded by the
United States, Canada, and Mexico, is the North American Free Trade Agreement
The formation of free trade areas and customs unions by nations also adhering to the WTO is allowed
under Art. XXIV GATT 1947. See also Regionalism and the World Trading System (World Trade
Organization ed., 1995) 5-23; Winham, supra note 3, at 109-10, 117-21; Jagdish Bhagwati, Regionalism
versus Multilateralism, 15:5 World Economy 535 (1992); John H. Jackson, Regional Trade Blocs and the
GATT, 16:2 World Economy 121 (1993); Thomas Oppermann, Die Europaische Gemeinschaft und Union
in der Welthandelsorganisation (WTO) [The European Community and Union in the World Trade
Organization], 1995 Recht der intemationalen Wirtschaft [RIW] 919, 920-21; Heinz G. Preusse, Regional
Integration in the Nineties — Stimulation or Threat to the Multilateral Trading System, 28:4 J. World
Trade 147 (1994). For a recent evaluation of the relations between the WTO and regional agreements, see
Guy de Jonquieres, WTO Urged to Act on Regional Pacts, Fin. Times, Feb. 6, 1997, at 10.
For instance, the states adhering to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are
planning to establish a free trade zone. Asean Trade Zone Nears, Fin. Times, Feb. 25, 1997, at 1. Chile
wants to become partner of the NAFTA. Nancy Dunne, Chile's NAFTA Hopes Fade as Trade Pacts Lose
US Favour, Fin. Times, Feb. 26, 1 997, at 6. A number of countries in central-east and south-east Europe
are eager to join the European Union. The Universal Almanac 364 (John W. Wright ed., 1996). For the
negotiations between 34 American countries about the creation of the Free Trade Area of the Americas
(FTAA), see Geoff Dyer, Americas Free Trade Talks Get Green Light, Fin. Times, May 19, 1997, at 4.
Plans exist to establish the TAFTA, the Transatlantic Free Trade Area to be formed by the U.S. and the
EU. Oppermann, supra note 29, at 921.
For a complete overview of currently existing customs union and free trade area agreements that
have been notified under GATT 1947 Art. XXIV or covered or notified under the 1979 Enabling Clause
(GATT Decision, Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of
Developing Countries, Nov. 28, 1979, GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 203), see Regionalism and the
World Trading System, supra note 29, at 77-89. See also World Trade Without Barriers (Vol. 1), supra
note 5, at 103-24. A selective collection of texts of regional agreements' dispute settlement systems,
including explanatory notes, are found in Frank W. Swacker et al., World Trade Without Barriers (Vol. 2):
Comparative Dispute Resolution — Public and Private 49-691 (1995) [hereinafter World Trade Without
Barriers (Vol. 2)].
32
North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Mex.-Can., 32 I.L.M. 289 & 32
I.L.M. 605 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter NAFTA].
See Barry Appleton, Navigating NAFTA (1994); Assessing NAFTA: A Trinational Analysis (Steven
Globerman and Michael Walker eds., 1993); Joseph Darby, Legal and Economic Aspects of the NAFTA
(1995); Jon R. Johnson, The North American Free Trade Agreement: A Comprehensive Guide (1994);
7(NAFTA). Analogous to the WTO, the NAFTA has its origins in another treaty, the
former U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement (CFTA). By eliminating tariffs and other
trade barriers the NAFTA is expected to create the world's largest single market with
over 360 million consumers and an output of over $6 trillion each year.
In relation with the NAFTA, two other accords, the so-called Side Agreements35
,
have been signed, the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation36
NAFTA and Beyond (Joseph J. Norton & Thomas L. Bloodworm eds., 1995); The North American Free
Trade Agreement (Judith H. Bello et al. eds., 1994); The North American Free Trade Agreement: Issues,
Options, Implications (Stewart A. Baker & Jeffrey P. Bialos eds., 1992). Links to NAFTA information on
the Internet is found at Library of Congress, Global Legal Information Network (GLIN), The North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (visited July 12, 1997) <http://lcweb2.1oc.gov:8081/glin/
nafta.html>.
33
Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 22, 1987-Jan. 2, 1988, U.S.-Can., 27 I.L.M. 281 [hereinafter CFTA]
(also FTA or CUSFTA are used as abbreviation, see Gary N. Horlick and F. Amanda DeBusk, Dispute
Resolution under NAFTA, 27:1 J. World Trade 21 (1993); Charles M. Gastle, Policy Alternatives for
Reform of the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas: Dispute Settlement Mechanisms, 26 Law & Pol'y
Int'l Bus. 735, 738 (1995), for instance).
See Assessing the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (Murray G. Smith & Frank Stone eds., 1987);
Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, Guide to the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement (1990); Ivan Bernier
& Benoit Lapointe, Free Trade Agreement between Canada and the United States Annotated (1990); Jon
R. Johnson & Joel S. Schachter, The Free Trade Agreement (1988); Debra P. Steger, A Concise Guide to
the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (1988); The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (Daniel
E. Nolle ed., 1990); Trade-Offs on Free Trade (Marc Gold & David Leyton-Brown ed., 1988);
Understanding the Free Trade Agreement (Donald M. McRae & Debra P. Steger eds., 1988); Gilbert R.
Winham, Trading with Canada (1988).
34
Scott Pendleton, Clinton, Mexican President Endorse Free Trade Agreement in First Foreign
Summit, Christian Sci. Mirror, Jan. 1 1, 1993, at 9. For a more detailed description of the economic effects
of NAFTA, see Thomas J. Schoenbaum, The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA): Good
for Jobs, for the Environment, and for America, 23 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 461, 465-84 (1993).
35
Even if the Side Agreements do "not constitute a part ofNAFTA as such, [they] must nevertheless
be viewed as part of the NAFTA package." J. Owen Saunders, NAFTA and the North American
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation: A New Model for International Collaboration on Trade and
Environment, 5 Colo. J. Int'l Envtl. L. & Pol'y 273, 284 (1994).
North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32
I.L.M. 1480 (hereinafter NAAEC); see Johnson, supra note 32, at 260; Steve Charnovitz, The NAFTA
8(NAAEC) and the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation37 (NAALC). This
development shows that also other than "classical" trade related issues are nowadays
brought into connection with economical treaties.
2. National Economic Implications of Internationalized Trade
Why would a country enter into a contractual relation with other countries that
obliges it to decrease its customs tariffs and open up its market? Does it not lose a source
Environmental Side Agreement: Implications for Environmental Cooperation, Trade Policy, and
American Treatymaking, 8 Temp. Int'l & Comp. L.J. 257 (1994); Saunders, supra note 35, at 273-304.
37
North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M.
1499 (hereinafter NAALC); see Johnson, supra note 32, at 266; Michael McGuiness, The Protection of
Labor Rights in North America: A Commentary on the North American Agreement on Labor
Cooperation, 30 Stan. J. Int'l L. 579 (1994); Benjamin Rozwood & Andrew R. Walker, Side Agreements,
Sidesteps, and Sideshows: Protecting Labor from Free Trade in America, 34 Harv. Int'l L.J. 333 (1993).
38
"The interface of trade with other seemingly unrelated issues (such as the environment) is an
indicator that the world is becoming more of a single society instead of a group of separate and anarchic
societies." Winham, supra note 3, at 122.
For the relationship between environment and trade, see Michael J. Trebilcock & Robert Howse, The
Regulation of International Trade 331-66 (1995); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, International Trade Law and
International Environmental Law, 27:1 J. World Trade 43 (1993); Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Trade and
Environment: Free International Trade and Protection of the Environment — Irreconcilable Conflict?, 86
Am. J. Int'l L. 700 (1992); Christopher Thomas & Greg A. Tereposky, The Evolving Relationship
Between Trade and Environmental Regulation, 27:4 J. World Trade 23 (1993); Peter P. Uimonen, Trade
Rules and Environmental Controversies During the Uruguay Round and Beyond, 18:1 World Economy 71
(1995).
For the relationship between labor issues and trade, see International Labour Standards and Economic
Interdependence (Walter Sengenberger & Duncan Campbell eds., 1994); Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development, Trade, Employment and Labour Standards: A Study of Core Workers'
Rights and International Trade (1996); Andre Sapir, The Interaction between Labour Standards and
International Trade Policy, 18:6 World Economy 791 (1995); United States International Trade
Commission, Trade, Employment and Labor Standards, Int'l Economic Review, Dec. 1994, at 18.
For the relationship between environmental and labor issues and trade, see Jagdish Bhagwati, Trade
Liberalisation and "Fair Trade" Demands: Addressing the Environmental and Labour Standards Issues,
18:6 World Economy 745 (1995); Steve Chamovitz, Environmental and Labour Standards in Trade, 15:3
World Economy 335 (1992).
9of income for the national budget as a result of lower tariffs? Does the national economy
not suffer from overwhelming foreign competition? Various responses might be given. A
philosophical approach utilizes the theory that international trade helps to promote world
peace. However, even from an economical, more secular point of view, transnational
commercial relations are beneficial. Adam Smith had described the advantages of free
trade for landed nations when he analyzed that "the most effectual expedient ... for
raising the value of . . . surplus pro[ ]duce, for encouraging its increase . . . would be to
allow the most perfect freedom to the trade of all such mercantile nations." Even
modern economists believe that an unregulated trade results in lower prices, a greater
variety of commodities to choose from, and in consumer welfare, whereas high tariffs
and other means of protectionism lead to opposite result. However, it is not only
39
Immanuel Kant developed the idea that "[t]he spirit of trade cannot coexist with war". Immanuel
Kant, To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, in Perpetual Peace and Other Essays 107, 125 (Ted
Humphrey trans., Hackett Publishing 1983) (1795). For John Stuart Mill, trade is "the principal guarantee
of the peace of the world". John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy, in 3 Collected Works of
John Stuart Mill 594 (John M. Robson ed., Univ. of Toronto Press 1965) (1884). However, "the
assumption that [trade] reduces the probability of war between nations is . . . not proven, and much
evidence exists to the contrary." Huntington, supra note 27, at 67 & 218.
40
In sum, the benefits of international trade can be described as follows: "International trade takes
place because no single country can produce efficiently all of the commodities it needs, and some nations
enjoy an advantage in producing certain kinds of products, either because of a comparative wealth of
resources (capital, labor, natural resources) or more efficient production techniques. Even an economy
with the most efficient technology has a limit on its resources, however, and rather than using them to
produce all kinds of products, it concentrates its resources on what it makes most efficiently. It then trades
those goods for other commodities, importing those it produces less efficiently. As a result, all countries
are better off; specialization results in the expansion of the total supply of goods, and the cost of acquiring
them falls accordingly." The Universal Almanac, supra note 30, at 358.
41
Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations 670 (R. H. Campbell
etal.eds., 1976) (1776).
42
The subject of this thesis does not allow a detailed analysis of economical reasoning. An overview
summarizing the major arguments that have been put forth for and against free trade is flund in Raj Bhala,
International Trade Law 5-78 (1996); Robert McGee, The Trade Policy of a Free Society, 19 Cap. U.L.
Rev. 301(1990).
10
relevant to take a look at the consequences for the individual consumer, but also to note
the outcomes for national economies as a whole. It may be useful to give two examples:
the United States and Germany. In 1995, the United States exported goods worth
$581.1 billion; its gross domestic product (GDP ) was $7245.8 billion.45 This means
that the exported goods account for eight percent of the GDP. At the same time, the
United States imported goods worth $758.9 billion.4 The German GDP was $2407.5
47
billion in 1995 . During that year, Germany exported goods worth $506.4 billion, i.e.,
21 percent of the GDP, while importing goods worth $441.4 billion. The numbers
show the importance of international trade for the national economies. As can be seen,
exports provide a significant number ofjobs for these two countries. In addition, jobs are
created in foreign countries through the import of their goods. Higher tariffs would
diminish the sale of imported goods and affect the economy negatively. For instance, a
recent study indicated that a 15 percent import quota on steel "would save 26,000 jobs in
43
The decision to pick these countries was made because the author has close links with both of
them. Nevertheless, it has to be admitted that the impact on other nations' economies might be less
important due to the fact that the United States and Germany were the worlds leading importers and
exporters in 1995. World Trade Organization, World Trade Expanded Strongly in 1995 for the Second
Consecutive Year (visited April 3, 1997) <http://www.wto.org/wto/Pressrel/press44.htm>.
44
The gross national product (GNP) is the "total monetary value of all final goods and services
produced in a country during a year"; and the gross domestic product (GDP) equals the "gross national
product excluding payments on foreign investments". Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of
the English Language 843 (Gramercy Books publ., 1996).
45
United States Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, U.S. Aggregate
Foreign Trade Data (visited April 14, 1997) <http://www.ita.gov/industry/otea/usfth/t05.prn>.
46
Id.
47
Statistisches Bundesamt [Federal Census Bureau], Gesamtwirtschaft [Economy in its entirety]
(visited April 14, 1997) <http://www.statistik-bund.de/basis/d/bdl2.htm>. This conversion is based on the
1995 one U.S. dollar value which was worth 1.437 German marks on average.
48
Statistisches Bundesamt [Federal Census Bureau], Deutschland als Handelspartner [Germany as
Trade Partner] (visited April 14, 1997) <http://www.statistik-bund.de/basis/d/bdl8.htm>. For the
conversion, see supra note 47.
11
the steel industry", but "destroy 93,000 in the industries that import steel for a loss/gain
ratio of 3.6 to 1." A lot of studies show the detrimental economic consequences of
protectionist measures. As these examples have demonstrated, both the individual
consumer and the business community as a whole benefit from free trade.
3. The Importance of Resolving Disputes Effectively
In order for the trade agreements to achieve maximum benefit, they have to work as
intended. This will only be the case if the parties respect the terms of the agreements and
act accordingly. But what happens if one contracting country accuses another of
adopting a national measure contrary to the agreed terms of the treaty? What if one party
did not adapt its law conform to the agreement? To put it more generally, how do the
treaties deal with disputes? Especially during the last decade, many countries have
49
McGee, supra note 17, at 554 (citing Arthur T. Denzau, American Steel: Responding to Foreign
Competition, 66 Center for the Study of American Business (Washington University at St. Louis) (1985)).
See the various examples given by McGee, supra note 17, at 554.
"There is no real alternative to free trade — admittedly an ideal — which rests on the twin pillars of
open world markets and the idea of comparative advantage." Thomas J. Schoenbaum, The International
Trade Laws and the New Protectionism: The Need for a Synthesis with Antitrust, 19 N. C. J. Int'l L. &
Com. Reg. 393, 416 (1994). The reason for this is that "[generally, the total costs of protectionism well
exceed its total benefits". Judith H. Bello, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: Less is More, 90
Am. J. Int'l L. 416, 417 (1996). Nevertheless, there is still a widespread belief that, if protectionism rules,
the domestic industry will be better off ~ and demanding the application of protectionist measures is not
unpopular in the political community. For instance, fearing that the United States' membership in the
WTO will affect the domestic industry negatively, "prominent figures, such as the Rev. Jesse Jackson,
billionaire [and presidential candidate] Ross Perot, consumer advocate Ralph Nader, ... as well as
distinguished members of Congress such as Senators Byrd (West Virginia), . . . , Hollings (South
Carolina), Heflin (Alabama), and Brown (Colorado) [tried vigorously] to defeat the GATT-WTO Bill.
Have they succeeded, they would have caused a monumental financial catastrophe for the United States."
World Trade Without Barriers (Vol. 1), supra note 5, at 1. Despite the detrimental effects of protectionism
"[e]ven staunch advocates of free trade must admit that trade liberalization results in net gains to an
economy. There are 'winners' and 'losers', [even if] the gain to the winners more than offsets the pain to
the losers." Bhala, supra note 42, at 935 (emphasis in original).
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realized the importance of a dispute settlement regime for any treaty. Its role "is
particular crucial for a treaty system designed to address today's myriad of complex
economic questions and to facilitate the cooperation among nations that is essential to
the peaceful and welfare-enhancing aspect of those relations."53
Indeed, one of the essential questions is whether the dispute settlement functions in a
beneficial way for the parties. This question may decide whether the arrangement is
going to be a success or a failure. Will the parties rely on the institutions and means
provided for or will they resort to unilateral action on the national level? "A well-
designed, contextually responsive [dispute resolution mechanism] can minimize
frustration and tension between parties by providing procedures suited to their goals and
their internal and external political relationships. An ill-designed [dispute resolution
mechanism] can generate friction and actually contribute to vitiation the trade agreement
it was created to preserve." Therefore, member states will preferably accept an efficient
and effective conflict resolution system. To reach this goal the dispute settlement
mechanism has to be one that:
(1) investigates complaints on a timely basis and reaches principled conclusions
that are binding and enforceable upon the parties;
(2) prevents multiple jeopardy in the form of commencent of a series of trade
disputes until the domestic industry's result is achieved;
52
Steven P. Croley & John H. Jackson, WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures, Standard of Review,
and Deference to National Governments, 90 Am. J. Int'l L. 193 (1996) (citing John H. Jackson, The
Uruguay Round, World Trade Organization, and the Problem of Regulating International Economic
Behavior, in Policy Debates/Debats Politiques 2, 2-25 (Ottawa, Centre for Trade Policy and Law, 1995)).
53
Id.
54
John H. Jackson, The Uruguay Round and the Launch of the WTO, in Stewart, The WTO, supra
note 10, 5, 17; Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Remedies along with Rights: Institutional Reform in the New
GATT, 88 Am. J. Int'l L. 477, 487-88 (1994).
Michael Reisman and Mark Wiedman, Contextual Imperatives of Dispute Resolution Mechanisms,
29:3 J. World Trade 5, 35 (1995).
13
(3) eliminates tactical advantages to both parties so that disputes are not
launched simply to obtain interim relief, which often may dictate the
outcome; and
(4) eliminates the possibility of retaliatory trade legislation that is designed to
punish the successful party and/or overturn the dispute settlement panel
determination.
56
4. The Idea and Aim of the Thesis
The aim of this thesis is to determine whether the dispute settlement institutions of
the WTO and the NAFTA meet the aforementioned standard, to compare the two
systems, and to evaluate them. An issue that should be dealt with first is the question of
comparability. Is it possible to compare the WTO and the NAFTA with regard to their
conflict resolution procedures? Or are they too different because one agreement works
on the global level and the other on a regional one? Their institutions and their scope
may differ, but they are still conducive to comparison because the underlying structure
of these two international treaties is quite similar. Secondly, even if major differences
existed, the analysis of the dispute settlement regimes is conducted in a very narrow
field. It is intended to find out the principles of how the agreements deal with conflict
resolution. Since the area to be examined is very limited, a comparison would not be
hindered by structural differences.
The topic has been chosen for several reasons: both the agreements are fairly new,
and both have had "predecessors". It will be interesting to see whether their draftees
considered the "flaws" of other trade agreements and improved the dispute settlement
systems accordingly.
Gastle, supra note 33, at 736.
For the conception, aims and methods of comparative legal studies, see Konrad Zweigert & Hein
KOtz, An Introduction to Comparative Law, Volume I: The Framework, 1-41 (1977).
58
For the mutual influence of international and regional agreements, see Louis B. Sohn, An
Abundance of Riches: GATT and NAFTA Provisions for the Settlement of Disputes, 1 U.S.-Mex. L.J. 3,
14
A topic not to be dealt with is the access of private parties to the different conflict
settlement regimes.
5
It will not be analyzed if and how individuals have the possibility
to initiate or take part in the proceedings. This thesis will concentrate strictly on the
governmental participation during the procedures.
Both of the next chapters will be analyzing the WTO and the NAFTA separately. In
chapter two, after giving a short overview the WTO, its dispute settlement regime will be
examined. First, the old system under the GATT and its major weaknesses will be
explained. Second, the new, reformed WTO dispute resolution mechanism will be
explained. The following section will assess the new regime and suggest improvements.
In the third chapter the institutions and scope of the NAFTA will be discussed.
Consecutively, the different conflict settlement procedures instituted by the NAFTA will
be portrayed, including short references to the former CFTA. Finally, this chapter will
close with an evaluation of the procedures and improvement proposals. In chapter four, a
comparison between the WTO and the NAFTA procedures will be made. The final
chapter will conclude with the assumption that trade agreements which grow with
respect to the number of members and subjects will have to establish a more rule-based
dispute settlement mechanism in order to provide for an effective resolution procedure.
11 (1993). See also Statement of Administrative Action, at 345, reprinted in Uruguay Round Trade
Agreements, Texts of Agreements, Implementing Bill, Statement of Administrative Action, and Required
Supporting Statements, H.R. Doc. No. 316, 103d Cong., 2nd. Sess. 1, at 1014 (1994).
59
See Martin Lukas, The Role of Private Parties in the Enforcement of the Uruguay Round
Agreements, 29:5 J. World Trade 181 (1995).
CHAPTER II
THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
The World Trade Organization provides a "common institutional framework for the
conduct of trade relations among its members." It works as a forum for multilateral
trade negotiations, cooperates with the IMF and the World Bank, and is charged with the
administration and operation of the Uruguay Round Agreements (the WTO Agreement,
the Multilateral Trade Agreements, the Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes (Dispute Settlement Understanding or DSU), the
Trade Policy Review Mechanism, and the Plurilateral Trade Agreements). Whereas the
Plurilateral Trade Agreements are only binding for those WTO members that signed
them, the other agreements form integral parts of the WTO Agreement and are binding
on all members .
The WTO Agreement establishes a complex structure of different institutions. The
highest authority is the Ministerial Conference which consists of representatives of the
members. Meeting at least once every two years it executes the functions of the WTO6 .
60
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WTO Agreement, Art. II (2).
WTO Agreement, Art. HI. The Multilateral Trade Agreements include the Agreements on Trade in
Goods (consisting of, e.g., the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 [hereinafter GATT 1994]
and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures), the General Agreement on Trade in
Services [hereinafter GATS Agreement], and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]). The Plurilateral Agreements include, among other agreements,
the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft, and the Agreement on Government Procurement. The
Multilateral Trade Agreements are located in Annex 1 of the WTO Agreement, the Dispute Settlement
Understanding is located in Annex 2, the Trade Policy Review Mechanism in Annex 3, and the
Plurilateral Trade Agreements in Annex 4. Final Act; WTO Agreement, Art. II (3)-(4).
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WTO Agreement, Art. II (3)-(4).
WTO Agreement, Art. IV (1).
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When the Conference is not in session, a General Council, also made up of member
states' representatives, carries out the Conference's functions in order to guarantee the
effective functioning of the Organization . One of the most essential tasks to be
completed by the General Council is to determine the responsibilities of the Dispute
Settlement Body . Furthermore, it also defines the Trade Policy Review Body's
responsibilities . Under the General Council's guidance, various councils and
committees with different tasks are installed . With respect to the administrative work
of the Organization, the Agreement provides for a Secretariat of the WTO, whose
Director-General is appointed by the Ministerial Conference68
1. The Weaknesses in the GATT 1947 Dispute Settlement System
Even if they worked well in the beginning, the dispute resolution procedures
installed by the GATT 1947 had too many deficiencies which prevented effective
conflict resolution in the later years. Initially, the GATT Articles XXII70 and XXIII 71
64
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WTO Agreement, Art. IV (2).
WTO Agreement, Art. IV (3).
WTO Agreement, Art. IV (4).
WTO Agreement, Art. IV (5)-(8). A Council for Trade in Goods (for the Multilateral Agreements
on Trade in Goods), a Council for Trade in Services (for the GATS), and a Council for TRIPS (for the
TRIPS Agreement) are established. These Councils oversee the functioning of the different agreements.
They "shall carry out the functions assigned to them by their respective agreements and by the General
Council". The membership in these Councils is open to representatives of all member states. The
Ministerial Conference establishes a Committee on Trade and Development, a Committee on Balance-of-
Payments Restrictions, and a Committee on Budget, Finance and Administration to "carry out functions
assigned to them by [the WTO] Agreement and by the Multilateral Trade Agreements, and any additional
functions assigned to them by the General Council." Id.
WTO Agreement, Art. VI. The Director-General and the staff of the secretariat are required to be
impartial and not to accept any government's instructions. Id., at Art. VI (2).
69
See Bhala, supra note 42, at 109 ; Jackson, in Stewart, The WTO, supra note 54, at 13-14; Pierre
Pescatore, Drafting and Analyzing Decisions on Dispute Settlement, in Handbook ofGATT/WTO Dispute
Settlement, Part Two (William Davey et al. eds., 1996) [hereinafter Handbook (Part Two)] 3, 4; Peter
17
were the only texts dealing with dispute settlement, thus being "the most primitive
mechanism for interpreting and enforcing [the GATT] provisions". 72 As a result thereof,
Backes, Die neuen Streitbeilegungsregeln der Welthandelsorganisation (WTO) [The New Dispute
Settlement Provisions of the WTO], 1995 Recht der internationalen Wirtschaft [RIW] 916; William J.
Davey, Dispute Settlement in GATT, 1 1 Fordham Int'l J. 51, 61-65, 81-90 (1987); Peter-Tobias Stoll, Die
WTO: Neue Welthandelsorganisation, neue Welthandelsordnung [The WTO: New World Trade
Organization, New World Trade Order], 54 Zeitschrift fur auslandisches offentliches Recht und
Volkerrecht [ZaoRV] 241, 245-46 (1994).
70
Art. XXII provides:
"1. Each contracting party shall accord sympathetic consideration to, and shall afford adequate
opportunity for consultation regarding, such representations as may be made by another contracting party
with respect to any matter affecting the operation of this Agreement.
2. The CONTRACTING PARTIES may, at the request of a contracting party, consult with any
contracting party or parties in respect of any matter for which it has not been possible to find a satisfactory
solution under paragraph 1." GATT 1947, Art. XXII.
Art. XXIII provides:
1. "If any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to it . . . under this Agreement is
being nullified or impaired ... as the result of (a) the failure of another contracting party to carry out its
obligations under this Agreement, or (b) the application by another contracting party of any measure,
whether or not it conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement, or (c) the existence of any other
situation, the contracting party may, with a view to the satisfactory adjustment of the matter, make written
representations of proposals to the other contracting party or parties which it considers to be concerned.
Any contracting party thus approached shall give sympathetic consideration to the representations or
proposals made to it.
2. If no satisfactory adjustment is effected between the contracting parties concerned within a
reasonable time . . . , the matter may be referred to the CONTRACTING PARTIES. The
CONTRACTING PARTIES shall promptly investigate any matter so referred to them and shall make
appropriate recommendations to the contracting parties which they consider to be concerned, or give a
ruling on the matter, as appropriate . . . If the CONTRACTING PARTIES consider that the circumstances
are serious enough to justify such action, they may authorize a contracting party or parties to suspend the
application to another contracting party or parties of such concessions or other obligations under this
Agreement as they determine to be appropriate in the circumstances. If the application to any contracting
party of any concession or other obligation is in fact suspended, that contracting party shall then be free . .
. to give written notice to the Executive Secretary to the CONTRACTING PARTIES of its intention to
withdraw from this Agreement . . ." GATT 1947, Art. XXIII.
Curtis Reitz, Enforcement of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 17 U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ.
L. 555, 560(1996),
18
«73
"[f]or almost 25 years, disputes were settled in a haphazard way." Panels were created
"4
in 1952 to take over the duty of resolving the disputes. For over 35 years the
7 5
procedures remained based on customary principles , but in 1979, after the Tokyo
76
Round, the traditionally followed procedures were codified. In addressing any
-
complaint, the first phase was negotiation and consultation. If they remained
78
unsuccessful, the party could request the establishment of a panel. It was the GATT
"9
Council's task to appoint the panel members and determine the panel's terms of
80
reference. These decisions required unanimity with the principle of each country
73
Pescatore, in Handbook (Part Two), supra note 69, at 4.
74
Before the creation of the panels "the contracting parties carried out their responsibilities [to settle
disputes] by forming working parties ... In 1952, upon a suggestion of the chairman of the seventh
session of the contracting parties, the working parties were transformed into panels and became more
adjudicatory." Michael K. Young, Dispute Resolution in the Uruguay Round: Lawyers Triumph over
Diplomats, 29 Inti Law. 389, 393 (1995). The panels consisted of three or five experts in the field of
GATT law. Sohn, supra note 58, at 7.
Miquel Montana i Mora, A GATT with Teeth: Law Wins over Politics in the Resolution of
International Trade Disputes, 31 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 103 (1993).
On Nov. 28, 1979, the GATT Contracting Parties approved the "Understanding Regarding
Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance", and the "Annex: Agreed Description of
Customary Practice of the GATT in the Field of Dispute Settlement" which is found at GATT B.I.S.D.
(26th Supp.) at 210 (1980) [hereinafter Tokyo Round Understanding].
For the results of the Tokyo Round with regard to dispute settlement, see John H. Jackson, GATT
Machinery and the Tokyo Round Agreements, in Trade Policy in the 1980s 159 (W.R. Cline ed., 1983);
Robert E. Hudec, GATT Dispute Settlement after the Tokyo Round: An Unfinished Business, 13 Cornell
Int'lL.J. 145(1980).
77
78
Tokyo Round Understanding, Para. 4.
Tokyo Round Understanding, Para. 10.
79
The GATT Council of Representatives was established in 1960 as the Contracting Parties'
intersessional body; it was "composed of representatives of all contracting parties", and had the power "to
deal with . . . matters with which the CONTRACTING PARTIES may deal at their sessions." Decision of
4 June 1960 establishing the Council of representatives, June 4, 1960, GATT B.I.S.D. (9th Supp.) at 8-9
(1961).
XI)
Tokyo Round Understanding, Para.
19
Q 1
having one vote. The panel would then hear the dispute and "usually come up with a
reasoned conclusion" with regard to the validity of the challenged measure under the
82GATT 1947. The panel report was subject to the unanimous approval by the GATT
Council in order to have legal effect. Another change was made after the Tokyo
Round. Whereas initially one procedure would be followed in resolving disputes
occurring in all areas covered by the GATT, some of the non-tariff agreements
negotiated during the Tokyo Round provided for their own settlement system84 .
However, these changes did not solve many problems and even created new ones .
During the last years, the way the GATT tried to resolve conflicts was criticized
sharply because:
81
Backes, supra note 69, at 916; Lowenfeld, supra note 54, at 479. "The tradition of decision making
by consensus has evolved in GATT practice, but is not specified in the rules of procedure." Jeffrey P.
Bialos & Deborah E. Siegel, Dispute Resolution under the NAFTA: The Newer and Improved Model, 27
Int'l Law. 603, 605 n. 10 (1993).
82
Lowenfeld, supra note 54, at 479. Before rendering their decision, "[t]he panels receive[d] written
and oral submissions from the parties [and] prepare[d] findings of fact." Id.
83
Oliver Long, Law and its Limitations in the GATT Multilateral Trade System 47 (1985).
"While some of the codes are modeled more [or] less after the general regime established in the
Understanding of 1979 (Codes on Technical Barriers to Trade, Government Procurement and Customs
Valuation), others include a more detailed regulation (Codes on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties, and
Anti-[D]umping). One includes specific norms but also refers to the general provisions of Article XXIII
and those of the Understanding of 1979 (Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft). Another refers
completely to the general regime (Code on Import Licensing Procedures) . . . [T]wo agreements ... do not
contain any provisions dealing with dispute settlement (Agreement on Bovine Meat and the International
Dairy Agreement), thus leaving the general regime to apply." Montana i Mora, supra note 75, at 124 n. 93
(citations omitted).
85
Claudio Cocuzza & Andrea Forabosco, Are States Relinquishing their Sovereign Rights? The
GATT Dispute Settlement Process in a Globalized Economy, 4 Tul. J. Inti & Comp. L. 161, 164 (1996).
For the following, see Davey, supra note 69, at 81-89; Robert E. Hudec, The FTA Provisions on
Dispute Settlement: The Lessons of the GATT Experience, in Understanding the Free Trade Agreement,
supra note 33, 31, 37-42; Kendall W. Stiles, The New WTO Regime: The Victory of Pragmatism, 4 J.
Int'l L. & Prac. 3, 7-9 (1995); Ivo Van Bael, The GATT Dispute Settlement Procedure, 22:4 J. World
Trade 67, 71-73 (1988); John H. Weeks, Procedures for Dispute Settlement under the World Trade
20
( 1
)
as a result of the requirement of unanimity in the Council a party could easily block
or at least delay the establishment of a panel;
(2) the adoption of the panel report could be blocked or delayed;
(3) there were no time limits during the panel process;
(4) there was basically no mechanism to survey the implementation of the panel reports,
and at the end of 1994 compliance with the reports was less that 60 percent;
(5) the system of sanctioning a country in the case of non-compliance with the panel
87
report did not work ;
(6) the quality and neutrality of panel members was sometimes of questionable value;
(7) panel reports were sometimes ambiguous and inconsistent;
(8) the Tokyo Round led to a fragmentation or "balkanization" of the law, so that several
resolution procedures existed and a party was able to do "panel shopping", trying to
obtain a desired result rather than an impartial and neutral panel decision.
Some deficiencies were corrected by the 1989 "Improvements Decision"
,
but the
situation was far from satisfactory, and the prevailing party could still not be sure that a
successful complaint would make the losing party change its behavior.
It was mainly left to the Uruguay Round to improve the dispute mechanism. During
the negotiations, the EU favored a pragmatic approach: a regime more based on
negotiations and compromise. At the same time, the U.S. wanted a more legalistic, rule-
Organization — GATT 1994 and under Chapter 19 of the North American Free Trade Agreement, 18
HamlineL. Rev. 343(1995).
87
Only once a trade sanction was formally approved (Netherlands Measures of Suspension of
Obligation to the United States, Nov. 8, 1952, GATT B.I.S.D. (1st Supp.) at 32 (1953)).
88
Decision on Improvements to the GATT Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedures, April 12, 1989,
GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 61 (1990). See Erwin P. Eichmann, Procedural Aspects of GATT Dispute
Settlement: Moving towards Legalism, 8 Int'l Tax & Bus. Law. 38 (1990); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The
Mid-Term Review Agreements of the Uruguay Round and the 1989 Improvements to the GATT Dispute
Settlement Procedures, 32 Ger. Y.B. Int'l L. 280 (1989).
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based system
89
. It is noteworthy that the GATT 1947 Articles XXII and XXIII still
remain the legal basis for dispute settlement in the WTO90 , but they are "silent as to
which approach, adjudication or negotiation, might be appropriate"91 . In the end the U.S.
was successful, and this is why the new DSU is much more adjudicatory than the GATT
1 947 system .
2. Innovations by the WTO Treaty
a) The New DSU
The new Dispute Settlement Understanding, that is part of the basic framework of
the WTO, sets up an elaborate regime of provisions still built upon the GATT Articles
XXII and XXIII.
9
This mechanism "is a central element in providing security and
89
Philip A. Akakwam, The Standard of Review in the 1994 Antidumping Code: Circumscribing the
Role of GATT Panels in Reviewing National Antidumping Determinations, 5 Minn. J. Global Trade, 277,
284-85 (1996); Montana i Mora, supra note 75, at 128-36.
For the pro-legalists view, see Davey, in Handbook (Part One), supra note 10, at 75-77; John H.
Jackson & William J. Davey, Legal Problems of International Economic Relations 2, 282 (Supp. 1986);
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Constitutional Functions and Constitutional Problems of International Economic
Law 221-44 (1991); Harold H. Koh, The Legal Markets of International Trade: A Perspective on the
Proposed Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, 12 Yale J. Inti L. 193, 196-97 (1987).
For the pro-pragmatists view, see Long, supra note 83, at 88; David K. Tarullo, Logic, Myth and
International Economic Order, 26 Harv. Int'l L. J. 533 (1985); Philip R. Trimble, International Trade and
the "Rule of Law", 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1016, 1017 (1985).
90
DSU, Art. 3 (1). The GATT 1994 Articles XXII and XXIII still are the same as in GATT 1947.
91
Thomas J. Dillon, Jr., The World Trade Organization: A New Legal Order for World Trade?, 16
Mich. J. Int'l L. 349, 395 (1995); see also Davey, in Handbook (Part One), supra note 10, at 75-76.
92
Young, supra note 74, at 391
.
93
DSU, Art. 3(1). See also supra n. 70 & 71 . Art. XXIII enumerates the three situations when a party
can initiate the dispute settlement procedures. GATT 1947, Art. XXIII.
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predictability to the multilateral trading system". Its aim is to reestablish credibility of
the member states into the WTO conflict resolution process.95
(1) A Single Procedure
One major improvement is that member states have to follow only one settlement
procedure once a conflict arises with regard to the covered agreements. The exclusivity
of the system leads to more coherence because "panel shopping" is abolished
98
, and
there is no uncertainty in determining the applicable procedure. However, it seems
impossible to centralize the procedures completely because some covered agreements
contain altering provisions. Nevertheless, the general rules will control the majority of
the conflicts. Interestingly, the Understanding encourages parties to resort to binding
arbitration as an "alternative means of dispute resolution".
It has been observed that "unilateral action undermines the multilateral basis of the
WTO [because i]t challenges the WTO's credibility and encourages other countries to
94
DSU, Art. 3 (2).
95
Jackson, in Stewart, The WTO, supra note 54, at 15. See also Rules-Based Dispute Settlement
Called Useless without Enforcement, 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 30, at 1267 (July 26, 1995).
The DSU covers the multi- and plurilateral agreements listed in its Appendix 1. DSU, Art. 1 (1).
97
Pescatore, in Handbook (Part Two), supra note 69, at 30.
98
Backes, supra note 69, at 917.
99
Azar M. Khansari, Searching for the Perfect Solution: International Dispute Resolution and the
New World Trade Organization, 20 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 183, 190 (1996),
100
Edwin Vermulst & Bart Driessen, An Overview of the WTO Dispute Settlement System and its
Relationship with the Uruguay Round Agreements, 29:2 J. World Trade 131, 138 (1995).
A list of the provisions derogating from the general rules is found in Appendix 2 to the DSU.
Missing in the list are Art. 64 of the TRIPS Agreement and Art. 7 (3) of the Textiles Agreement. Vermulst
& Driessen, supra note 100, at 138 n. 33 & 139 n. 34.
102
Vermulst & Driessen, supra note 100, at 139.
103
DSU, Art. 25.
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act unilaterally as well." Therefore, the Understanding directs the member states to
refrain from any unilateral action in connection with measures infringing rights under the
WTO agreements, and instead requires them to resort always to the DSU proceedings. 105
(2) The Dispute Settlement Body
The drafters of the Understanding agreed to establish a Dispute Settlement Body
(DSB) being responsible for administering the rules and procedures of the DSU, for
establishing panels, adopting panel and Appellate Body reports, surveying the
implementation of rulings and recommendation and for allowing disciplinary action in
the case of non-complying member states. It is the General Council that meets also as
DSB, but the DSB has its own chairman and rules of procedures. 1 1 Therefore, an
I no
"integrated system' is created. The Understanding has the same legal authority as the
104
Tracy M. Abels, The World Trade Organization's First Test: The United States-Japan Auto
Dispute, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 467, 469 (1996).
105
DSU, Art. 23.
Authors have noted that the DSU Article 23 is especially directed against Section 301, the "probably
most effective unilateral trade sanction" of the U.S. See Backes, supra note 69, at 11-12; Lowenfeld, supra
note 54, at 481.
For the relation between Section 301 and the DSU, see Abels, supra note 104, at 483-526; William J.
Aceves, Lost Sovereignty? The Implications of the Uruguay Round Agreements, 19 Fordham Int'l L.J.
427, 439 (1995); Richard O. Cunningham & Clint N. Smith, Section 301 and Dispute Settlement in the
World Trade Organization, in Stewart, The WTO, supra note 10, at 581-612; Susana Hernandez Puente,
Section 301 and the New WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, 2 ILSA J. Int'l & Comp. L. 213
(1995); Jared R. Silverman, Multilateral Resolution over Unilateral Retaliation: Adjudicating the Use of
Section 301 before the WTO, 17 U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. 233 (1996); C. O'Neal Taylor, The Limits of
Economic Power: Section 301 and the World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement System, 30 Vand. J.
Transnat'lL. 209(1997).
106
DSU, Art. 2(1).
107 WTO Agreement, Art. IV (3).
108
Cocuzza and Forabosco, supra note 85, at 27.
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WTO Agreement itself, while the whole dispute resolution process is woven into the
organic structure of the WTO. 109
(3) The "Negative" Consensus
Another important attempt to speed up the settlement procedure involves the
principle of "negative consensus". All decisions in the WTO are still taken by
consensus, but "the idea of consensus applies to the DSB in a vastly different
manner". A decision is deemed to be adopted by the DSB unless its members decide
by consensus not to adopt the decision. This "most radical innovation" has already
been hailed as an "ingenious solution" and "perhaps the most important advantage" 115
to prevent a party from blocking the decision making process.
109
Pescatore, in Handbook (Part Two), supra note 69, at 29.
Jackson, in Stewart, The WTO, supra note 54, at 14. It is also called "reverse" or "inverse
consensus". See Dillon, supra note 91, at 373. One author even refers to it as the "consensus to overrule".
G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade
Organization, 44 Duke L.J. 829, 901 (1995).
Reitz, supra note 72, at 585. The introduction of the majority vote would have politicized the
complete dispute settlement process. Jeffrey M. Waincymer, Revitalizing GATT Article XXIII-Issues in
the Context of the Uruguay Round, 12:1 World Competition 5, 42-43 (1988).
1 12
DSU, Art. 6(1), 16 (4), 17 (14), 22 (6). If a member formally objects to the proposed decision, the
majority vote is introduced with one vote for each member. World Trade Without Barriers (Vol. 1), supra
note 5, at 373-74.
Cocuzza & Forabosco, supra note 85, at 168.
114
Reitz, supra note 72, at 585.
Dillon, supra note 91, at 378.
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(4) The Appellate Body
Finally, "perhaps the most definitive move in the direction of legalism"
116
is the
creation of a standing Appellate Body ~ a "unique and unprecedented institution in
I i o
international trade". Aiming at "broadly [representing] the membership in the WTO",
it is composed of seven "persons of recognized authority, with demonstrated expertise in
law, international trade and the subject matter of the covered agreements generally [, and]
i in
unaffiliated with any government". The members are appointed for a four year
term
120
, and, unlike the panel phase, the disputing parties cannot choose who is sitting on
a case. Based on rotation, three of the seven members will hear a case. " The working
procedures that are to be drawn up contain the schedule determining who will serve.
Young, supra note 74, at 403. The establishment of the Appellate Body is even seen as a
"significant step toward the creation of an international legal tribunal of trade." Dillon, supra note 91, at
379.
117
DSU, Art. 17.
1 18
Jeffrey M. Lang, Full Committee Hearing on the World Trade Organization, Federal News
Service, June 10, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLNEWS File.
1 19
DSU, Art. 17 (3). Prof. Lowenfeld made interesting deliberations concerning the quality of the
Appellate Body members noting that "[t]he whole concept may well stand or fall on the skill and prestige
of the first generation of members of the Appellate Body." Lowenfeld, supra note 54, at 484-85. By the
same token, Prof. Nichols predicted that "the Appellate Body will become a focal point for scrutiny of the
World Trade Organization." Nichols, supra note 16, at 453 (citations omitted). See also Reitz, supra note
72, at 602.
"The [Appellate Body] was constituted in December 1995, and it took up its function forthwith with
the assistance of a small Secretariat . . . The criterion of 'broadly representative' was met by appointing
persons from the following [m]ember [s]tates (in alphabetical order): Egypt, Germany (European Union),
Japan, New Zealand, Philippines, Uruguay, United States of America." Pescatore, in Handbook (Part
Two), supra note 69, at 36 n. 57.
120
DSU, Art. 17(2).
121
For the panel phase, see infra n. 142-46.
122
DSU, Art. 17(1).
123
DSU, Art. 17 (1) & (9). The Appellate Body establishes the working procedures in consultation
with the DSB Chairman and the Director-General. DSU, Art. 17 (9).
26
Inspired by common law systems 1 4
,
the Appellate Body reexamines the case with
regard only to ''issues of law . . . and legal interpretations"'
125
,
and not of fact. 126
As the decisions are now adopted "quasi-automatically" 127
,
it became necessary to
128
provide for a review mechanism. One might even say that the Appellate Body has
been created in order to "compensate for the loss of a party's ability to block or delay
implementation of panel reports".
It is very likely that the quality of the panel reports will improve. One has to bear
in mind the stability of the Appellate Body and the limitation of its competence on legal
issues, so that it must be able to build up a corpus of decisions assuring consistency in
WTO jurisdiction and guiding the panels.
124
Montana i Mora, supra note 75, at 150.
125
DSU,Art. 17(4)&(6).
The distinction between questions of law and questions of fact is not always obvious. Croley &
Jackson, supra note 52, at 195; Lowenfeld, supra note 54, at 483-84.
127
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The Dispute Settlement System of the World Trade Organization and
the Evolution of the GATT Dispute Settlement System since 1948, 31 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 1157, 1208
(1994).
128
John H. Barton & Barry E. Carter, International Law and Institutions for a New Age, 81 Geo. L.J.
535, 549-50 (1993); Lowenfeld, supra note 54, at 483.
129
Weeks, supra note 86. See also Jackson, in Stewart, The WTO, supra note 54, at 14. It seems that
(only) in a few cases the loosing party blocked the adoption of the report in the Council because of an
erroneous panel decision. Stoll, supra note 69, at 275 (citing Robert E. Hudec, Dispute Settlement, in
Completing the Uruguay Round: A Results-Oriented Approach to the GATT Trade Negotiations 180,
183 (Jeffrey J. Schott ed., 1990)).
Horlick & DeBusk, supra note 33, at 40 (assuming that panelists will prepare better reports when
they know of the possibility of appealing the decision).
Reitz, supra note 72, at 584; Edwin Vermulst & Bart Driessen, supra note 100, at 145.
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b) Legalistic Procedure
Beside the establishment of new institutions detailed procedural provisions are laid
down in the DSU in order to strengthen the settlement regime. Also, a tight time
schedule for each of the different phases ensures "greater transparency and likelihood of
132
success" for the settlement process.
(1) Consultations
When a member state alleges that the operation of any covered agreement is affected
by another member's measure, it requests consultations and notifies the DSB. 133 The
language employed by the DSU makes it clear that consultations are to be taken
seriously and "not simply exist as a formality before the establishment of a panel."
134
Interestingly, the drafters of the DSU did not favor an adjudicative decision at all costs,
but "a solution mutually acceptable to the parties to a dispute." By the same token, the
Aceves, supra note 105, at 439.
DSU, Art. 4 (2) & (4). In order to limit misuse, the DSU provides that "before bringing a case, a
[mjember shall exercise its judgment as to whether action under these procedures would be fruitful. The
aim of the dispute settlement mechanism is to secure a positive solution to a dispute." DSU, Art. 3 (7).
134
Dillon, supra note 91, at 380 (1995). To ensure that the consultation phase is in fact taken
seriously, the Understanding states that "[m]embers affirm their resolve to strengthen and improve the
effectiveness of the consultation process . . . [Also e]ach [m]ember undertakes to accord sympathetic
consideration to and afford adequate opportunity for consultation regarding the representations made by
another [m]ember" in view of any measure that could affect the operation of any covered agreement.
DSU, Art. 4 (1) & (2). Members do take advantage of the possibility to consult, because "[m]ore disputes
are being resolved by the parties themselves, even in cases already far advanced in the WTO dispute-
settlement process". Several Disputes resolved "out of court", Focus: WTO Newsletter, Aug./Sept. 1996,
at 4 (Information and Media Relations Division of the WTO publ.). A list showing the cases settled by
consultation is found at World Trade Organization, Overview of the State-of-play of WTO Disputes
(visited on April 27, 1997) <http://www.wto.org/wto/dispute/bulletin.htm>.
135
DSU, Art. 3 (7). See also DSU, Art. 12 (7).
28
DSU provides for the end of the conflict at any time during the procedure whenever the
parties agree on a solution.
The Understanding suggests other ways of non-adjudicatory conflict resolution such
as good offices, conciliation, and mediation, all of which may be offered by the Director-
General ex officio. However, if a member does not reply to a consultation request
within 10 days, if it does not begin consultations within 30 days, or if the dispute is not
settled by consultations within 60 days, the complaining party can ask the DSB to
establish a panel. In urgent cases, such as in those involving perishable goods, the
time frame is shorter.
(2) Panel Phase
When the Dispute Settlement Body is asked by the complaining party to establish of
a panel, it will decide the issue by "negative" consensus. As a result of this voting
mode, the complaining party practically obtains a "right to a panel."
41
The DSU
DSU, Art. 3 (6) (emphasis added). To underline this principle the Understanding directs the panels
to "give [the disputing parties] adequate opportunity to develop a mutually satisfactory solution." DSU,
Art. 11.
DSU, Art. 5. Good offices, conciliation, and mediation are some of the traditional ways of settling
disputes in the area of international law. Rainer Lagoni, Volkerrecht, Teil 1 : Allgemeine Lehren und
besondere Gebiete [International Law, Part I: General Doctrines and specific Fields] 55-56 (W. Mauke
Sonne publ., Hamburg 1994).
Pescatore pointed out that "[n]o confusion should be admitted between good offices, conciliation and
mediation, on the one hand, and 'consultation' on the other. Consultation is a mandatory prerequisite for
the opening of contentious proceedings. Good offices, conciliation and mediation ... are optional
measures of amicable settlement." Pescatore, in Handbook (Part Two), supra note 69, at 39.
no
DSU, Art. 4 (3) & (7).
139
In urgent cases a request for consultations must be answered within 10 days, and disputes must be
settled within 20 days. DSU, Art. 4 (8). If the complaint is directed against a developing country member,
the parties can agree on extending these time limits. DSU, Art. 12(10).
140
DSU, Art. 6.
141
Backes, supra note 69, at 917.
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stipulates that the panel is to be established at the DSB meeting following the one in
which the request was made. 142 The Secretariat holds a list of "well-qualified
governmental and/or non-governmental individuals" from which the panelists are chosen
by the disputing parties upon proposal of the Secretariat.
143
The qualification
requirement obviously aims at increasing the quality as well as the authority of panel
reports. As under GATT a panel is usually made up of three persons, unless the parties
to the dispute demand five panelists. If the parties cannot agree within 20 days on
whom to appoint, the Director-General will choose the panelists after being requested to
do so by either party.
14
Therefore, the parties lose another possibility to block the
process.
142
DSU, Art. 6.
143
DSU, Art. 8(1), (4) & (6). The "well-qualified individuals" that sit on a panel include "persons
who have served on or presented a case to a panel, served as a representative of a [m]ember of a
contracting party to GATT 1947 or as a representative to the Council or Committee of any covered
agreement or its predecessor agreement, or in the Secretariat, taught or published on international trade
law or policy, or served as a senior trade policy official of a [m]ember." DSU, Art. 8(1).
The panelists are supposed to be selected "with a view to ensuring . . a sufficiently diverse
background and a wide spectrum of experience" and should not interfere with the independence of the
panel. DSU, Art. 8 (2) Consequently, panelists who are not citizens of the disputing nations are clearly
preferred. DSU, Art. 8 (3).
If one of the parties is a developing country and it requests so, one of the panelists must be also a
citizen of a developing country. DSU, Art. 8(10).
144
Khansari, supra note 99, at 192. The panel process is laid out in DSU, Art. 12.
145
DSU, Art. 8 (5). The request for a five-member panel has to be made "within 10 days from the
establishment of the panel". Id. "Experience shows that three panelists can function more efficiently than
five . . . [But] the input of five members during deliberations may be more effective in resolving the
dispute to the satisfaction of all." World Trade Without Barriers (Vol. 1), supra note 5, at 380.
146
DSU, Art. 8 (7). The parties are supposed to reject proposals for panelists only for "compelling
reasons". DSU, Art. 8 (6). In case of disagreement on the panelists, the Director-General consults with the
Chairman of the DSB and the Chairman of the Council or Committee involved for whom to choose. DSU,
Art. 8 (7).
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It may occur that more than one member requests a panel regarding the same issue.
In this case, the DSU recommends the establishment of only one panel. In attempting
to "eliminate drawn-out disputes over the terms of reference" 148
,
the Understanding
provides for compulsory Terms of Reference if the parties cannot agree on special
terms. Also, as a result of the past experience under the GATT, the DSU lays down a
very detailed panel process which is "marked by legalistic underpinnings." 150 The
Understanding requires the complete panel phase to be completed within 6 months.
151
This time frame is limited to 3 months in cases of urgency, and it may exceptionally be
extended up 9 months.
As the panel's function is to assist the DSB in discharging its responsibilities, the
panel is required to objectively assess the case with regard to the facts as well as the
legal issues involved, and to make other findings that support the DSB in making the
appropriate rulings or recommendations. A panel is not allowed to interpret any of the
provisions of the covered agreements. During its examination of the case, the panel
follows detailed "Working Procedures". After fixing the time table the panelists
receive the parties' submissions, hear their arguments, and, if necessary, request
147
DSU, Art. 9.
148
Young, supra note 74, at 402.
149
DSU, Art. 7.
Khansari, supra note 99, at 192.
151
DSU, Art. 12(8).
DSU, Art. 12 (8) & (9). The DSB must be informed by the panel about the reasons of the delay.
DSU, Art. 12(9).
153
DSU, Art. 11.
154
"The Ministerial Conference and the General Council shall have the exclusive authority to adopt
interpretations" of the covered agreements. WTO Agreement, Art. DC (2) (emphasis added).
Appendix 3 to the Understanding contains model Working Procedures that have to be followed if
the panel does not decide otherwise. DSU, Art. 12 (1). These Working Procedures also contain a proposed
time table for panel work. DSU Appendix 3(12).
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information from any source. 6 In this context, the DSU provides that the reports of
experts or committees, established under some of the agreements, may or, in some cases,
shall be considered. Also, the Understanding instructs the panel to hear the arguments
of any member who is substantially interested in the matter . Nevertheless, the panel
deliberates confidentially and drafts the report in absence of the parties. 159
An interim report containing the facts and parties' arguments as well as the panel's
own findings and conclusions is issued to the parties for discussion with the panel. If
not misused for interfering with panel's internal working, the interim review stage
"surely will constitute an incentive to more responsible reasoning and a guarantee
against unpredictable arguments" , because the parties get another, final chance to
DSU, Art. 12 (3)-(6) & 13. More specifically, the procedural stage involving the parties consists
of the following steps: first, the parties will submit their written submission, then have a first meeting
with the panel for oral presentations, then submit written rebuttals, and finally meet the panel a second
time. DSU, Art. 12 (6) and Appendix 3 (4)-(10).
The provision stipulating that the panels have the "right to seek information . . . from any individual
or body" seems far-reaching, but one has to bear in mind that "the right to seek information is not the
same as the right to get information." World Trade Without Barriers (Vol. 1), supra note 5, at 393.
DSU, Art. 13 (2); see Art. 11 (2) of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Photosanitary Measures; Art. 14 (2)-(4) of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade; Art. 19 (3) &
(4) of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
1994 (Customs Valuation); Art. 4.5 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. Annex
IV of the DSU includes rules for the establishment of an expert review group and the procedures of its
operation.
For a description of the use of experts in the proceedings, see Vermulst & Driessen, supra note 100,
at 131-34.
158
DSU, Art. 10.
159
DSU, Art. 14. For information regarding the confidentiality of information given by an expert
review group, see DSU Appendix 4 (5).
160
DSU, Art. 15(1)&(2).
Pescatore, in Handbook (Part Two), supra note 69, at 35-36. Pescatore feared that "[t]he 'interim
review' . . . would constitute an outright intervention into the panel's independence." Letter from Pierre
Pescatore to Kenneth W. Abbott, quoted in Kenneth W. Abbott, The Uruguay Round and Dispute
Resolution: Building a Private-Interests System of Justice, 1992 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. Ill, 134 & n. 122.
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argue before the panel.
1 The quality of the panel and its acceptance would surely be
enhanced.
Under the condition that no party requests a (third) meeting with the panel in time
for commenting on the interim report, it becomes final and will be circulated to each
member. 164 After considering the final report, the DSB adopts it between 20 and 60 days
after its issuance to the members unless either one of the disputing parties notifies the
DSB of its decision to appeal or the DSB decides by consensus against adoption. 165 The
DSB is not empowered to change the reports' contents in any way. 1 The only
possibilities are acceptance or refusal.
(3) Appeal
An appeal has to be filed by a party to the dispute, whereas third party members do
not have the right to appeal. However, their statements are considered by the
Appellate Body. There is a strict time limit with regard to the proceedings. Normally,
the period is 60 days, but in no case it is more than 90 days. Like the panel's, the
1 62
David S. Huntington, Symposium on the North American Free Trade Agreement: Settling
Disputes under the North American Free Trade Agreement, 34 Harv. Int'l L.J. 407, 422 (1993).
Abbott, supra note 161, at 135.
164
DSU, Art. 15(2).
165
DSU, Art. 16.
Reitz, supra note 72, at 582.
DSU, Art. 17 (4). This restriction enhances the similarity of the panel proceedings with a tribunal
procedure. Vermulst & Driessen, supra note 100, at 144.
DSU, Art. 17 (4). As in the panel phase, the condition for a third party to make written
submissions and to be heard by the Appellate Body is to have a "substantial interest in the matter". Id.
DSU, Art. 17 (5). The period is counted from the day the disputing party notifies the DSB of its
decision to appeal until the day the Appellate Body circulates its report. Id. For some authors "these
deadlines seem unrealistic in view of the complex legal issues in many proceedings." Vermulst &
Driessen, supra note 100, at 146. See also Backes, supra note 69, at 917.
33
Appellate Body's proceedings are confidential, and the report is drafted without the
presence of the parties.
170
The panel report is written unanimously, and yet the Appellate
Body members may express individual opinions — a tradition found in common law
countries. It has been feared that including individual opinions weakens the
''authoritative force of the reports." However, these opinions are anonymous 1 so that
an Appellate Body member cannot be accused of being biased, and "passive
manipulation" with regard to composing the Appellate Body panels will not take
place.
1 4
The Appellate Body, in contrast to the DSB, has the power to "uphold, modify
or reverse the legal findings and conclusions of the panel"
17
, but it may not remand the
case.
176
The Appellate Body report is adopted without amendments unless the DSB votes
by consensus to the contrary within 30 days after the report's circulation to the member
i 177
states.
(4) Implementation and Enforcement of Decisions
If the panel or the Appellate Body find that the measure in question is consistent
with the agreements, and the DSB decides the same way, the complaint will be
,70
DSU,Art. 17(10).
171
DSU,Art. 17(11).
Montana i Mora, supra note 75, at 152.
,73
DSU,Art. 17(11).
174
Dillon, supra note 91, at 386. An active manipulation of the composition of the Appellate Body
panels is not possible since their members are not chosen by the parties. DSU, Art. 17(1). Nevertheless, a
party is allowed "to time its appeal, within provided limitations, to coincide with the next rotation of
Appellate Body members." Dillon, supra note 91, at 386.
175
DSU, Art. 17(13).
The exclusion of remanding a case is a unique limitation that does not exist in any other
"multitiered system of legal decision making." Lowenfeld, supra note 54, at 484.
177
DSU, Art. 17(14).
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I TO
rejected. In case of an offending measure, the panel or Appellate Body conclude their
reports by recommending the accused member state bring the measure into conformity
with the concerned agreement and proposing how to implement the recommendation. 179
After the DSB has adopted the report, a well laid-out system with respect to
implementation and sanctions applies. As a majority of problems faced under the GATT
1947 dispute resolution mechanism were connected with the unwillingness of the parties
to comply with the reports , three entire articles of the DSU contain stipulations related
181 /* • • •
to this question. A new feature introduced in this context is the surveillance of the
1 82
implementation by the DSB. Under the old system practically no institution observed
• 183
whether the members complied with the recommendations and rulings. Therefore, the
DSB will review the implementation after a six month period and continuously thereafter
until the issue is completely resolved.
The Understanding favors the withdrawal of the inconsistent measure as the best
solution. It emphasizes that the effectiveness of the dispute settlement system depends
essentially on the "[p]rompt compliance with recommendations or rulings of the
178
Cocuzza & Forabosco, supra note 85, at 181 (citing DSU, Art. 3). In case of a rejection, unilateral
retaliatory actions of the member states are foreclosed. DSU, Art. 23; see also supra p. 23 n. 105.
179
DSU, Art. 19 (1). For non-violation complaints, specific procedures have been introduced; the
panels and the Appellate Body are authorized to recommend only a "mutually satisfactory adjustment."
DSU, Art. 26.
180
See GATT Dispute Settlement Stymied by Non-Implementation of Reports, Focus: GATT
Newsletter, May-June 1991, at 1, 12-13 (Information and Media Relations Division of GATT publ.);
Dispute Panels Jump from 1 to 11, Focus: GATT Newsletter, Nov.-Dec. 1991, at 1 (Information and
Media Relations Division ofGATT publ.).
181
The problem of implementation and sanctions is treated by DSU, Art. 21-23.
DSU, Art. 21(6).
183
Lowenfeld, Preface to Handbook (Part One), supra note 10, at viii; Young, supra note 74, at 404.
184
DSU, Art. 21 (6).
DSU, Art. 3 (7).
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DSB." The member is therefore given 30 days after the adoption of the report to notify
the DSB if it intends to implement the recommendations and rulings. If an immediate
compliance is not practical, a "reasonable period of time" not exceeding 1 5 months from
1 ftft
the date of the establishment of the panel shall be granted. If it is unclear whether the
measures undertaken to comply with the report are satisfying, a second procedure under
the DSU shall be initiated, preferably with the original panel.
The Understanding notes that "neither compensation nor the suspension of
concessions or other obligations is preferred to full implementation of a recommendation
to bring a measure into conformity with the covered agreement." However, if the
country does not comply with the report within the given time, a graded scheme of
sanctions will apply. As a first possibility the disputing parties may agree on the
186
DSU, Art. 21(1).
187
DSU, Art. 21(3).
188
DSU, Art. 21 (3). The 15 months period may be extended subject to an agreement between the
disputing parties. Id.
Three alternative ways exist to determine the "reasonable period of time": first, the member
concerned proposes it; if this proposal is not approved by the DSB the disputing parties try to agree on it;
if an agreement cannot be reached, binding arbitration will be the last resort. Id. One author has observed
correctly that the notion "reasonable period of time" is all but precise. Backes, supra note 69, at 917.
in
DSU, Art. 21(5).
190
DSU, Art. 22(1)
191
DSU, Art. 22.
From an economical view point, imposing sanctions has questionable value because "generally
everyone loses when a nation takes retaliatory action. Retaliation will never be the rule, only the exception
to the rule. A single cycle of retaliation and counter-retaliations is enough to demonstrate an
administration's political resolve, but also to incur substantial economic harm." Judith H. Bello & Alan F.
Holmer, U.S. Trade Law and Policy Series No. 24: Dispute Resolution in the New World Trade
Organization: Concerns and Net Benefits, 28 Int'l Law. 1095, 1103 (1994). Also noteworthy is the
outcome of the only GATT panel decision that allowed retaliation (see n. 87). In 1947, the Netherlands
were authorized to impose a 60,000-ton quota on flour from the USA, but it feared that the price of bread
would increase and took no action. World Trade Without Barriers (Vol. 1), supra note 5, at 377-78.
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payment of compensation. The Understanding states that compensation is voluntary 192
,
meaning that a country cannot be forced to pay it. However, almost nothing is said about
the nature or measure of compensation.
1
The parties have 20 days to reach a
satisfactory agreement regarding compensation, otherwise the DSB can be requested to
authorize the suspension of concessions or other obligations under the covered
agreement.
1
The DSB has 30 days to decide the issue by "negative" consensus which
means that retaliatory measures are introduced almost automatically.
1
The suspension
should first be sought in the same sector in which the inconsistency was found. If this
seems unpractical or ineffective, the suspension with regard to other sectors should be
1 9 ft
considered. If the complainant believes this to be insufficient, concessions or other
obligations under another covered agreement can be suspended. Of course, the level of
suspension must be equivalent to the level of the original nullification or impairment.
20
Whenever a dispute arises in terms of the level or scope of suspension, an arbitrator shall
192
DSU, Art. 22(1).
193
Reitz, supra note 72, at 590.
194
DSU, Art. 22 (2).
195
DSU, Art. 22 (6).
One author spoke of the creation of "a regime of 'retaliation at request'." Montana i Mora, supra
note 75, at 156.
197
DSU, Art. 22 (3)(a).
198
DSU, Art. 22 (3)(b).
199
DSU, Art. 22 (3)(c). When the complaining party considers in which sector it will suspend
concessions and other obligations, it "shall take into account:
(i) the trade in the sector or under the agreement under which the panel or Appellate Body has found
a violation or other nullification or impairment, and the importance of such trade to that party;
(ii) the broader economic elements related to the nullification or impairment and the broader
economic consequences of the suspension of concessions or other obligations." DSU, Art. 22 (3)(d).
The suspension of concessions or other obligations in other sectors is known as "cross-retaliation".
Pescatore, in Handbook (Part Two), supra note 69, at 37.
200
DSU, Art. 22 (4).
37
examine the question within 60 days." Retaliatory measures are considered only
temporary until the inconsistent measure has been removed or a "mutually satisfactory
solution is reached."
202
3. Criticism and Reform Proposals
Even authors who think that the more rule-oriented approach of the DSU is a step in
the right direction have already expressed their discontent with some stipulations and
have come up with suggestions on how to improve the dispute settlement system. 203 The
major ones will be discussed below.
Professor Jackson has claimed that the process is too secret and it should become
more transparent. Likewise, it has been stated that the confidentiality of the
proceedings is not favored by "many groups whose interests are immediately and
directly affected by . . . decisions" of the DSB (as an example discussions after decisions
involving environmental matters are cited).
A second point of criticism is the fact that no DSU provision determines any
condition of admissibility to the Appellate Body. In order to "discourage frivolous
DSU, Art. 22 (6). The arbitrators are either the original panel or an individual or group appointed
by the Director-General. Id.
202
DSU, Art. 22 (8).
203
See Bhala, supra note 42, at 145-46; Jackson, in Stewart, The WTO, supra note 54, at 14-16;
Dillon, supra note 91, at 399-402; Khansari, supra note 99, at 195-197; Montana i Mora, supra note 75, at
176-180; Reitz, supra note 72, at 598-600; Young, supra note 74, at 406-09. See also Alan Wm. Wolff &
John A. Ragosta, How the Uruguay Round will change the Practice of International Trade Law in the
United States: Two Views, View One, in Stewart, The WTO, supra note 10, 695,701-710.
204
Jackson, in Stewart, The WTO, supra note 54, at 14.
Young, supra note 74, at 406-07. Conversely one author argued that "[i]t is difficult to conceive
that serious issues of state economic policy between countries can best be resolved in a public forum."
World Trade Without Barriers (Vol. 1), supra note 5, at 394.
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appeals" (appeals without substantive reason), which would result in an overload of
work for the Appellate Body delaying the adoption of the reports, a minimum threshold
should be established.
Another objection concerns the system of sanctions. It is questionable to what extent
compliance with the panel and Appellate Body rulings and recommendations can be
enforced. Termination of infringing measures is, of course, more desirable than the
introduction of retaliation. Furthermore, the retaliatory measures only work effectively
when member states of similar economic power are involved.210 In order to effectively
render a claim of a small and poorer country against a large and wealthier country, it has
been suggested that the WTO itself should be authorized to bring complaints and enforce
them.
The extent to which the aforementioned issues will be debated on the political level
in the near future is unclear. A result of "the judicialization of the dispute settlement
system is that it will be much more difficult to reach an agreement on the substantive
212
rules." Pursuant to a Ministerial Decision, the Dispute Settlement Understanding is
subject to review within four years after the entry into force of the WTO. l
Dillon, supra note 91, at 385.
207
Id.; Cocuzza & Forabosco, supra note 85, at 1 79; Montana i Mora, supra note 75, at 1 5 1 . It is even
feared that the overload of work would finally lead to paralyzing the Appellate Body. Cocuzza &
Forabosco, id. Another author sees the danger in the to-date mechanism of being "likely to encourage
regular appeals, and therefore to weaken the panel authority." Lei Wang, Some Observations on the
Dispute Settlement System in the World Trade Organization, 29:2 J. World Trade 173, 178 (1995).
208
Young, supra note 74, at 407-08.
209
Lowenfeld, supra note 54, at 487.
Cocuzza & Forabosco, supra note 85, at 185; Khansari, supra note 99, at 196.
211
Dillon, supra note 91, at 400 (giving the example of a mosquito biting an elephant).
212
Montana i Mora, supra note 75, at 177.
213
Ministerial Decision on the Application and Review of the Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, April 15, 1994, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. at 1259.
CHAPTER III
THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
The North American Free Trade Agreement is "preeminently" a trade agreement.214
Its main purpose is the establishment of a free trade zone between Canada, Mexico and
the United States. 215 The agreement enumerates its objectives as the elimination of trade
barriers with respect to goods and services; the furthering of conditions of fair
competition; the extension of investment possibilities; the protection of intellectual
property rights; the creation of effective procedures concerning its implementation,
application, joint administration, and dispute settlement; and the set-up of a framework
for further cooperation. 216
1 . NAFTA Institutions
As the principal institution of the NAFTA, a Free Trade Commission (FTC)
consisting of trade ministers or their designees has been created. 217 It meets at least once
a year. 218 Among its functions are the supervision of the NAFTA' s implementation, its
further elaboration, and the resolution of disputes concerning interpretation or
214 Saunders, supra note 35, at 278.
215 NAFTA, Art. 101.
216 NAFTA, Art. 102 (1). Beside the "classical" areas of a trade agreement that are related to the trade
in goods the NAFTA also covers investment (Chapter 11), trade in services (Chapter 12),
telecommunications (Chapter 13), financial services (Chapter 14), and intellectual property (Chapter 18)
217 NAFTA, Art. 2001. For a detailed description of the institutions established under the NAFTA and
the Side Agreements, see J. Ernesto Grijalve and Patrick T. Brewer, Monitoring and Managing North
American Free Trade: The Administrative Bodies of the North American Free Trade Agreement, 2 San
Diego Just. J. 1 (1994).
2 " NAFTA, Art. 200 1(5).
39
40
application. 219 The Commission also establishes committees or working groups and
supervises them. 220 Decisions of the Commission are taken by consensus. 221 The FTC is
assisted by a Secretariat which also renders support to the Chapter 19 and Chapter 20
panels to settle disputes and the Extraordinary Challenge Committee. 222 The Secretariat is
composed of national sections, for which each member nation is responsible. 223
Outside the main agreement, the parties agreed to establish a North American
Secretariat in charge of coordinating the work of the NAFTA Secretariat's national
sections by, e.g., translating and archiving documents.224
2. The Side Agreements
After signing the NAFTA, the parties concluded the two Side Agreements on
Environmental Cooperation and Labor Cooperation which set up their own institutions.
The negotiation of these agreements became necessary when concerns were raised in the
U.S. that the NAFTA "would spur excessive environmental degradation and job loss". 225
119 NAFTA, Art. 2001 (1). Furthermore, the Commission "considers] any other matter that may effect
the operation of [the] Agreement." Id. NAFTA dispute resolution panels are bound by the FTC's
interpretations of the NAFTA provisions. Appleton, supra note 32, at 146.
220 Id. The committees and working groups that are established under different provisions of the
NAFTA are listed in Annex 2001.2.
"'NAFTA, Art. 2001 (4).
222 NAFTA, Art. 2002 (1) & (3). The Secretariat also supports the work of committees and working
groups established under the NAFTA. Id.
223 NAFTA, Art. 2002 (2).
224 Grijalve & Brewer, supra note 217, at 2, 4-5. "The North American Trade Secretariat . . . was
created ... at a meeting of the trade ministers at the first meeting of the FTC on January 4, 1994." Id. at 4.
225 Michael J. Kelly, Bringing a Complaint Under the NAFTA Environmental Side Accord: Difficult
Steps Under a Procedural Paper Tiger, but Movement in the Right Direction, 24 Pepp. L. Rev. 71, 72
(1996). See also Robert F. Housman, The Treatment of Labor and Environmental Issues in Future
Western Hemisphere Trade Liberalization Efforts, 10 Conn. J. Int'l L. 301, 304-08 (1995); C. O'Neal
Taylor, Fast Track, Trade Policy, and Free Trade Agreements: Why the NAFTA Turned into a Battle, 28
Geo. Wash. J. Inti L. & Econ. 1, 76-1 17(1994) (citations omitted).
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Environmentalists feared that Mexico would serve as a "pollution haven". 226 Workers
were concerned that the elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers, the liberalization of
investment rules, the low labor costs, and the lower labor and environmental standards
would result in a movement of U.S. capital towards Mexico and the loss of U.S. jobs. 227
Therefore, the Environmental and Labor Side Agreements "were instrumental in
securing passage of the NAFTA [in the United States]."228 At the same time, however,
Mexico feared that under a regime of free trade environmental and labor standards could
be used as a means of protectionism. 229
Both Side Agreements "do not contain labor or environmental norms; they
constitute legal process."230 One of their aims is to make the countries enforce their own
labor or environmental laws. 231 The concept underlying the agreements has generated
controversy. 232
226 Paulette L. Stenzel, Can NAFTA's Environmental Provisions Promote Sustainable Development?,
59 Alb. L. Rev. 423, 460-72 (1995) (citations omitted). See also Daniel B. Magraw, Jr., Trade
Agreements, C990 ALI-ABA 193, 195-99 (1995); Kevin W. Patton, Dispute Resolution under the North
American Commission on Environmental Cooperation, 5 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 87, 90-94 (1994)
227 Jorge F. Perez-Lopez & Eric Griego, The Labor Dimension of the NAFTA: Reflections on the
First Year, 12 Ariz. J. Inti & Comp. L. 473, 475 (1995) (citations omitted). See also Roy J. Adams &
Parbudyal Singh, Early Experience with NAFTA's Labour Side Accord, 18 Comp. Lab. L.J. 161-163
(1997); Karen Vossler Champion, Who Pays for Free Trade? The Dilemma of Free Trade and
International Labor Standards, 22 N.C. J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 181, 225-26 (1996); Robert E. Herzstein,
The Labor Cooperation Agreement among Mexico, Canada and the United States: Its Negotiations and
Prospects, 3 U.S.-Mex. L.J. 121-25 (1995); Sarah Lowe, The First American Case under the North
American Agreement for Labor Cooperation, 51 U. Miami L. Rev. 481, 487-90 (1997).
2J* Jorge A. Gonzalez, Jr., The North American Free Trade Agreement, 30 Inti Law. 345, 352 (1996).
229 Saunders, supra note 35, at 303.
230 Jack I. Garvey, Trade Law and Quality of Life -- Dispute Resolution under the NAFTA Side
Accords on Labor and the Environment, 89 Am. J. Inti L. 439, 440 (1995).
231 NAAEC, Art. 3, 5 & 6; NAALC, Art. 2-4. Under both agreements, the parties are directed to
ensure that their laws provide for high standards of environmental protection or for high labor standards,
respectively, and to strive for an improvement of those standards. NAAEC, Art. 2 & 3; NAALC, Art. 1 &
2. The agreements also provide for the exchange of information and cooperation between the parties.
NAAEC, Art. 1 & 10; NAALC, Art. 1, 10 & 11."This was the most that the member states, jealously
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a) The Environmental Side Agreement
The NAAEC stipulates the establishment of a Commission for Environmental
Cooperation made up of a Council, a Secretariat, and a Joint Public Advisory
Committee. 2" The Council, the governing body of the ECE, consists of "cabinet-level or
equivalent representatives". 234 It convenes at least once a year and, among other issues,
"address[es] questions and differences that may arise between the [p]arties regarding the
interpretation or application of [the] Agreement". 235 The Council arrives at its decisions
by consensus. 236 Assistance to the Council is provided by the Secretariat237 and advice by
the Joint Public Advisory Committee, which is composed of 15 members appointed in
equal numbers by the parties. 238
b) The Labor Side Agreement
A Commission for Labor Cooperation consisting of a Council and a Secretariat is set
up under the Labor Side Accord. 239 The Commission is governed by the Council, a body
safeguarding their own sovereign prerogatives, were willing to concede to each other." Darby, supra note
32, at 15.
"2 See Adams & Singh, supra note 227, at 162, 180-81; Noemi Gal-Or, Multilateral Trade and
Supranational Environmental Protection: The Grace Period of the CEC, or a Well-Defined Role?, 9 Geo.
Int'l. Envt'l. L. Rev. 53, 66-67, 77-78 (1996); Patton, supra note 226, at 114-15; Reisman & Wiedman,
supra note 55, at 30-34; Saunders, supra note 35, at 302-04.
» NAAEC, Art. 8.
""NAAEC, Art. 9(1), 10(1).
235 NAAEC, Art. 9 (3), 10 (l)(d). Some of the Council's responsibilities also include strengthening
the cooperation on the development and continuing improvement of environmental laws, observing the
implementation of the Agreement, and furthering the cooperation between the parties regarding
environmental matters. NAAEC, Art. 10 (l)(b) & (0, 10 (3).
* NAAEC, Art. 9 (6).
»7 NAAEC, Art. 11 (5).
»« NAAEC, Art. 16(1)&(4).
m NAALC, Art. 8.
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consisting of the labor ministers which convenes at least once a year. 240 As is true under
the Environmental Side Agreement, one of the Council's responsibilities is to address
disputes concerning the Agreement's interpretation and application. 241 Decision-making
is subject to consensus. 242 The Secretariat supports the Council in "exercising its
functions". 243 The Commission is assisted by National Administrative Offices (NAO),
which each party is directed to establish at the federal level. 244
3. The Dispute Settlement Regimes
The North American Free Trade Agreement establishes dispute resolution systems
depending on the subject at stake. 245 Usually, conflicts are covered by the general dispute
settlement mechanism described in Chapter 20246 , excluding investment and related
matters (Chapter 11) and cases of antidumping and countervailing duty247 (AD/CVD)
240 NAALC, Art. 9(1) & (3).
241 NAALC, Art. 10 (g). For the other of the Council's functions, see NAALC, Art. 10,1 1.
241 NAALC, Art. 9 (6).
245 NAALC, Art. 13(1).
144 NAALC, Art. 8 (1),15. "Each NAO shall serve as a point of contact with . . . governmental
agencies of that [p]arty, . . . NAOs of other [p]arties, ... the Secretariat." NAALC, Art. 16(1).
245 See Bialos & Siegel, supra note 81, at 603-22; Horlick and DeBusk, supra note 33, at 21-41;
Huntington, supra note 162, at 407; Kristin L. Oelstrom, A Treaty for the Future: The Dispute Settlement
Mechanisms of the NAFTA, 25 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 783 (1994); Hector Rojas V., The Dispute
Resolution Process under NAFTA, 1 U.S.-Mex. L.J. 19 (1993); Andrew Kayumi Rosa, Old Wine, New
Skins: NAFTA and the Evolution of International Trade Dispute Resolution, 15 Mich. J. Int'l L. 255,
260-283 (1993); Jose Luis Siqueiros, NAFTA Institutional Arrangements and Dispute Settlement
Procedures, 23 Cal. W. Int'l L.J. 383 (1993); Louis B. Sohn, Comments on Dispute Resolution, 1 U.S.-
Mex. L.J. 31 (1993).
24* NAFTA, Art. 2003-22.
247
"[D]umping is ... a form of price discrimination [that] occurs when foreign buyers are charged
lower prices than domestic buyers for an identical product." Robert J. Carbaugh, International Economics
112 (2nd ed., 1985). The importing country levies antidumping duties in order to protect its domestic
industry from injury. Id. at 115. The amount of the AD duty equals the dumping margin, i.e., the
difference between the producer's home market price and the price charged for sales in the importing
country. Id. at 115-16.
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(Chapter 19)248 , for which particular provisions are in place. 249 Also, both the
Environmental and the Labor Side Agreement set up separate dispute resolution
mechanisms, which, however, are very similar to the Chapter 20 system. 250
a) Experiences under the CFTA
Generally stated, the scattered conflict settlement procedures of the NAFTA reflect
the system that has already been in existence under the CFTA. 251 This treaty provided for
Also with the intention to protect the domestic industry, countervailing duties are applied to goods
that are produced with the aid of a foreign subsidy. Id. at 130. "[A] countervailing duty equal to the
amount of the subsidy is to be levied upon import of the [subsidized] goods." Id. at 130.
For a very detailed and critical analysis of U.S. and WTO AD and CVD provisions, see Bhala, supra
note 42, at 601-842.
"• NAFTA, Art. 2004.
249 For investment disputes, see NAFTA, Art. 1 101-39 & Annexes; for AD/CVD cases, see NAFTA,
Art. 1901-11 & Annexes. Chapter 11 will not be discussed because it deals with disputes between a
private investor and the country of investment. NAFTA, Art. 1 1 15 & 1116.
» NAAEC, Art. 22-36; NAALC, Art. 27-4 1
.
251 Rojas V., supra note 245, at 19. See Judith H. Bello et al., U.S. Trade Law and Policy Series No.
18: Midterm Report on Binational Dispute Settlement under the United States-Canada Free Trade
Agreement, 25 Int'l Law. 489 (1991); J.G. Castel, The Settlement of Disputes under the 1988 Canada-
United States Free Trade Agreement, 83 Am. J. Int'l L. 118 (1989); William C. Graham, Dispute
Resolution in the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement: One Element of a Complex Relationship,
37 McGill L.J. 544 (1992); Robert Hage, Dispute Settlement under the Canada-United States Free Trade
Agreement, 1990 Can. Y.B. Int'l L. 361; Ted L. McDorman, The Dispute Settlement Regime of the Free
Trade Agreement, 2 Rev. Int'l Bus. 303 (1988); Joseph A. McKinney, Dispute Settlement under the U.S.-
Canada Free Trade Agreement, 8 J. Int'l Arb. 89 (1991); T. Bradbrooke Smith, Comments on Dispute
Resolution under a North American Free Trade Agreement, 12 Can.-U.S. L.J. 337 (1987).
"[T]he basic principles of dispute resolution embodied in the FTA are largely based on those
incorporated in the GATT. Of course, the dispute resolution mechanisms in the FTA considerably broaden
and extend those in the GATT, and tailor the process to better fit the bilateral relationship." The Canada-
U.S. Free Trade Agreement, supra note 33, at 65.
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a general framework for settling disputes in Chapter 18, excepting financial services252
and AD/CVD cases253 , for which a special arrangement existed.
Chapter 18 installed the Canada-U.S. Trade Commission, bilaterally composed of
cabinet-level representatives. 254 The Commission facilitated consultations and
negotiations between parties when a dispute arose. 255 If these efforts remained
unsuccessful, the Commission would establish a panel of experts. 256 Three types of panel
proceedings were possible: binding arbitration in safeguard cases257 and in cases when
the governments mutually agreed258 , and panel recommendations. 259 In the third case, the
Commission would try to find an agreement in order to achieve a final resolution of the
dispute. 260 If the disagreement continued, the party whose rights were being infringed
upon was entitled to retaliation until a resolution was found. 261
The system installed by Chapter 19 in connection with AD/CVD cases was
"unusual". 262 The CFTA did not contain any stipulation in terms of harmonizing AD and
CVD laws; instead, every country still applied its national law. 263 A party could request
2,2 The agreement stipulates clearly that "[n]o other provision . . . confers rights or imposes
obligations on the [p]arties with respect to financial services." CFTA Art. 1701 (1).
253 Chapter 19 contains the dispute settlement system for AD/CVD cases.
2M CFTA Art. 1802.
"'CFTA Art. 1802(1), 1805.
256 CFTA Art. 1807 (2). The panels established under Chapter 18 and 19 consisted of five persons.
CFTA Art. 1807 (3) & Annex 190 1.2 (2).
257 CFTA Art. 1 103.
* CFTA Art. 1806 (1). No panels came together under the Art. 1103, so did not play any role in
practice. Harry B. Endsley, Dispute Settlement under the CFTA and NAFTA: From Eleventh-hour
Innovation to Accepted Institution, 18 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 659, 666 n. 34 (1995).
»' CFTA Art. 1807.
260 CFTA Art. 1807(8).
"'CFTA Art. 1807(9).
242 William J. Davey, Dispute Settlement under the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, in Trade-Offs
on Free Trade, supra note 33, 173, 177.
265 CFTA Art. 1902 (1). The U.S. and Canada were not able to agree on the harmonizing their
AD/CVD laws, "despite, for example, their common intention at the start of the negotiations to develop a
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the establishment of a panel to review either an AD or a CVD statutory amendment, or
the AD/CVD decisions of a national authority (instead of a review by a national court). 264
In the latter case, the panel had to apply the standard review and general legal principles
of the importing country. 265 The panel decisions were binding on the parties. 266 An appeal
was not possible, but the agreement provided for an "Extraordinary Challenge
Procedure"267 designed for "issues of impropriety which bring the entire system of panel
review into question."268
Generally, the CFTA dispute settlement system worked "extraordinarily well", with
the Chapter 1 9 process being "more successful" than the Chapter 1 8 process. 269 It was
considered that in both sets of procedures, qualified panelists fulfilled their task well by
maintaining a high level of knowledge and expertise, issuing well-thought-out decisions,
respecting nevertheless the strict time limits set by the CFTA, and not being divided
new body of rules regulation government subsidies." Bello et al., supra note 251, at 494. Therefore they
established a working group to take care of the matter. CFTA Art. 1907. The fate of this Working Group
remains an open question because "[tjhere has been very little activity by [it]." Paul et al., North American
Free Trade Agreement: Summary and Analysis 108 (1993).
For the negotiating history of the CFTA, see Bello et al., supra note 251, at 493-95; Winham, supra
note 33, at 23-42.
** CFTA Art. 1903, 1904.
26s fjFTA Art. 1904 (3). This method of AD/CVD review has been chosen because it promised an
objective and fair application of the national laws in the politically sensitive field of antidumping and
subsidies. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Binational Dispute Settlement under Chapter 19 of the Canada-United
States Free Trade Agreement: An Interim Appraisal, 24 NYU J. Int'l L. & Pol. 269, 270 (1991).
It seems that Canada and the U.S. were not sure whether this new mechanism would fulfill the
expectations because its application was limited to five years (CFTA Art. 1906). But at the end of those
five years, the NAFTA was signed already. See supra note 32.
** CFTA Art. 1904(9).
247 CFTA Art. 1904 (13) & Annex 1904 (13).
268 Appleton, supra note 32, at 140. This safeguard mechanism, which consisted of a three-member
committee of Canadian and U.S. judges or former judges, was accessible but under very restricted
conditions. See CFTA Art. 1904 (13) & Annex 1904 (13)(1). In the only two challenges filed the
Committee unanimously upheld the original panels' decisions. Huntington, supra note 162, at 437.
269 Lowenfeld, supra note 265, at 334.
47
along national lines. 270 Also, compliance with the decision did not constitute a problem. 271
A sign that even politicians appreciated the panels' work is that the CFTA rules for the
general procedure and the AD/CVD procedure were taken over into the NAFTA with
only minor changes. 272
270 Bello et al., supra note 251, at 516; Horlick & DeBusk, supra note 33, at 31-32; Endsley, supra note
258, at 675; Huntington, supra note 162, at 414; Johnson, supra note 32, at 520; Lowenfeld, supra note
265, at 334; Homer E. Moyer, Chapter 19 of the NAFTA: Binational Panels as the Trade Courts of Last
Resort, 27 Int'l Law. 707, 726 (1993); Comments of former U.S. FTA Secretary James Holbein, Forum:
Binational Dispute Resolution Procedure under the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement —
Experiences to Date and Portents for the Future, Washington, D.C., April 23, 1991, 24 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L.
& Pol. 341, 349 (1991). For instance, Prof. Lowenfeld noted: "[T]he panelists have been thoughtful;
their opinions have been thorough and articulate, and their conclusions on the whole persuasive. Taking
all the cases together one could not detect a bias in favor of protectionism of unrestricted trade . . ."
Lowenfeld, supra note 265, at 334.
An "exception" to the well-accepted decisions seems to be the "Softwood Lumber III" case, which
was "the first dispute in which both the binational panel and the extraordinary challenge committee
divided along national lines." Charles M. Gastle & Jean-G. Castel, Q.C., Should the North American Free
Trade Agreement Dispute Settlement Mechanism in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Cases Be
Reformed in the Light of Softwood Lumber III?, 26 Law & Pol'y Inti Bus. 823, 823-24 (1995). See also
Zsolt K. Bessko, CFTA-NAFTA Dispute Resolution on the Rocks?: The Softwood Lumber Case, 15 J.L.
& Com. 335 (1995); Johnson, supra note 32, at 520.
For further criticism and reform proposals see Bello et al., supra note 251, at 515-16; John Moss,
Summary of Proceedings of the Seminar on Dispute Resolution under the Canada-United States Free
Trade Agreement, 26 Stan. J. Int'l L. 153, 176-79, 189-91, 195-97 (1989). Proposals that were made in
order to enhance the dispute resolution process included the participation of private parties, the reduction
of the number of different procedures, and the creation of a North American Trade Tribunal that "should
have jurisdiction with respect to disputes involving the interpretation and application of the North
American Free Trade Agreement." Joint ABA/CBA/BM Working Group on Dispute Settlement,
American Bar Association Section of International Law and Practice Reports to the House of Delegates,
26 Int'l Law. 855, 863 (1992).
271 Gary N. Horlick & F. Amanda DeBusk, Dispute Resolution Panel of the U.S.-Canada Free Trade
Agreement: The First Two and One-half Years, 37 McGill L.J. 575, 581 (1992); Huntington, supra note
162, at 436; Clara Hills (former U.S. Trade Representative), quoted in Gary N. Horlick, The U.S.-Canada
FTA and GATT Dispute Settlement Procedures - The Litigant's View, 26 J. World Trade 5, 1 1 (1992).
272 Gilbert R. Winham, Dispute Settlement in NAFTA and the FTA, in Assessing NAFTA: A
Trinational Analysis, supra note 32, 251, 253.
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b) The General Dispute Settlement Mechanism
The NAFTA opens up an interesting option for a complaining party: when a dispute
arises under the provisions of the NAFTA as well as the GATT, the complaining party
may select either forum for settlement. 273 But once the procedures have started under one
forum, generally the other one is excluded. 274 On the other hand, a party cannot enforce
any NAFTA provision against another party in a domestic court, but only by the means
described in the NAFTA itself. 275
"To promote efficiency" the complete Chapter 20 process is marked by time limits
that allow the parties to find a resolution within eight months.276
(1) Consultations
The resolution of a conflict under Chapter 20, i.e. with regard to the NAFTA except
AD/CVD and investment cases, begins with consultations. 277 The Agreement requests
that the parties "make every attempt to arrive at a mutually satisfactory resolution . . .
For the differences between CFTA and NAFTA dispute settlement provisions, see James R. Holbein
& Gray Carpentier, Trade Agreements and Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in the Western Hemisphere,
25 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 531, 560-65 (1993); Rojas, supra note 245, at 19; Rosa, supra note 245, at 260-
283.
273 NAFTA, Art. 2005. This option has already existed under the CFTA (CFTA Art. 1801 (2)). For
certain matters the parties may only have recourse to the NAFTA provisions. NAFTA, Art. 2005 (3) &
(4).
274 NAFTA, Art. 2005 (6), but see also NAFTA, Art. 2005 (2) with regard to the involvement of a
third party.
275 Bhala, supra note 42, at 186.
276 Bhala, supra note 42, at 186.
277 NAFTA, Art. 2006 (1). A party can initiate the Chapter 20 mechanism in three situations: when a
dispute exits with regard to the interpretation or application of the agreement, when a party believes "that
an actual or proposed measure of another [p]arty is or would be inconsistent with" the agreement, or when
a party considers such a measure to cause nullification or impairment of a benefit that it could have
reasonably expected under many NAFTA provisions. NAFTA, Art. 2004 & Annex 2004. One author has
it called a "step backward" that the CFTA provision requiring the notification of proposed measures which
could negatively effect the agreement is left out in the NAFTA. Rojas, supra note 245, at 21.
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through consultations"278
,
thus "clearly emphasizing] the prevention of disputes in the
first instance or their cooperative resolution through consultations". 279 Thus, it can be
said that "the underlying principle of Chapter 20 is that of amicable agreement". 280 An
interested third party can already participate in the consultations. 281
(2) Special Commission Meeting
If the parties are not able to reach an accord after 45 days at the latest, any party may
ask the Free Trade Commission for a meeting282 , which is required to take place within
the following 10 days. 283 In order to "resolve the dispute promptly", i.e., to assist the
parties in finding a solution, the Commission can employ good offices, conciliation and
278 NAFTA, Art. 2006 (5). The CFTA, however, did not contain a similar provision. Rojas, supra note
245, at 20. It has been noted that this "new provision constitutes] an international obligation of the three
parties." Id.
279 Endsley, supra note 258, at 663. See also Winham, supra note 272, at 266. But is not clear whether
a lot of disputes will be settled by consultations. "As of December 1996, only eight disputes formally
entered the Chapter 20 consultations phase. . . Chapter 20 consultations could be credited with resolving
only one of these eight controversies . . . Consultations failed to resolve five other conflicts. . . [They]
formally advanced to the second dispute settlement stage, a meeting of the Free Trade Commission."
David Lopez, Dispute Resolution Under NAFTA: Lessons from Early Experience, 32 Tex. Int'l L.J.
163,168,170-71 (1997).
280 Siqueiros, supra note 245, at 387. It is noteworthy that the NAFTA eliminated binding arbitration
which the CFTA required in certain instances. Id. at 385. "Although this elimination seems a bold stroke,
the change is not of great importance [because] neither arbitration process has been used at all under [the
CFTA], and there is no reason to believe there would be a great demand for them under [the] NAFTA."
Rosa, supra note 245, at 285.
281 NAFTA, Art. 2006 (3).
2,2 NAFTA, Art. 2007 (1). The regular period is 30 days from the delivery of request for
consultations; it is limited to 15 days when perishable agricultural goods are involved, and extended to 45
days if another party has asked for or participated in consultations on the same matter. Id.
2H NAFTA, Art. 2007 (4).
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the like, call on technical experts, establish working groups, and make
recommendations. 284
(3) Panel Phase
If the parties still disagree, either can request to set up a panel 30 days after the
Commission's meeting. 285 A third party that considers having a substantial interest in the
matter is entitled to join as a complaining party. 286 The Agreement stipulates that "the
Commission shall establish an arbitral panel". 287 Despite consensus being required for
decision making288 , "the mandatory nature of the language suggests that the
representatives of the three [p]arties are legally bound to approve the establishment of a
panel"289
,
which means that the requesting party has, in fact, a right to a panel. 290 A panel
consists of five persons, usually chosen from a pre-established roster of "individuals who
are willing and able to serve as panelists". 291 In case of a two-party dispute, the parties
2,4 NAFTA, Art. 2007 (4) & (5). The NAFTA text asks the Commission to use "good offices,
conciliation, mediation or such other dispute resolution procedures" to resolve the dispute. NAFTA, Art.
2007 (5)(b). Thus, one could assume that the "Commission may choose to refer a dispute to arbitration as
simply another means" of alternative dispute resolution. Huntington, supra note 162, at 418.
M NAFTA, Art. 2008 (1). This period may be modified if the parties agree on a reduction or
extension. Id.
'"NAFTA, Art. 2008(3).
» NAFTA, Art. 2008 (2).
» NAFTA, Art. 2001 (4).
2,9 Huntington, supra note 162, at 419.
2,0 Samuel S. Straight, GATT and NAFTA: Marrying Effective Dispute Settlement and the
Sovereignty of the Fifty States, 45 Duke L.J. 216, 226 (1995) (citation omitted).
291 NAFTA, Art. 2009 (1), 2011 (1). The individuals listed in the roster have to meet the certain
requirements; they "shall:
(a) have expertise or experience in law, international trade, other matters covered by this Agreement
or the resolution of disputes arising under international trade agreements, and shall be chosen strictly on
the basis of objectivity, reliability and sound judgment;
(b) be independent of, and not be affiliated with or take instructions from, any [plarty; and
51
have 15 days to agree on the chair of the panel; otherwise one of the disputing parties
selected by lot nominates the chair, who must not be a citizen of that party. 292 Within the
next fifteen days each party chooses two citizens of the other party as panelists293 — a so-
called "reverse selection process"294 which is "designed to ensure impartiality". 295 If no
panelist is chosen before the deadline, the selection will be done by lot. 296 For a three-
party dispute, the Agreement slightly modifies the method of selection. 297 It has been
observed that the possibility for a party to block the selection process is very limited, a
situation which promotes the integrity of the settlement system. 298
Unless the parties agree otherwise, the panel has to follow Model Rules of
Procedure set up by the Commission as well as the Terms of Reference laid down in the
(c) comply with a code of conduct to be established by the Commission." NAFTA, Art. 2009 (2),
2010(1).
A non-roster individual may be nominated as panelist, too, but he or she is subject to a peremptory
challenge from another disputing party. NAFTA, Art. 201 1 (3).
292 NAFTA, Art. 2011 (l)(b). Even if the system works well theoretically, some obstacles occurred
during its practical application. The experience made with the only dispute that reached the panel phase
(as of December 1996) reveals these obstacles. "Although four panelists were selected by early October
1995, the parties experienced substantial difficulty in agreeing upon an fifth panelist, the chairperson.
Canada and the United States finally agreed on a chairman ... in January 1996." Lopez, supra note 279, at
1 72 (citations omitted). It seems that in this case neither the deadlines were respected nor the stipulated
procedure (selection by lot) was followed.
293 NAFTA, Art. 201 1(1 )(c).
294 Holbein & Carpentier, supra note 272, at 562; Johnson, supra note 32, at 523.
2,5 Endsley, supra note 258, at 682.
294 NAFTA, Art. 201 l(lXd).
291 In case of three-party disputes, the parties have to agree on the chair; if they are unable to do so
within 15 days, "the [pjarty or [pjarties on the side of the dispute chosen by lot shall select within 10 days
a chair who is not a citizen of such [p]arty . . . [T]he [p]arty complained against shall select two panelists,
one of whom is a citizen of a complaining [p]arty, and the other of whom is a citizen of another
complaining [p]arty. The complaining [p]arties shall select two panelists who are citizens of the [plarty
complained against." NAFTA, Art. 201 1 (2)(b) & (c).
"» Bialos & Siegel, supra note 81, at 617.
52
Agreement. 299 Pursuant to the latter ones, the panel has to examine the case regarding its
factual and legal aspects. 300 With respect to information or technical advice, the panel
may question any person or body deemed appropriate if the disputing parties so agree. 301
Furthermore, the Agreement provides for a written report of a scientific review board for
any scientific matter if so requested by a party or initiated by the panel (unless a party
objects). 302
Third parties are authorized to participate in the hearings and make submissions to
the panel. 303 Nevertheless, the entire panel proceedings except the final report must be
confidential. 304
A time limit of 90 days starting after the selection of the last panelist is set for the
panel to produce an interim report which includes factual findings, legal determinations,
recommendations, and the report of a scientific review board, if one has been
199 NAFTA, Art. 2012 (l)-(3). The NAFTA enumerates several principles that have to be included in
the Model Rules of Procedure: the right for at least one hearing before the panel; the opportunity to
provide initial and rebuttal written submissions; confidentiality for basically the whole procedure.
NAFTA, Art. 2012 (1). The Model Rules of Procedures are a new concept that has not existed under the
CFTA. Siqueiros, supra note 245, at 386.
One author has noted that "it is in . . . connection [with the way of selecting arbitrators] that
NAFTA's dispute resolution procedures may be most worth studying." Johnson, supra note 32, at 2189.
» NAFTA, Art. 2012 (3), 2016 (2).
3oi NAFTA, Art. 2014. The panel can seek information either on its own initiative or at the request of
a party. Id.
302 NAFTA, Art. 2015 (1). It is stipulated that the board consists of "highly qualified, independent
experts" selected by the panel. NAFTA, Art. 2015 (2). The provision that "panels may . . . solicit reports
from scientific review boards on issues concerning environmental, health, safety or other scientific
measures . . . was obviously designed to meet criticism from the environmental lobby, but it apparently
fell short of the demands of that lobby." Winham, supra note 272, at 258 (citation omitted).
301 NAFTA, Art. 2013.
«* NAFTA, Art. 20 12(1 )(b).
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established. 305 Separate opinions may be drafted on matters to which there has been no
unanimous agreement, but the identity of their authors remains undiscovered. 306 Thus
protests with respect to a possible national bias are avoided, and the integrity of the
process is ensured. 307
Within a stipulated period of 14 days a disputing party may comment on the initial
report; such comment may lead the panel to make further inquiries and reconsider its
report. 308 Thirty days after presenting the initial report, the panel must issue its final
report including anonymous separate opinions and reports of scientific review boards. 309
Thus, "[p]anels will only issue determinations and recommendations, and not arbitral
awards."310
(4) Implementation and Enforcement of Panel Reports
Once the final report has been issued, it is up to the parties find a resolution to the
dispute, which "normally shall conform with the determinations and recommendations
of the panel" 3 ", although conformity is not a requirement. 312 Nevertheless, even a
505 NAFTA, Art. 2015 (4), 2016 (1) & (2). The possible advantages or disadvantages of this interim
review stage are the same as already described for the WTO, see supra p. 31 & n. 161-63. For the
experience made with regard to the deadlines, see infra n. 309.
*• NAFTA, Art. 2016 (4), 2017 (2).
507 Bialos & Siegel, supra note 8
1
, at 6 1 7- 1 8.
» NAFTA, Art. 2016 (4) & (5).
" NAFTA, Art. 2017 (l)-(3). The final report shall be transmitted to the Commission. NAFTA, Art.
2017 (3). In the only case that had reached the panel phase (as of December 1996), the deadlines for the
initial and the final report were not respected. "Pursuant to NAFTA Articles 2016 and 2017, the panel
should have issued an initial report on the dispute by no later than April 1996 . . . and a final report by not
later than May 1996 . . . Nevertheless, the panel did not present an initial report . . . until July 1996 and a
final report until December 1996." Lopez, supra note 279, at 172-73 (citations omitted).
310 Siqueiros, supra note 245, at 386.
'"NAFTA, Art. 2018(1).
" 2 Consequently, one author has observed that "[i]n terms of sovereign discretion ... the [p]arties will
have little to lose by resorting to panel adjudication". Huntington, supra note 162, at 426.
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non-binding panel report has a certain influence on the disputing parties. 313 When the
report finds that the measure in question causes an infringement, the Agreement
proposes either non-implementation or removal of that measure or compensation as
possible solutions. 314 If the parties are unable to agree on a solution or if no compensation
is offered within the 30 days following the receipt of the final report, the complaining
party is allowed to apply sanctions, i.e. to "suspend the application ... of benefits of
equivalent effect". 315 Thus, the use of retaliatory measures can be regarded as an
"automatic right" because no further authorization is needed. 316 But this retaliation (and
its temporal limitation) is the "same sanction that customary international law would
provide to the offended party even in the absence of an arbitration procedure."317 The
suspension must first be sought in the sector or sectors affected. 318 If the complaining
party believes this to be impracticable or ineffective, it can suspend benefits in other
sectors. 319 The application of sanctions has to be discontinued when a mutually agreed
upon solution to the dispute is found. 320 In addition, the parties' actions during the
313 O. Thomas Johnson, Jr., Alternative Dispute Resolution in the International Context: The North
American Free Trade Agreement, 46 SMU L. Rev. 2175, 2180-81 (1993). "Even though an arbitrator's
report may not be viewed as binding, it radically alters the relative positions of the parties to the dispute. It
does so by stating who is right and who is wrong, thereby changing the question at issue. With a report in
hand, the question becomes not whether a particular action violated the agreement but, if it did, whether
the offending party takes the agreement seriously . . . Moreover, as a basis for retaliation, a nonbinding
opinion is virtually the equivalent of a binding one, particularly when the agreement expressly authorizes
retaliation in cases of non-compliance." Id. at 2180-82 (citation omitted).
3,4 NAFTA, Art. 2018 (2). Under the CFTA it was mainly the Commission's task to agree on the
resolution of a dispute after the issuance of the final report. CFTA Art. 1 808.
315 NAFTA, Art. 2019 (1). With respect to the economic effect of sanctions, see supra n. 191.
316 Huntington, supra note 162, at 425.
3,7 Johnson, supra note 3 1 3, at 2 1 8 1
.
318 NAFTA, Art. 2019 (2)(a).
3 " NAFTA, Art. 2019 (2)(b).
320 NAFTA, Art. 2019(1).
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implementation phase are not monitored by any NAFTA institution. 321 But should any
party believe that the "level of benefits suspended by a [p]arty ... is manifestly
excessive", the Commission establishes a panel to investigate the issue. 322 The
effectiveness of this provision has been questioned because the reviewing panel only
recommends, whereas any action has to be taken by the disputing parties or the FTC, and
"[s]ince the [p]arty levying 'manifestly excessive' sanctions will necessarily be a
member of both groups, it will be able to block any action because both bodies act by
consensus."323
c) Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Cases
Just as happened during the CFTA talks, the parties which negotiated the NAFTA
were unable to agree on harmonized rules and standards regulating the investigation and
imposition of antidumping and countervailing duties. 324 Therefore, as was the rule under
the CFTA, every country keeps its own AD and CVD laws. 325 The NAFTA also provides
521 Michael Barber, NAFTA Dispute Resolution Provisions: Leaving Room for Abusive Tactics by
Airlines Looking Southward, 61 J. Air L. & Com. 991, 999 (1996).
322 NAFTA, Art. 2019 (3) & (4).
525 Rosa, supra note 245, at 286.
324 James R. Cannon, Resolving Disputes under NAFTA Chapter 19 169-70 (1994); Debra P. Steger,
Dispute Settlement, in Trade-Offs on Free Trade, supra note 33, 182, 183. "Both Canada and Mexico (like
Canada in the 1988 FTA talks) wanted to use the NAFTA negotiations to win substantial relief from the
U.S. AD and CVD laws. The United States, in contrast, was not prepared to accept any substantive
weakening of its trade laws." Paul et al., supra note 263, at 107. For an overview of the parties' different
aims during the negotiations, see Cannon, supra, at 167-68, and Oelstrom, supra note 245, at 793-96, 804-
05.
JM NAFTA, Art. 1902 (1). Consequently, one author has called this principle the "cornerstone of
dispute resolution under Chapter 19." Cannon, supra note 324, at 7. Unlike the CFTA the NAFTA "has no
sunset provision limiting the continuation of the Chapter 19 binational process, and it drops the working
party established in the [C]FTA to develop different rules for subsidies and antidumping procedures."
Winham, supra note 272, at 266. "The absence of a NAFTA Working Group or any required studies of the
AD/CVD issue might result from the U.S. position that this issue should only be addressed in the context
of the GATT." Paul et al., supra note 263, at 108. One author has criticized that the NAFTA does not
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a formal mechanism for resolving disputes involving the review of statutory
amendments to the parties' laws326 and for the review of final AD and CVD duty
determinations made by the relevant national authorities. 327 "[Problems that may arise
with respect to the implementation or operation of . . . Chapter [19]" are to be solved by
annual consultations. 328 Furthermore, Chapter 19 requires the parties to adapt their laws to
the NAFTA provisions according to a schedule. 329 It also obliges any party to notify the
others if it amends its AD or CVD laws. 330
( 1 ) Review Of Statutory Amendments
An amendment to one party's AD or CVD law may undergo a review by a two-
nation panel if another party suspects these amendments to violate the WTO
Antidumping Agreement or the object and purpose of the NAFTA, irrespective of the
amendment having the "function and effect of overturning a prior [panel] decision"
regarding AD and CVD duties. 331
contain any provision dealing with the harmonization of AD and CVD laws. Huntington, supra note 162,
at 441.
'"NAFTA, Art. 1903.
"'NAFTA, Art. 1904.
» NAFTA, Art. 1907(1).
»' NAFTA, Art. 1904 (15) & Annex 1904.15. All three parties are required to alter their laws, but
most of the changes have to be made by Mexico. Cannon, supra note 324, at 88, 95-100.
330 NAFTA, Art. 1902 (2). Consultations prior to the enactment of the amendment can be requested.
NAFTA, Art. 1902 (2)(c).
It became a necessity to include a special chapter that contains "more elaborate procedures for dispute
resolution concerning the imposition of antidumping and countervailing duties" than Chapter 20 because
as a result of "the reduction and elimination of tariffs and non-tariff barriers under NAFTA, it may be
expected that the [p]arties will more frequently resort to AD and CVD measures in reaction to trade
friction." Cannon, supra note 324, at 4-5.
"' NAFTA, Art. 1903 (l).The panel analyzes whether
"(a) the amendment does not conform to the provisions of Article 1902 (2) (d) (i) or (ii); or
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The five panelists, of whom the majority "shall be lawyers in good standing", are to
be chosen from a roster established by the parties in advance. 332 The qualification
requirements for the panelists have been questioned, because, while the condition that
they be expert in trade law is laudable, "their expertise does not necessarily imbue them
with judicial qualities."333 Consulting with the other party involved, each disputing party
(b) such amendment has the function and effect of overturning a prior decision of a panel [with
respect to final antidumping and countervailing duty determinations by national authorities] and does not
conform to the provisions of Article 1902 (2) (d) (i) or (ii)." Id.
Art. 1902 (2) (d) requires an amendment to an AD or CVD law not to be "inconsistent with
(i) the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the Agreement on Implementation of
Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the Antidumping Code) or the Agreement on
the Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (the Subsidies Code), or any successor agreement to which all the original signatories to this
Agreement are party, or
(ii) the object and purpose of this Agreement and this Chapter, which is to establish fair and
predictable conditions for the progressive liberalization of trade between the [p]arties to this Agreement
while maintaining effective and fair disciplines on unfair trade practices, such object and purpose to be
ascertained from the provisions of this Agreement, its preamble and objectives, and the practices of the
[p]arties." NAFTA, Art. 1902 (d).
"l NAFTA, Art. 1901 (2), Annex 1901.2 (1) & (2). It is stipulated that "[t]he roster shall include
judges or former judges to the fullest extent practicable." NAFTA, Annex 1901.2 (1). This provision
which was not contained in the CFTA was added at the request of the United States "expressing the view
that panels containing judges are less likely to create an independent jurisprudence in AD and CVD cases
that would otherwise be the case." Endsley, supra note 258, at 684 (citation omitted). The change was
appreciated insofar that "panelists with a judicial background will help ensure that the panels apply the
proper standard of review and directly follow the appropriate countervailing duty of anti-dumping laws."
Bessko, supra note 270, at 353.
The Agreements requires "all candidates [on the roster to] be citizens of Canada, Mexico or the
United States. Candidates shall be of good character, high standing and repute, and shall be chosen strictly
on the basis of objectivity, reliability, sound judgment and general familiarity with international trade law.
Candidates shall not be affiliated with a [p]arty, and in no event shall a candidate take instructions from a
[p]arty." NAFTA, Annex 190 1.2 (1).
"J Robert P. Deyling, Free Trade Agreements and the Federal Courts: Emerging Issues, 27 St. Mary's
L.J. 353, 363(1996).
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has 30 days to nominate two candidates. 334 It has to propose alternative candidates if its
opponent exercises its right to four preemptory challenges within 45 days after the
request to establish a panel. 335 Thus the selection process "will encourage the selection of
fair panelists."336 If one of the deadlines is not met the missing candidate is chosen by
lot. 337 The parties are required to agree on a fifth panelist within 55 days of the request
for a panel. 338 If no agreement can be reached, the drawing of lots will determine which
party is to select the fifth panelist. 339 Like the appointment of the chairman, the panel
takes all decisions by majority vote. 340
To conduct the review of statutory amendments, the panel establishes rules of
procedure. 341 The panel conducts its deliberations in confidentiality. 342 Based upon the
parties' hearings and submissions, the panel issues an "initial written declaratory opinion
containing findings of fact and its determinations" within 90 days of the appointment of
the chairman. 343 The panel may recommend "appropriate" modifications to the
amendments if it has found a violation of the said provisions.344
3M NAFTA, Annex 1901.2 (2). The Agreement allows also persons who are not on the roster, but who
fulfill the criteria named in Annex 1901.2 (1) to be nominated as candidates. Id.
» 5 NAFTA, Annex 1901.2 (2).
136 Horlick & DeBusk, supra note 33, at 3 1
.
«" NAFTA, Annex 1901.2 (2).
»« NAFTA, Annex 1901.2 (3).
»' NAFTA, Annex 1901 .2 (3).
340 NAFTA, Annex 1901.2 (5). The five panelists select a chairman "from among the lawyers on the
panel by majority vote [; otherwise] by lot . . ." NAFTA, Annex 1901.2 (4).
Ml NAFTA, Art. 1903 (2) & Annex 1903.2 (1). This and some of the following provisions may be
altered if the parties to the dispute agree so. See NAFTA, Annex 1903.2 (1), (2), (5) & (6), for instance.
According to the Agreement "[t]he procedure shall ensure a right to at least one hearing before the
panel, as well as the opportunity to provide written submissions and rebuttal arguments." NAFTA, Annex
1903.2(1).
J« NAFTA, Annex 1903.2 (1).
'« NAFTA, Annex 1903.2 (1) & (2).
™ NAFTA, Annex 1903.2 (3).
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A time limit of 14 days is set for the parties to object to the initial report; otherwise
it becomes final. 345 In case of an objection, the panel has 30 days to reconsider its initial
report and to reexamine the issue. 346 Then the panel must present its "final opinion"
which might, like the initial report, include dissenting and concurring opinions. 347
The panel's report is not binding on the parties but just "declaratory". 348 Therefore,
if the panel makes recommendations, the parties are to start consultations immediately
with the aim of arriving at a "mutually satisfactory solution . . . within 90 days."349 The
complaining party may resort to self-help if within nine months following the end of the
consultations, no modifications to the amendment has been made and no other agreement
has been reached. 350 Self-help consists of either the enactment of "comparable legislative
of equivalent executive action" or the termination of the Agreement regarding the
violating party. 351
(2) Review of Final AD and CVD Determinations
Although the NAFTA parties could not agree on harmonizing their AD and CVD
laws, at least they replaced the review of national AD and CVD duties by national courts
with a review by independent binational panels. 352 Such panels are considered to be less
MS NAFTA, Annex 1903.2 (3) & (4).
™ NAFTA, Annex 1903.2 (4).
147 NAFTA, Annex 1901.2 (5), Annex 1903.2 (4). The introduction of dissenting or concurring
opinions in the panel's decision results from the common law background of Canada and the United
States.
"• NAFTA, Art. 1903 (1); Annex 1903.2 (4).
'» NAFTA, Art. 1903 (3)(a).
""NAFTA, Art. 1903 (3)(b).
« NAFTA, Art. 1903 (3 )(b).
352 NAFTA, Art. 1904 (1). Once a party has chosen the panel procedure, a national judicial review is
excluded. NAFTA, Art. 1904 (1 1).
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biased than the national courts. 353 Moreover, the panels use simpler procedures354 and act
more expeditiously than national courts. 355
(a) Panel Phase
Once a final determination concerning the application of an AD or CVD duty for
goods of one NAFTA party has been published in the official journal of the importing
party, the exporting party has 30 days to request the establishment of a panel. 356 The
selection of the panelists and the establishment of the panel is carried out exactly the
same way as for the panels to review amendments to AD and CVD laws. 357
The panel carries out its investigation pursuant to the rules of procedure established
by the parties. 358 The rules include a tight time schedule because the aim is to have a final
decision within the 315 days following the date when the request for the panel was
made. 359 The panel inspects the record of the national authority that imposed the duty,
353 Johnson, supra note 313, at 2185. See also Deyling, supra note 333, at 359-60. As two authors
noted, "[t]here is a need to control the exercise of the broad discretion granted to administrative tribunals
by the complex web of domestic trade laws." Gastle & Castel, supra note 270, at 829.
154 Robert E. Burke & Brian F. Walsh, NAFTA Binational Panel Review: Should it be Continued,
Eliminated or Substantially Changed?, 20 Brook. J. Inti L. 529, 533-34 (1995).
555 Cannon, supra note 324, at 35, 44; Horlick & DeBusk, supra note 33, at 30.
356 NAFTA, Art. 1901 (1); 1904 (4) & (14). If the final determinations are not published in the official
journal, the Agreement directs the importing party to notify its counterpart. Id. The time limit has to be
strictly observed, because "[f]ailure to request a panel within the time specified in this paragraph shall
preclude review by a panel." Id.
To get an overview of the Canadian, Mexican and U.S. AD and CVD procedures, see Johnson, supra
note 32, at 525-31.
337 NAFTA, Art. 1901 (2), Annex 1901.2. See supra p. 57-58.
"* NAFTA, Art. 1904 (6) & (14). The Agreement prescribes in very meticulous manner what
provisions have to be contained in the rules of procedure. It seems that the negotiating parties were very
eager not to leave anything unsaid as AD and CVD law is a highly politicized area.
'"NAFTA, Art. 1904(14).
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receives briefs and reply briefs of the parties, and hears their oral arguments. 360 These
proceedings are limited to 195 to 210 days. 361 Because this tight timetable is the same as
under the CFTA, NAFTA AD/CVD panels have been expected to "issue prompt
decisions", because this was what happened under the CFTA. 362 The panel determines
whether the imposition of the duty was correct under the national law of the importing
party. 363 It has to "apply the standard of review . . . and the legal principles that a court of
the importing [p]arty otherwise would apply". 364 With respect to the qualifications of the
panelists, it has been asked whether the requirement of being an expert in trade law is
sufficient to conduct such a judicial review, since "non-judge panelists may lack
expertise in [the other party's] administrative law" and they "may have little expertise in
the art ofjudging." 365 It has also been feared that interpretations of the standard of review
might develop differently between the panels and the courts. 366 Interestingly, the same
arguments have been brought forth against CFTA panels, which, however, worked well
560 NAFTA, Art. 1904 (14). The Agreement confers on the national authority that applied the AD or
CVD duty "the right to appear and be represented by counsel before the panel." NAFTA, Art. 1904 (7).
161 NAFTA, Art. 1904 (14). "[T]he rules [of procedure] . . . shall allow: . .
.
(b) 30 days for designation or certification of the administrative record and its filings with the panel;
(c) 60 days for the complainant to file its brief;
(d) 60 days for the respondent to file its brief;
(e) 15 days for the filing of reply briefs;
(0 15 to 30 days for the panel to convene and hear oral arguments . . ." Id.
542 Horlick & DeBusk, supra note 33, at 29. The authors consider that "[t]he many interim deadlines
prevent the panels from falling behind schedule." Id.
*3 NAFTA, Art. 1904 (1) & (2).
364 NAFTA, Art. 1904 (3); Annex 1911. For an overview of the different standards of review in
Canadian, Mexican and U.S final determinations, see Cannon, supra note 324, at 61-75; Johnson, supra
note 32, at 532-33.
365 Deyling, supra note 333, at 364-67. On the other hand, "[t]o such panelists issues that may be
arcane to lawyers of judges not specialized in the complex filed of trade law are readily understandable.
This level of expertise, not always available in an appellate court, can both inform the panel and serve as
an important check on counsel." Moyer, supra note 270, at 714.
m Burke & Walsh, supra note 354, at 541-44; Cannon, supra note 324, at 35, 50.
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and did not exceed their competence. 367 And there are no indications why the system
should not work well under the NAFTA.
The panel is given 90 days to write its report. 368 Only the panelists take part in the
confidential deliberations. 369 The panel's decisions are made according to majority rule,
but the report may contain concurring and dissenting opinions. 370 The panel has two
choices: either to confirm the determination of the national authority, or to remand it371
,
i.e., the panel is not authorized to change the amount of the duty imposed or to alter the
*7 See supra p. 46-47 & n. 269-71. "At the outset of the [CFTA], some commentators predicted that a
distinctive body of binational law would emerge in spite of the different standards . . . The hope was that
this binational law would bring the [p]arties closer to legal uniformity in the areas of dumping and
subsidies. Experience, however, has not borne out these predictions. The [CFTA] panels have stayed
strictly within their limited role as interpreters of national law, resisting the temptations to develop a
distinctive jurisprudence." Huntington, supra note 162, at 434 (citations omitted).
It is true that the Mexican legal order as a civil law system differs from the common law systems in
the U.S. and Canada. On the other hand, one could mention that also there are differences between
Canadian and the U.S. law, but, as experience under the CFTA shows, "Canadian panelists have adeptly
grasped U.S. trade law issues and shown no hesitancy in quizzing counsel on their position [, and t]he
questions of U.S. panelists have reflected their 'informed experience'." Horlick & DeBusk, supra note 33,
at 33 (citation omitted). However, all in all, "[t]he commonalties and mutual understanding that served so
well in the Canada-U.S. context do not have an analogue in the Mexican context . . . Nevertheless, . . .
these challenges will also be successfully dealt with . . ." Endsley, supra note 258, at 695. See also Moyer,
supra note 270, at 714. One has to bear in mind that the AD and CVD laws are also written codes in the
U.S. and in Canada, and, secondly, it is just a question of becoming familiar with each other's system.
Comments of Prof. Andreas W. Lowenfeld, Forum: Binational Dispute Resolution Procedures Under the
Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement — Experiences to Date and Portents for the Future:
Washington, D.C., April 23, 1991, supra note 270, at 430-31. See also Johnson, supra note 32, at 541.
However, it has been asked if it is "realistically possible" to require the panelists to have the same
competence as a judge, especially as panels are created on an ad hoc basis. Burke & Walsh, supra note
354, at 544.
*» NAFTA, Art. 1904(14).
349 North American Free Trade Agreement: Rules of Procedure for Article 1904 Binational Panel
Review, Rule 18, reprinted in 59 Fed. Reg. 8686,8690 (Feb. 23, 1994) [hereinafter NAFTA: Rules of
Procedure for Article 1904].
170 NAFTA, Annex 1901.2 (5).
571 NAFTA, Art. 1904 (8).
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determination in another way. Whatever the panel decides, the parties are bound by it. 372
In case of a remand, the panel is asked to "establish as brief a time as is reasonable for
compliance with [it]."373 It may became necessary to review what the national authority
undertook on remand. The same panel will conduct this review and "shall normally issue
a final decision within 90 days . . . after such remand action is submitted to it."374
The NAFTA employs two mechanisms to ensure the proper functioning of the panel
process concerning obstacles from outside and disturbances from inside the panel. The
first category is dealt with by the Safeguard Mechanism375 , the second by the
Extraordinary Challenge Procedure. 376
372 NAFTA, Art. 1904 (9). This means also that national law must not install a domestic procedure for
appeals from a panel decision. NAFTA, Art. 1904 (11). Although panels decision do not have an explicit
precendential effect, United States courts are allowed to consider them as persuasive authority (19 U.S.C.
1516a (b) (3)). One author observed that "[t]he nature of chapter 19 panel decisions reflects the inherent
tension between legalistic and pragmatic conceptions of the binational review system. On the one hand,
these decisions are considerably more 'binding' that decisions made under chapter 20 ... At the same
time, panel decisions are quite limited in scope [as] chapter 19 restricts the binding effect of panel
decisions to 'the involved parties with respect to the particular matter between the [p]arties that is before
the panels, [i.e., these decisions] will be accorded no precedential value." Huntington, supra note 162, at
434-36. (citations omitted).
373 NAFTA, Art. 1904 (8). When calculating the time the panel is directed to "tak[e] into account the
complexity of the factual and legal issues involved and the nature of the panel's decision. In no event shall
[this] time . . . exceed an amount of time equal to the maximum amount of time . . . permitted by statute
for the competent investigating authority in question to make a final determination in an investigation." Id.
57< NAFTA, Art. 1904(8).
375 NAFTA, Art. 1905. The Safeguard Mechanism will be displayed only very briefly since the aim of
this procedure is less connected with the resolution of actual disputes than it is to securing a domestic legal
environment in which a panel can operate.
Consultations can be requested when "a [p]arty alleges that the application of another [p]arty's
domestic law:
(a) has prevented the establishment of a panel requested by the complaining [p]arty;
(b) has prevented a panel requested by the complaining [p]arty from rendering a final decision;
(c) has prevented the implementation of the decision of a panel requested by the complaining [p]arty
or denied it binding force and effect with respect to the particular matter that was before the panel; or
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(b) Implementation and Enforcement of Panel Reports
The Agreement tries to safeguard the panel review system by providing for
consultations and the creation of a special committee when a party alleges that another
party's domestic law "has prevented the implementation of the decision of a panel ... or
denied it binding force and effect" or has frustrated the proceedings in other ways. 377 In
such a case the complaining party can ask for consultations, which are to start within 1
5
days following the request. 378 If the consultations do not lead to a result after 45 days, a
"special committee" is established within 1 5 days after the complaining party requests its
formation. 379
The three special committee members are selected from the same roster and in the
same way as the Extraordinary Challenge Committee members. 380 The parties submit
briefs and make submissions and oral arguments upon which the committee bases its
initial report, due 60 days after its members are selected. 381 A final report including
separate, anonymous opinions is to be issued 30 days thereafter. 382
If the committee holds the party complained against is responsible for non-
compliance with the panel report or otherwise impairing the panel process, the parties are
(d) has resulted in a failure to provide opportunity for review of a final determination by a[n
independent] panel or court . . ." NAFTA, Art. 1905 (1). The CFTA did not contain similar
"safeguarding" provisions. Winham, supra note 272, at 268.
376 NAFTA, Art. 1904 (13) & Annex 1904.13. See infra p. 65.
377 NAFTA, Art. 1905 (1). A party can call for consultations also when it alleges that the other party's
law denied it the possibility to obtain panel review, prevented establishment of a panel or prevented a
panel from rendering final decision. Id.
"•NAFTA, Art. 1905(1).
"' NAFTA, Art. 1905 (2) & (3).
3«° NAFTA, Art. 1905 (4) & (5); Annex 1904.13. See infra p. 67-68 & n. 397-99.
381 NAFTA, Art. 1905 (6); Annex 1905.6. See also Cannon, supra note 324, at 105. For the special
committee's rules of procedure, see NAFTA Annex 1905.6. A schedule for the Safeguard Procedure is
found in Cannon, supra note 324, at 105.
3» NAFTA, Art. 1905 (6); Annex 1905.6.
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invited to start consultations. 383 The complaining party is entitled to suspend benefits or
the operation ofNAFTA Art. 1 904 if, after 60 days, the parties are unable to agree on a
mutually satisfactory solution or the responding party does not correct the problem.384
The suspensions are subject to revision by the special committee whether the suspension
of benefits is "manifestly excessive" or the problem has already been corrected. 385 In the
case that the complaining party is suspending the operation of NAFTA Art. 1904, the
violating party is allowed to suspend the other party's benefits as a countermeasure. 386
The effectiveness of the Safeguard Mechanism has been doubted because its use would
indicate a failure of the entire Chapter 19 process. 387
'"NAFTA, Art. 1905(7).
3M NAFTA, Art. 1905(8).
315 NAFTA, Art. 1905(10).
» NAFTA, Art. 1905(9).
347 Winham, supra note 272, at 269. "[I]t appears that given the successful history of Chapter 19 in the
[C]FTA it is unlikely a Special Committee would arise between Canada and the United States, but it may
form a useful sanction to ensure that Mexico . . . adopts the domestic practices necessary to implement
Article 19. However, it is unlikely that the extension of Chapter 19 to Mexico could survive any
substantial use of Article 1905, since that article essentially signals a breakdown of the undertakings of
Chapter 19 itself." Id. Conversely, another author finds that this mechanism "should provide added
reinforcement for the binational review system" as "the safeguard mechanism is both more formal and
more specific than the general provisions of chapter 20." Huntington, supra note 162, at 438. See also
Cannon, supra note 324, at 107. Yet the first opinion seems more realistic. If a party in fact sets up legal
obstacles with respect to the establishment of a panel or the implementation of its decision, this party
shows no interest at all in a well-functioning process and will try to obstruct the process wherever it can.
Under these circumstances, the Agreement is practically terminated. See Huntington, supra note 162, at
438. At the present, this scenario is not very likely to happen because "the NAFTA countries are taking
their obligations under the NAFTA and its side agreements seriously and are willing to take steps to
resolve the disputes, which is what the dispute resolution process is intended to achieve." Gonzalez, supra
note 228, at 366.
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(c) The Extraordinary Challenge Procedure
A party may attack a panel's final decision only under the very restricted conditions
of the Extraordinary Challenge Procedure. The NAFTA does not provide for routine
appeals because they would not be "consistent with the general objective of providing
expeditious procedures for settling [AD] and [CVD] matters/' 388 But of course, one could
ask if only speed should matter with in light of the complex nature of the cases. 389 The
Extraordinary Challenge Procedure must not be considered as a regular appeal; it is in
fact far from that. 390
The cause of the complaint, which has to be filed within a "reasonable time" after
the panel's final decision, must fall within one of the three categories listed in the
Agreement, i.e., personal failure of a panel member, a serious disregard by the panel of a
principal procedural provision, or an obvious misuse of its limited powers. 391 Secondly, it
3M Johnson, supra note 32, at 535. See also Moyer, supra note 270, at 716.
3,9 Burke & Walsh, supra note 354, at 539-41 (stating that "[i]f one chooses to look any deeper than
the simple issue of speed, however, the elimination of routes to appeal is clearly troublesome").
390 Appleton, supra note 32, at 140; Huntington, supra note 162, at 437. "Extraordinary challenges are
not designed to act as an appeal court for disputants who are displeased with the result of the panels.
Rather, [they] are designed to consider issues of impropriety which bring the entire system of panel
review into question." Appleton, supra note 32, at 140. Already under the CFTA, the ECC was not to
function as an appellate tribunal. In re Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Pork from Canada, ECC 91-1904-01
USA, opinion (June 14, 19910, reprinted in 13 ITRD (BNA) 1859, 1865; Testimony of M. Jean Anderson,
then Chief Counsel for International Trade, U.S. Dept. of Commerce Subcommittee on Courts, Civil
Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of
Representatives, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. 69, 75-76 (1988).
391 NAFTA, Art. 1904 (13). The article requires a party to allege that
"(i) a member of the panel was guilty of gross misconduct, bias, or a serious conflict of interest, or
otherwise materially violated the rules of conduct,
(ii) the panel seriously departed from a fundamental rule of procedure, or
(iii) the panel manifestly exceeded its powers, authority or jurisdiction set out in ... Article [1904], for
example by failing to apply the appropriate standard of review . . ." Id. It is noteworthy that the CFTA did
not contain the failure to apply the correct standard of review as an example of an act beyond the panel's
competence. This was added at the demand of the U.S. Cannon, supra note 324, at 229-30 . "The purpose
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is necessary that "any of [these] actions ... has materially affected the panel's decision
and threatens the integrity of the binational panel review process."392
Thus, in contrast to the Chapter 19 panels which work within the limits of the
existing domestic law, "challenge committees construing and applying [the
aforementioned provision] are fashioning a new jurisprudence." 393 The functioning of the
panel process will "undoubtedly" be affected by the newly created case law. 394 Therefore,
it has been predicted that "the arbitral model of nonreviewable dispute resolution will
remain intact" if the decisions issued by the ECE "continue to limit recourse to
extraordinary challenges to truly extraordinary abuses of the Chapter 19 panel
process."395
Once a complaint has been filed, the parties are given 15 days to set up a three-
person Extraordinary Challenge Committee (ECE). 396 The committee members are
"judges or former judges" listed in a pre-established roster. 397 Every party nominates one
committee member, and the drawing of lots decides which party is to select the third
of the change is to maximize the uniformity of panel decisions, with each other and with established U.S.
law." Endsley, supra note 258, at 685 (citation omitted).
3,2 NAFTA, Art. 1904 (13). Given the aforementioned restrictive conditions, it is very doubtful
whether the "ECC review is intended to promote uniformity between panel decisions", as one author
wrote. See Deyling, supra note 333, at 370.
m Moyer, supra note 270, at 724.
m Moyer, supra note 270, at 724.
3,5 Moyer, supra note 270, at 724.
"* NAFTA, Annex 1904.13 (1).
m NAFTA, Annex 1904.13 (1). Compare to the NAFTA Chapter 20 panel roster of up to 30 persons
and the Chapter 19 panel roster of 75 persons, the 15-person roster for the extraordinary challenge
committee is relatively small, which may also indicate that the negotiating parties did not consider the
extraordinary challenge procedure to be used very often. Nevertheless, they gave high priority to the
qualifications of the committee members requiring to be or have been judges. Just the same, one author
has criticized that, in contrast to Chapter 19 panelists, the ECE members "are not supposed to be
specialists in trade law [but] generalists [which] leave[s] the problem of [their] unfamiliarity with the other
countries' standard ofjudicial review." Bessko, supra note 270, at 353-54.
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member. 398 "Even though this selection process is thorough and attempts to eliminate
bias by leaving the deciding ECC to . . . lottery, it still does not completely eliminate
potential bias". 399
Rules of procedure that have to be established by the parties "shall provide for a
decision . . . within 90 days."400 The ECE analyzes the legal and factual aspects of the
initial case as well as the panel's findings and conclusions, and it determines whether the
extraordinary challenge is justified. 401 If they are not, the committee will deny the
challenge, thereby upholding the original panel's decision. 402 But if the ECE finds that
the complaint is justified, the panel's decision will be remanded or vacated. 403 In the
latter situation, a panel composed of new members will reinvestigate the case.404
d) Dispute Settlement under the Environmental and the Labor Side Agreements
The Side Agreements distinguish between disputes arising out of a "persistent
pattern of failure by [a] party to effectively enforce" its environmental laws or particular
labor standards and all other disputes405 ("enforcement matters and non-enforcement
« NAFTA, Annex 1904.13 (1).
599 Bessko, supra note 270, at 354.
« NAFTA, Annex 1904.13 (2).
401 NAFTA, Art. 1904 (13) & Annex 1904.13 (3). "By expanding the period of review [which was 30
days under the CFTA] and requiring ECCs to look at the panel's underlying legal and factual analysis
[which was not contained in the CFTA], the changes to Annex 1904 clarify that an ECCs responsibilities
do not end with simply ensuring that the panel articulated the correct standard of review. Rather, ECCs are
to examine whether the panel analyzed the substantive law and underlying facts." Statement of
Administrative Action, at 197, reprinted in North American Free Trade Agreement, Texts of Agreement,
Implementing Bill, Statement of Administrative Action, and Requiring Supporting Statements, H.R. Doc.
No. 159, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., at 663 (1993).
« NAFTA, Annex 1904.13 (3).
403 NAFTA, Annex 1904.13 (3).
« NAFTA, Annex 1904.13 (3).
*°5 NAAEC, Art. 20 (1) & 22 (1); NAALC, Art. 20 & 27 (1). A "persistent pattern of failure" means
"a sustained or recurring course of action or inaction, . . . and does not include a single instance of case."
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matters"406). In order to resolve the latter ones, the NAAEC and the NAALC simply
encourage the parties to "make every attempt through consultations and cooperation to
resolve [the] matter" without further specification.407
The way both Side Agreements deal with the first category of conflicts is "far more
intricate". 408 Their system is nearly identical when it comes to the consultation phase of
the settlement procedure, which is why they will be analyzed together for the most part.
But in contrast to the Environmental Side Accord, the NAALC requires the parties to
follow an initial process before the dispute resolution concerning "enforcement matters"
begins the consultation phase.
(1) The Pre-Stage under the Labor Side Agreement
Under the Labor Side Agreement, an NAO may ask for consultations with another
NAO concerning "the other [p]arty's labor law, its administration, or labor market
conditions". 409 Also, a meeting at ministerial level may be requested "regarding any
matter within the scope of [the] Agreement".410 Should the ministerial consultations not
lead to a resolution, the Council for Labor Cooperation, upon request of any consulting
party, establishes an Evaluation Committee of Experts (ECE). 411 The ECE's analysis is
NAAEC, Art. 45; NAALC, Art. 49. One author has noted correctly that it still remains unclear what
exactly constitutes a "persistent pattern of failure". Bhala, supra note 42, at 1349.
406 Lopez, supra note 279, at 185.
« NAAEC, Art. 20 (1); NAALC, Art. 20.
« Lopez, supra note 279, at 185.
*°» NAALC, Art. 21 (1). "As of December 1996, seven controversies were formally submitted to the
NAOs . . . Two of [those seven] progressed to the level of ministerial consultations." Lopez, supra note
279, at 195.
"° NAALC, Art. 22(1).
411 NAALC, Art. 23 (1). An ECE can only be established if the matter is either "trade-related" or
"covered by mutually recognized labor laws." NAALC, Art. 23 (3). Friction might occur when it comes to
decide what is meant by these expressions as no further definition is given by the agreement itself. Bhala,
supra note 42, at 1353.
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limited to "patterns of practice by each [p]arty in the enforcement of its occupational
safety and health and other technical labor standards".412 Following the Rules of
Procedure established by the Council, the three ECE members, who have to meet certain
qualifications, are chosen from a roster whenever possible.413
After gathering information from all possible sources and receiving comments
thereon and submissions from the parties, the ECE issues a draft report within 120 days
after it is established. 414 In this report, the ECE assesses the matter in question, draws its
conclusions, and recommends solutions. 415 Considering the parties' views on its draft, the
ECE has 60 days to present a final report to the Council.416 Thereafter the parties may
respond to the ECE's recommendations, and "[t]he final report and such written
responses shall be tabled for consideration at the next regular session of the Council
[which] may keep the matter under review".417
For actual developments within the scope of the CEC, see its website at Commission for
Environmental Cooperation (visited July 12, 1997) <http://www.cec.org>. "As of December 1996, no
ECE had been convened to review any labor dispute between the NAFTA countries." Lopez, supra note
279, at 195.
* NAALC, Art. 23 (2).
4" NAALC, Art. 24 (lXa)-(c). The Agreement provides that the chair is chosen by the Council from a
roster of experts established in consultation with the ILO, and, "where possible, other members shall be
selected from a roster developed by the [p]arties". Id. But no stipulation prescribes exactly the method of
how to choose the other ECE members. Compare to NAFTA, Art. 2011. Qualifications for the ECE
members are expertise or experience in labor matters or other appropriate disciplines; they have to be
chosen only "on the bases of objectivity, reliability and sound judgment [, and have to] be independent of,
and not affiliated with or take instructions from, any [p]arty or the Secretariat." NAALC, Art. 24 ( 1 )(c).
«m NAALC, Art.24 (l)(d)-(f), 25 (1).
'"NAALC, Art. 25(1).
«« NAALC, Art. 25 (2), 26 (1).
* NAALC, Art. 26 (3) & (4).
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(2) Consultations under the Two Side Agreements
Under the NAAEC, the resolution of a dispute of "non-enforcement matters" starts
with a request for consultations between the parties, whereas under the Labor Side
Accord, such a request is possible only after the ECE has presented its final report.418
Both Agreements require the parties to "make every attempt to arrive at a mutually
satisfactory resolution"419 , thus emphasizing the role of consultations in order to obtain a
solution at a very early stage of the dispute.
*'* NAAEC, Art. 22 (1); NAALC, Art. 27 (1). A dispute under both agreements arises when a party
alleges that "there has been a persistent pattern of failure by [another p]arty to effectively enforce" its
environmental laws or certain labor standards which means "a sustained or recurring course of action or
inaction beginning after the date of entry into force of [the Agreements]." Id.; NAAEC, Art. 45 (1);
NAALC, Art. 49(1).
It is noteworthy that "[t]he NAAEC contains no environmental injury test, and the complaining
country does not have to show environmental injury to it or to the scofflaw country." Chamovitz, supra
note 36, at 267.
The Labor Side Accord only allows consultations with respect to "occupational safety and health,
child labor or minimum wages." NAALC, Art. 27 (1). Hence the issue is further limited in comparison to
what the ECE is allowed to analyze. See supra p. 69-70 & n. 41 1-12. The reason for this limitation and the
one stipulated by the NAAEC might be that "[s]ince the process could result in the imposition of trade
sanctions [and monetary penalties] . . . , it has been restricted to the most serious cases of enforcement
failure." Christopher Thomas & Gregory A. Tereposky, The NAFTA and the Side Agreement on
Environmental Co-operation, 27:6 J. World Trade 5, 27 (1993). Nevertheless, one author criticized that
"the wording of Article 27:1 is confusing, and the result is anomalous." Bhala, supra note 42, at 1354.
As of December 1996, "[n]o NAFTA country formally has alleged that another country has engaged
in a persistent pattern of failure to effectively enforce its environmental laws." Lopez, supra note 279, at
188 (citation omitted). No dispute under the NAALC has reached the stage of party consultation. Id., at
195. One author has observed that "the Side Accordfs] substantially increased the threshold requirement
to begin [the arbitration] process" because of possible trade sanctions or monetary penalties. Kelly, supra
note 225, at 82.
«» NAAEC, Art. 22 (4); NAALC, Art. 27 (4).
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(3) Special Council Session
If no accord is reached after 60 days, any party may ask the respective Council to
convene for a special session within 20 days. 420 The Councils are to "resolve the dispute
promptly" by using the advice of experts, by employing alternative ways of dispute
resolution, or by making the appropriate recommendations. 421
(4) Panel Phase
If the parties are not able to reach a mutually satisfactory resolution within 60 after
the Councils' meetings, the Council establishes an arbitral panel upon request and by a
two-thirds vote.422 The introduction of a two-thirds vote (in contrast to the usual
consensus) obviously aims at preventing the accused party of blocking the process. But,
in contrast to the framework in Chapter 20 of the NAFTA, a "panel cannot be formed
absent a majority vote of the Council." 423 The panelists who have to meet certain
qualifications will be chosen from a roster. 424 The provisions for the selection process and
420 NAAEC, Art. 23 (1) & (3); NAALC, Art. 28 (1) & (3). The Councils are the Council for
Environmental Cooperation and the Council for Labor Cooperation, respectively. See supra page 42.
421 NAAEC, Art. 23 (3); NAALC, Art. 28 (3).
422 NAAEC, Art. 24 (1); NAALC, Art. 29 (1). Both Side Agreements limit the scope of the panels'
investigations. The Environmental Side Accord authorizes a panel to examine only a case where a
persistent pattern of failure of effectively enforcing the environmental law "relates to a situation involving
workplaces, firms, companies or sectors that produce goods or provide services: (a) traded between the
territories of the [pjarties; or (b) that compete, in the territory of the [p]arty complained against, with
goods and services produced or provided by persons of another [p]arty." NAAEC, Art. 24 (1). By the
same token, under the NAALC a panel must not investigate more than the enforcement failure regarding
"occupational safety and health, child labor or minimum wage technical labor standards [that] is: (a)
trade-related; and (b) covered by mutually recognized labor laws." NAALC, Art. 29 (1).
423 Lopez, supra note 279, at 187. See also supra p. 50 & n. 288-89.
424 The panelists shall have expertise or experience in environmental or labor law, respectively, or "its
enforcement, or in the resolution of disputes arising under international agreements, or other relevant
scientific, technical or professional expertise or experience; ... be chosen strictly on the basis of
objectivity, reliability and sound judgment; ... be independent of, not affiliated with or take instructions
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the possibility for a third party to join as complainant are the same as the NAFTA Art.
2008 (3) and 201 1.425 The Councils establish Model Rules of Procedure containing
certain procedural guarantees, and the Agreements set up the Terms of Reference; both
are valid until the parties agree otherwise. 426 The role of experts is regulated as it is in the
NAFTA.427
Based on information gathered from the parties, experts, or other appropriate
persons or bodies, the panels distribute an initial report within 180 days after the last
panelist is selected.428 The initial report contains findings of fact, determines whether
there has been a "persistent pattern of failure" by a party in effectively enforcing its
domestic environmental or labor laws, and, if so, recommends how "to remedy the
pattern of non-enforcement."429 Separate opinions are possible, but they are
anonymous.430 A time limit of 30 days is set for the parties to make comments on the
initial report. 431
Taking such comments into account, the panels may reexamine the case and
reconsider the draft, asking the view of another party, before issuing a final report within
60 days after the presentation of the draft. 432
from any [p]arty, the [relevant] Secretariat," or — for disputes on environmental issues only ~ the Joint
Public Advisory Committee. NAAEC, Art. 25 (2), 26 (1); NAALC, Art. 30 (2), 31(1).
« NAAEC, Art.24 (2), 27; NAALC, Art. 29 (2), 32. See supra p. 50 & n. 286, p. 51 & n. 297.
» NAAEC, Art. 28; NAALC, Art. 33.
427 NAAEC, Art. 29, 30; NAALC, Art. 34, 35. See supra p. 52 and n. 302. In contrast to the NAFTA
the Side Agreements do not provide for the establishment of scientific review boards.
* NAAEC, Art. 31 (1) & (2); NAALC, Art. 36 (1) & (2). The agreements name the sources of
information for the panels, but "[h]ow a panel may ascertain whether there has been a failure of
enforcement remains unclear ... Is a high percentage of enforcement convictions a sign of effective or
ineffective enforcement? Are repeat violations a sign of enforcement failure? The [Agreements do] not
answer these questions." Charnovitz, supra note 36, at 268 (citation omitted).
« NAAEC, Art. 3 1 (2); NAALC, Art. 36 (2).
«° NAAEC, Art. 3 1 (3); NAALC, Art. 36 (3).
« NAAEC, Art. 31 (4); NAALC, Art. 36 (4).
« NAAEC, Art. 3 1 (5), 32; NAALC, Art. 36 (5), 37.
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(5) Implementation and Enforcement of Panel Reports
If the panel finds a "persistent pattern of failure" regarding the enforcement of
environmental or labor laws by the party complained against, the Agreements propose a
"mutually satisfactory action plan" agreed upon by the parties in the first place. 433 Three
articles and three annexes in each agreement lay down a very meticulous scheme
concerning implementation and sanctioning. 434 The detailed stipulations try to cover
every imaginable situation. A variety of possibilities, including time frames of not more
than 60 days up to at least 180 days, is described in a scrupulous but also "bewildering"
manner. 435
Basically, there are two situations for a complaining party to request the relevant
Council to reconvene the panel. The first occurs when the parties do not agree on an
action plan.436 In this case, the reconvened panel analyzes whether the plan is sufficient.437
If it is not, the panel develops its own action plan. 438 Additionally, it has the power but
not the duty to impose a monetary enforcement assessment. 439 Secondly, the panel may
be reassembled when the full implementation of an action plan is in doubt, no matter if it
is an agreed-upon or a panel-developed plan.440 In the case that the panel determines that
the implementation is insufficient, it is required to impose a monetary enforcement
« NAAEC, Art. 33; NAALC, Art. 38.
4M NAAEC, Art. 34-36 & Annexes 34-36B; NAALC, Art. 39-41 & Annexes 39-4 IB.
435 Reisman & Wiedman, supra note 55, at 32. In order to make the confusing treaty provisions easier
to understand, they are simplified in the following description, leaving out the time limits and some details
that are not necessary to understand how the system generally works. A helpful floating chart is displayed
in Reisman & Wiedman, supra note 55, at 36-38.
«6 NAAEC, Art. 34 (l)(a) & (2); NAALC, Art. 39 (l)(a) & (2).
«" NAAEC, Art. 34 (4Xa) & (6); NAALC, Art. 39 (4)(a) & (6).
43
« Id.
« NAAEC, Art. 34 (4)(b) & Annex 34; NAALC, Art. 39 (4)(b) & Annex 39.
«° NAAEC, Art. 34 (l)(b) & (3); NAALC, Art. 39 (l)(b) & (3).
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assessment. 441 All assessments are limited with respect to their amount. 442 If a party does
not pay, the complaining party is entitled to suspend NAFTA trade benefits "in an
amount no greater than that sufficient" to collect the assessment through tariffs.443 Once
the reconvened panel decides that either the monetary enforcement has been paid or the
action plan has been fully implemented, the "suspension of benefits . . . shall be
terminated."444 Should the recalcitrant party suspect that the suspension of benefits is
"manifestly excessive", the panel may be reconvened on request. 445
Summarizing the process, one scholar noted that
the feature that characterizes it is political adjustment. Despite the provision for
arbitration, modalities of consultation, negotiation, and mediation are employed
at every possible opportunity, even after the arbitrators have presented their
final report. Further, at virtually every stage, even after an arbitration ruling, the
party complained against is responsible for a solution short of sanctions. The
«' NAAEC, Art. 34 (5), (6), 35 & Annex 34; NAALC, Art. 39 (5), (6), 40 & Annex 39. The fines are
to be paid into funds established by the respective councils and to be used to improve the enforcement of
environmental or labor laws in the party complained against. NAAEC, Annex 34 (3); NAALC, Annex 39
(3).
442 For the first year after the agreements entered into force the monetary enforcement assessment
must not exceed $ 20 million; "[thereafter [it] shall be no greater than .007 percent of total trade in goods
between the [pjarties during the most recent year for which data are available." NAAEC Annex 34;
NAALC Annex 39. "In 1995, total trade in goods between the three NAFTA parties equaled
approximately $ 383 billion. . . Thus, the maximum monetary enforcement assessment that could have
been imposed during 1996 on any party was .007 percent of that amount, or $ 26.8 million." Lopez, supra
note 279, at 187 n. 255 (citation omitted).
« NAAEC, Art. 36 (l)-(3), Annexes 36 A & 36B; NAALC, Art. 41 (l)-(3), Annexes 41 A & 41 B.
The
*** NAAEC, Art. 36 (4); NAALC, Art. 41 (4).
445 NAAEC, Art. 36 (5); NAALC, Art. 41 (5). "'Manifestly excessive' will likely be construed to
mean that the suspension of benefits is greater than the monetary enforcement assessment issued by the
panel." Kelly, supra note 225, at 88.
Questioning the purpose of the monetary penalty, one author predicted that "[publicity and
transparency will prove to be more effective enforcement than the symbolic $20 million fine. In fact, most
disputes will be effectively resolved by the council, the ECE or the arbitral panels, so monetary and trade
sanctions will not be relied upon as the primary means of enforcement." Schoenbaum, supra note 34, at
483.
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respondent is encouraged at every stage to improve its enforcement of
environmental, health and labor standards, without having to appear to be
responding to threats from the other governments. The process is designed to
avoid coercive measures, but the possibility of sanctions, and all the negative
political implication they entail, stands at the end of the line to provide incentive
for mediated and negotiated resolution. 446
4. Criticism and Reform Proposals
a) NAFTA in General
Numerous suggestions have been proposed, some of which have already been made
for the CFTA. Among them was the proposal of the Joint Working Group of the
Canadian, Mexican, and United States bar associations to establish a permanent and
independent Free Trade Tribunal for the interpretation of the NAFTA.447 However, the
NAFTA negotiators considered such an institution undesirable or politically damaging. 448
After the conclusion of the NAFTA, the Joint Working Group nevertheless reissued the
proposal for a permanent tribunal responsible for interpretation. 449
446 Garvey, supra note 230, at 444. Interestingly, another author arrived at a partly different conclusion
when he reasoned that "each stage of the process provides an opportunity to apply pressure to get
countries to enforce their environmental [and labor] laws . . . [Their obligations] can be enforced by trade
sanctions . . . Moreover, [Canada, Mexico and the United States] are physical neighbors and interact
continuously in many ways. Therefore, the countries have ... a variety of means to attempt to persuade
each other to comply with the provisions." Magraw, Jr., supra note 226, at 204.
447 Joint ABA/CBA/BM Working Group on Dispute Settlement, supra note 270, at 863.
441 Frederick M. Abbott, Integration Without Institutions: The NAFTA Mutation of the EC Model and
the Future of the GATT Regime, 40 Am. J. Comp. L. 917, 944-45 (1992). Instead of an independent
tribunal, the NAFTA parties preferred to leave the question of interpretation to themselves. NAFTA, Art.
2003.
449 Joint ABA/CBA/BM Working Group on Dispute Settlement, The Joint Working Group of the
American Bar Association, the Canadian Bar Association, and the Barra Mexicana Report on Dispute
Settlement Procedures in the North American Free Trade Agreement, 27 Int'l Law. 831, 835 (1993). See
also Siqueiros, supra note 245, at 393-94.
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Similarly, some authors suggested the introduction of a right to appeal and,
consequently, the establishment of a standing Appellate Tribunal for disputes arising
under NAFTA and the side agreements.450 Such an appellate tribunal was considered to
"facilitate uniformity and coherence in the interpretation of regional norms."451
By the same token, it has been proposed to establish a permanent panel for Chapter
19 and 20 disputes which "would relieve the Secretariat of having to find eligible
panelists."452 A permanent tribunal would "develop a consistent jurisprudence" more
easily than ad hoc panels. 453 But the creation of a permanent tribunal might also cause
problems. Given the fact that the arbitration procedures under the CFTA has been used
only five times, it is hard to believe that a permanent institution "would have enough
work to justify its existence."454 Also, the possible damage done by "an uncongenial
tribunal" is much greater than that from an ad hoc panel which is dissolved after one
dispute. 455
Another point of criticism concerns the secrecy of the proceedings. 456 It was
proposed to open them more so that the public can have access not only to the final panel
report but also to, e.g., party submissions.457
Furthermore, the effectiveness of sanctions in the form of retaliatory measures has
been questioned.458 "[BJecause of the size difference and relative trade dependence of
450 Cannon, supra note 324, at 224; Burke & Walsh, supra note 354, at 561-62; Deyling, supra note
333, at 370; Fitzpatrick, supra note 28, at 9 1-94. See also Darby, supra note 32, at 15.
" Fitzpatrick, supra note 28, at 92. See also Cannon, supra note 324, at 174.
Rosa, supra note 245, at 301-02. See also Castel, supra note 251, at 126; Johnson, supra note 313,
•151
452
at 2185-86.
1 Johnson, supra note 3 1 3, at 2 1 85j n 5 u, zi»:>.
Johnson, supra note 313, at 2186. See also Garvey, supra note 230, at 452.
Johnson, supra note 313, at 2186. See also Oelstrom, supra note 245, at p. 790 n.
See Oelstrom, supra note 245, at 790.
457 See Bialos & Siegel, supra note 81, at 620.
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Mexico and Canada on the United States[, a] retaliatory suspension of benefits of 'equal
effect' would hurt [the first two countries] proportionately more than the [latter one]."459
b) The Side Agreements
The Side Agreements have been criticized for establishing too lengthy and too
cumbersome a procedure before finally arriving at a solution. 460 In the case of a losing
party that "continues to shirk implementation", it can take up to 1,485 days (i.e., nearly
four years) from the initiation of the procedure until the imposition of a sanction. 461 Due
to the time it takes to bring a complaint under the Side Agreements, "the abuses can
continue unchecked."462
Some critics have doubted if the relatively small monetary enforcement assessments
will contribute to a country's willingness to enforce its labor or environmental laws.463
However, one author who observed that "[t]he remedy of retaliation through the
suspension of benefits has never proven effective" welcomed the "unique damages
45» Hage, supra note 251, at 375-76; Rosa, supra note 245, at 298. Of course, the same arguments can
be used to oppose the present system of sanctions under the WTO.
459 Rosa, supra note 245, at 289-99. See also Barber, supra note 321, at 1016.
440 Champion, supra note 227, at 229; Charnovitz, supra note 36, at 270; Kelly, supra note 225, at 96;
Reisman & Wiedman, supra note 55, at 33; Alicia A. Samios, NAFTA's Supplemental Agreement: In
Need of a Reform, 9 N.Y. Int'l L. Rev. 49, 74 (1996).
461 Reisman & Wiedman, supra note 55, at 33. "At a minimum, it would take 755 days from the
initiation of a complaint to the attainment of a trade sanction [under the NAAEC]. While this is lengthy --
the same procedure under the NAFTA dispute settlement process takes only 240 days — it is summary
justice compared to the extremely prolonged and complex procedures to reach in the [NAALC]. Indeed,
some commentators have suggested that complaints about child labor enforcement will be rendered moot
because the victims will no longer be children by the time the Labor Commission would permit trade
sanctions." Charnovitz, supra note 36, at 270 (citations omitted).
462 Champion, supra note 227, at 229.
461 Charnovitz, supra note 36, at 269 (citing an Administration official who said that the value of the
penalties "would rather be symbolic"); Reisman & Wiedman, supra note 55, at 32-33. See also Patton,
supra note 226, at 109-1 1; Saunders, supra note 35, at 303.
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remedy". 464 It has also been noted that "[publicity and transparency will prove to be
more effective enforcement tools than the symbolic . . . fine[s]."465
Another object for critizism is the possibility for politicians to intervene at
practically every stage of the settlement process.466 Nevertheless, this possibility has been
justified by the fact that including labor and environmental issues in the framework of a
trade agreement is "still-unique" because considerable controversy exists with regard to
these issues. 467 Therefore, politicians prefer a system based on cooperation over one
based on adjudication. 468
Even if more countries are joining the NAFTA (or a succeeding agreement), it is
still not sure whether any of the reform proposals will become part of that agreement.
464 Gastle, supra note 33, at 81 1, 821.
465 Schoenbaum, supra note 34, at 483.
466 Kelly, supra note 225, at 96 (speaking of "political trapdoors"); Samios, supra note 460, at 75. See
also Garvey, supra note 230, at 452.
467 Garvey, supra note 230, at 452; Reisman & Wiedman, supra note 55, at 33.
461 Saunders, supra note 35, at 303-04.
CHAPTER IV
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
This chapter compares the WTO DSU and the various NAFTA settlement
procedures.
A major difference between the Agreements is that for any conflict that arises under
any of the WTO agreements, a single procedure is to be chosen469 , whereas in the
NAFTA, Chapter 19, Chapter 20, and both Side Agreements set up their own systems
and institutions. 470 However, with the exception of Chapter 1 9, it can also be seen as a
commonality that the DSU, NAFTA Chapter 20, and the Side Agreements establish
permanent institutions that are distinguishable from the contracting parties, even if
composed thereof. 471 These bodies (DSB, FTC, Council for Labor Cooperation, and
Council for Environmental Cooperation) play an important role in the settlement process
in that they convene arbitral panels. 472 It is unique that the DSB, in this regard the most
powerful institution, adopts the panel reports473 ; under the other agreements (with the
exception of Chapter 19474) it is left to the parties to decide475 . The voting modus in the
bodies differs: the DSB decides by "negative" consensus476 , the FTC and both Side
Agreement Councils basically by consensus.477
*» DSU, Art. 1(1).
470 NAFTA, Art. 1901 (2), 1903, 1904, 2001, 2006-19 ; NAAEC, Art.8, 22-36; NAALC, Art. 8, 20-
41.
« DSU, Art. 2(1); NAFTA, Art. 2001 (1); NAAEC, Art. 8(1); NAALC, Art. 8 (1).
472 DSU, Art. 6 (1); NAFTA, Art. 2008 (2); NAAEC, Art. 24 (1); NAALC, Art. 25 (1).
473 DSU, Art. 16(1)&(4).
*74 NAFTA, Art. 1904(9).
« NAFTA, Art. 2018 (1); NAAEC, Art. 33; NAALC, Art. 38 (1).
476 DSU, Art. 6 (1), 16 (4), 17 (14), 22 (6).
<77 NAFTA, Art. 2001 (4); NAAEC, Art. 9 (6); NAALC, Art. 9 (6).
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A second commonality is that at the beginning of a resolution procedure, nearly all
agreements require the disputants to start consultations in order to try to settle the dispute
as early as possible. 478 The exception is Chapter 19, which does not require consultations.
It has to be noted that under the NAAEC, consultations stand at the end of a long pre-
panel stage that involves meetings of the NAOs, meetings on the ministerial level, and
the establishment of an ECE.479
Between the consultation and the panel phase the agreements work differently.
Provided that consultations have failed, the parties ask the DSB to establish a panel. 480
Under Chapter 20, the parties have to ask for an FTC meeting481 ; under the NAAEC and
the NAALC, they must request a special Council session482 ; only in case of their failure
to reach a solution can a request for a panel be made. 483 The wording of Chapter 20 and
especially Chapter 19 suggests that the parties have a right to a panel. 484 The same is
basically true for the DSU because the DSB decides the establishment of a panel by
"negative" consensus. 485 However, the Side Agreements require a two-thirds vote by the
Councils to set up a panel486 ; i.e., a right to a panel does not exist under these
Agreements.487 All systems except Chapter 19 propose additional means of resolving
disputes like good offices, conciliation, and the like — the DSU during the consultation
phase488
,
Chapter 20 and the Side Agreements during the Commission or the Council
47» DSU, Art. 4 (2); NAFTA, Art. 2006 (1); NAAEC, Art. 22 (1); NAALC, Art. 27 (1).
'" NAALC, Art. 21-26.
« DSU, Art. 5 (4).
«' NAFTA, Art. 2007(1).
4» NAAEC, Art. 23 (3); NAALC, Art. 28 (3).
485 NAFTA, Art. 2008 (1); NAAEC, Art. 24 (1); NAALC, Art. 29 (1).
«•* NAFTA, Art. 1901 (2), Annex 1901.2 (2); Art. 2008 (2).
" DSU, Art. 6(1).
* NAAEC, Art. 24 (1); NAALC, Art. 29 (1).
4,7 Reisman & Wiedman, supra note 55, at 32.
DSU, Art. 5.
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meeting, respectively. 489 Thus, the drafters encourage the parties again to try to settle
their disputes as early as possible.
It is interesting to see that the DSU allows only the allegedly affected party to issue
a request for the establishment of a panel490 , whereas Chapter 19, Chapter 20, and the
Side Agreements entitle both parties to do so. 491
All agreements provide for the establishment of a roster from which the panelists are
usually selected. 492 They all require the panelists to meet certain conditions which, of
course, are not similar, 493 and under all agreements the parties choose the panelists.
However, the method of selection differs. Chapter 20 and the Side Agreements employ a
"reverse selection": first, the chair of the panel has to be agreed upon, and then two
citizens of the other party are to be selected by the disputants. 494 Under Chapter 19 each
party selects two panelists, and both parties have to agree on a fifth, whereas the
chairman is appointed by majority vote of the panelists. 495 The DSU stipulates that the
disputing parties find an accord with respect to the panelists which are proposed by the
WTO Secretariat. 496 Not all agreements provide for panels of five persons497 : the DSU
prefers three persons, and a five-member panel is considered exceptional. 498 In case the
« NAFTA, Art. 2007 (5)(b); NAAEC, Art. 23 (4)(b); NAALC, Art. 28 (4)(b).
"°DSU, Art. 5 (4), 6(1).
«" NAFTA, Art. 1904 (2), (5), 2008 (1); NAAEC, Art. 24 (1); NAALC, Art. 29 (1).
« DSU, Art. 8 (4); NAFTA, Art. 1901 (2), Annex 1901.2 (1) & (2), Art. 2009 (1) & (3); NAAEC,
Art. 25 (1) & (3); NAALC, Art. 30 (1) &(3).
" DSU, Art. 8 (1) & (2); NAFTA, Art. 1901 (2), Annex 1901.2 (1) & (2), Art. 2009 (2), 2010 (1);
NAAEC, Art. 25 (2), 26 ( 1 ); NAALC, Art. 30 (2), 31(1).
«< NAFTA, Art. 201 1 (l)(b) & (c); NAAEC, Art.27 (l)(b) & (c); NAALC, Art.32 (l)(b) & (c).
•" NAFTA, Art. 1901 (2), Annex 1901.2 (2).
«• DSU, Art. 8 (6) & (7).
*" NAFTA, Art. 1901 (2), Annex 1901.2 (2) & (3), Art. 2011 (l)(a); NAAEC, Art. 27 (l)(a);
NAALC, Art. 32(1 )(a).
«• DSU, Art. 8 (5).
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parties are unable to agree on the panelists, each agreement contains a safety mechanism
in order to prevent a blockage of the process. 499
Very similar are the panel proceedings. Under all agreements the parties are
accorded the rights to present their arguments in written form and orally500 in order to
ensure a fair process. Nearly all of the proceedings are confidential 501 , which is necessary
to guarantee that the panels function well; otherwise the panelists would be exposed to
influences from outside.
In contrast to the purely binational process employed by Chapter 19502 , third
parties are entitled under the other agreements either to participate during hearings and to
make and receive submissions or to join a panel proceeding as a complaining party. 503
The reason may be that a Chapter 19 panel has to supervise the correct application of
national law, usually an unknown field for a third party. Also under the NAAEC and
NAALC, national law is involved but under a different perspective. First, here the
question is whether it has been enforced and not if it has been applied correctly. Second,
the determination ofAD and CVD duties and the standards of review are highly complex
• DSU, Art. 8 (7); NAFTA, Art. 1901 (2), Annex 1901.2 (2)-(4), Art. 2011 (1Kb) & (d); NAAEC,
Art. 27 (l)(b) & (d); NAALC, Art. 32 (l)(b) & (d).
*» DSU, Art.12 (1), Appendix 3 (4) & (5);NAFTA: Rules of Procedure for Article 1904, Rule 55-69,
supra note 369, at 8694-97;NAFTA, Art.2012 (l)(a); NAAEC, Art. 28 (l)(a) & (b); NAALC, Art. 33
0Xa)&(b).
501 DSU, Art. 14, Appendix 3 (2) & (3); NAFTA: Rules of Procedure for Article 1904, Rule 18, supra
note 369, at 8690; NAFTA, Art. 2012 (l)(b). Unfortunately, it is not clear whether confidentiality also
plays a role for NAAEC and NAALC proceedings. The agreements do not deal with this issue, i.e., it is
not a compulsory matter to be included in the Model Rules of Proceedings that are to be established by the
Councils. NAAEC, Art. 28; NAALC, Art. 33. It seems that those Model Rules have not been established
yet because research in this direction did not lead to a positive result. It cannot be predicted whether those
Model Rules will contain a rule dealing with the confidentiality of the process.
" NAFTA, Art. 1904(1).
DSU, Art. 9, 10; NAFTA, Art. 2006 (3), 2008 (3) & (4), 201 1 (2), 2013; NAAEC, Art. 24 (2), 27
(2), 29; NAALC, Art. 29 (2), 32 (2), 34.
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and complicated, thus demanding a very thorough knowledge of the national law in
question.
In cases brought under the DSU, Chapter 20, NAAEC, and NAALC, the panel
issues an initial and a final report. 504 Only Chapter 19 instructs the panelists to write a
single report505
,
probably to speed up the procedure. With the exception of the DSU the
agreements allow separate opinions to be drafted. 506 Thus, the common law tradition of
dissenting opinions did not find a place within the confines of the WTO.
The force granted to panel reports varies from agreement to agreement, and thus the
agreements are very different in handling the acceptance and implementation of reports.
Chapter 1 9 panel reports are the "strongest" because they are binding on the parties and
do not need to be accepted by another body. 507 Furthermore, the only way to attack such a
report is through the very restrictive Extraordinary Challenge Procedure. 508 NAAEC,
NAALC, and Chapter 20 panel reports are not adopted, either, but they are not accorded
any binding force at all. The parties are encouraged only to use them as suggestions for a
mutually agreed-upon solution. 509 Therefore, politicians can exercise the largest influence
in these cases, because, basically, the disputing parties have to agree on a solution and
are not required to conform to the panel report. Under the DSU, it is the Dispute
Settlement Body, and not the parties, which adopts the report by "negative consensus"
without the possibility of altering it. 510 Thus, the losing party has only a very limited
possibility to block the adoption of the report.
*» DSU, Art. 15 (2); NAFTA, Art. 2016, 2017; NAAEC, Art. 31, 32; NAALC, Art. 36, 37.
« NAFTA, Art. 1904(8).
506 NAFTA: Rules of Procedure for Article 1904, Rule 72, supra note 369, at 8697; NAFTA, Art.
2016 (3), 2017 (1) & (2); NAAEC, Art. 31 (3), 32 (1); NAALC, Art. 36 (3), 37 (1).
•* NAFTA, Art. 1904(9).
» NAFTA, Art. 1904 (13), Annex 1904.13.
*» NAFTA, Art. 2018 (1); NAAEC, Art. 33; NAALC, Art. 38.
» DSU, Art. 16 (4).
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Chapter 19 and the DSU present two unique features, the Extraordinary Challenge
Committee 5 " and the Appellate Body 512
,
which, however, are not comparable. No other
of the agreements has similar procedures for judicial review of a panel decision. A
reason might be that the other agreements still enable the parties to exercise a much
larger influence on the process, i.e., block or delay it, or find a solution different from the
panel's proposition.
Another common factor is the question of sanctioning the non-implementation of
final reports (issued by the panels and ~ in case of the DSU ~ also by the Appellate
Body) or of an agreed-upon solution. In the end, all agreements provide for the
suspension of benefits, i.e., self-help. 513 Under the NAAEC and the NAALC, self-help is
possible only if the other party does not pay the fine imposed on it. 514 The DSU and
Chapter 20 offer voluntary compensation as an alternative solution to the suspension of
benefits. 515 All agreements also entitle the parties to ask for checking the amount of the
suspended benefits. 516 Usually it is left to the parties to supervise if the complained-
against party has taken appropriate action in order to comply with the agreed-upon
solution or the final report. 517 Thus, it is an exception that the Dispute Settlement Body
exercises this function for disputes arising under the WTO agreements. 518
"' NAFTA, Art. 1904 (13), Annex 1904.13.
" J DSU, Art. 17.
515 DSU, Art. 22; NAFTA, Art. 19; NAFTA, Art. 20; NAAEC, Art. 36, Annex 36 B; NAALC, Art. 41,
Annex 4 1 B.
"< NAAEC, Art. 34; Annex 34; NAALC, Art. 39, Annex 39.
515 DSU, Art. 22 (1); NAFTA, Art. 2018 (2).
« DSU, Art. 22 (6); NAFTA, Art. 1905 (10); NAFTA, Art. 2019 (3); NAAEC, Art. 36 (5); NAALC,
Art. 41 (5).
'" NAFTA, Art. 1905 (l)(d) & (2), 2018 (1), 2019 (1); NAAEC, Art. 33 & 34 (1); NAALC, Art. 38 &
39(1).
"•DSU, Art. 21.
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Very different are the maximum time frames from the initiation of a dispute
settlement procedure until the delivery of the final report. Chapter 20 establishes the
shortest time limits. It aims at having the panel issue its report after not more than 255
days. 519 After another 30 days, the winning party is allowed to suspend benefits. 520
Chapter 19 requires the panel to issue its report after 315 days at the latest. 521 It takes
another 210 days for the winning party to suspend benefits. 522 The reason why Chapter
19 panel proceedings take longer than those under Chapter 20 might be that AD and
CVD issues are highly complex and — as the CFTA experience has shown ~ need more
time. The usual time under the DSB is six months, with a maximum of 9 months 523
(plus, at the most, another 60 days for the adoption of the report524). If an appeal is filed,
the entire procedure will last 15 months at the very most525 (plus not more than 30 days
for the adoption of the Appellate Body report526). With up to nearly 16 months, the period
until sanctions can be applied is comparatively long. The lengthiest procedures are
established under the NAFTA Side Agreements. Barely any time limit is specified for
the NAALC pre-panel phase. 527 The NAALC and the NAAEC provide that the settlement
'"NAFTA, Art. 2007 (1), 2008 (1), 201 1 (l)(b) & (c), (3), 2016 (2), 2017 (1) (In this and some of the
following cases the individual time frames given in the respective articles have been added up to calculate
the complete time limit.)
» NAFTA, Art. 2019(1).
"'NAFTA, Art. 1904(14).
• NAFTA, Art. 1905 (2), (3), (6), (7), (8), Annex 1905.6.
DSU, Art. 12 (9).
'"DSU, Art. 16(4).
'"DSU, Art. 12(9), 17(5).
'"DSU, Art. 17(14).
527 The only time limit mentioned are 120 days for the Evaluation Committee to present its draft
report, and 60 days for the final report. NAALC, Art. 25 (1), 26 (1).
87
procedure from its initiation until the panel presents its final report may last up to 445
days. 528 In the worst case it can take another 1060 days to impose a sanction. 529
Another question in this context is if the parties are able not only to alter the given
time limits, which might make the procedures even longer, but also to depart from other
procedural stipulations. With this regard, Chapter 19 contains the strictest regime. There
exists no way for the disputing parties to deviate from the established provisions by
simple accord. 530 The parties have somewhat more freedom under the DSU because they
may determine the panel's Terms of Reference531 , but all other provisions (including the
time limits) have to be followed. Chapter 20 allows the parties to modify most of the
stipulations with the exception of those governing the establishment of a panel and the
application of sanctions. 532 The same is true for both Side Agreements. 533 Consequently,
the possibility for the parties to take deviations from the course described in the
agreements because of, e.g., political considerations varies a lot. 534
" NAAEC, Art. 23 (1), 24 (1), 27 (l)(b) & (c), (3), 31(2), 32 (1); NAALC, Art. 28 (1), 29 (1), 32
(l)(b)&(c),(3), 36(2), 37(1).
"'NAAEC, Art. 34 (l)-(4), 35, 36 (1); NAALC, Art. 39 (l)-(4), 39, 41 (1).
530 See NAFTA, Art. 1904. However, the Safeguard Mechanism allows the parties to make individual
agreements. See NAFTA, Art. 1905 (2) & (3).
»'DSU,Art.7(l).
« NAFTA, Art. 2007 (lXd), 2008 (l)(c), 4 (b), 2012 (2), 2016 (1) & (2), 2017 (1).
* NAAEC, Art. 23 (1), 24 (3), 28 (2) & (3), 31 (1) & (2); NAALC, Art. 28 (1), 29 (3), 33 (2) & (3),
36 (1) & (2). Interestingly, deviations from the stipulations governing the NAALC pre-panel phase do not
depend on agreements by the parties but on a Council decision. See NAALC, Art. 25 (1), 26 (1).
5M At least early events under NAFTA show not only that deviations from the Agreement are made,
but that "NAFTA parties will violate the Agreement under sufficient pressure from domestic political
forces. Certainly this is the case in the U.S.-Mexico trucking dispute (which is the product of pressure by
the U.S. trucking industry) and the Helms-Burton Act (which is the result of legislation designed to satisfy
the demands of Cuban-Americans during an election year) ... A NAFTA party could take a hard line
approach to another country's politically motivated breaches of the Agreement by immediately
demanding consultations and rapidly escalating the dispute to panel proceedings; however, the early
NAFTA experience shows that that is not what is happening. Rather, the NAFTA parties have displayed
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Generally it can be said that for a comparative study, the DSU panel proceedings as
well as the system of Chapter 20 and the Side Agreements should be regarded as being
on one level, whereas Chapter 19 and the DSU appeal process on another. The reason is
that both the Chapter 1 9 panel and the Appellate Body review an initial process, whereas
in the other cases it is the first proceeding. Thus, Chapter 19 differs in most aspects from
the other agreements which have, very basically, the same structure. The most distinctive
points of difference between the first-mentioned agreements are:
(1) the way the DSB is taking decisions;
(2) the possibility of an appeal under the DSU;
(3) the imposition of a monetary fine under the Side Agreements;
(4) the big differences with respect to the time limits; and
(5) the possibility to deviate from the treaty provisions under Chapter 20 and the Side
Agreements.
Thus, politicians do not have any chance to interfere during a Chapter 19 process.
Under the DSU it exists but is very limited because of the "negative consensus"
stipulation. Under Chapter 20 and the Side Agreements, politicians might intervene
practically every moment. This means that, in the end, the agreements are — with the
exception of Chapter 19 — politically controlled to varying degrees.
With regard to the conditions that an efficient and effective conflict resolution
system has to fulfill" 5 , the Chapter 19 dispute settlement procedure meets these
requirements. The DSU and Chapter 20 come close, but the systems established under
the Side Agreements are far from that.
tremendous sensitivity to the domestic electoral pressures faced by their fellow trading partners." Lopez,
supra note 279, at 206.
535 See supra p. 12-13.
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
The analysis conducted in this thesis shows that most of the systems for settling
disputes "seem to reflect the continuing subordination of law to politics in the realm of
international trade." 536 The degrees, of course, vary significantly. On the other hand, it
was demonstrated that there is a general tendency to reduce the political influence and to
become more adjudicatory the longer the agreement exists, the more complex and
complicated it gets, and the more signatories it has. It is a development away from the
negotiation-based settlement process. For the GATT, it was a necessity to render the
dispute settlement mechanism more rule-based537 because the negotiation-based system
failed and was not longer able to resolve disputes effectively. The same cannot be said
for the NAFTA, of course, but the NAFTA has two important features distinctive from
either the WTO or the GATT. First, the NAFTA itself is more adjudicatory than the
GATT ever was (even if it is less adjudicatory than the WTO mechanism). Nevertheless,
there were three possibilities under the CFTA for going through the general dispute
settlement mechanism, whereas under NAFTA there is only one. Insofar as it is possible
to speak of straightening the procedure of dispute settlement procedure, the NAFTA has
S3* Trebilcock & Howse, supra note 38, at 406.
517 The step from the GATT to the WTO was the most definite with regard to making the resolution
system more legalistic, but "[i]f one looks over a longer period, one sees a trend towards judicialization of
the GATT regime. This can be seen in the development of a legal staff at the GATT, and in the increasing
length and complexity of legal arguments of GATT panels. However, the most important indicator is
simply the frequency of GATT panels. In the first ten years of the GATT, there were some twenty rulings
made by GATT panels resulting from complaints brought by contracting parties. This number dropped off
sharply during the 1960s, and then began to climb again in the 1970s. In the decade 1980-9, the number
increased to forty-four rulings." Winham, supra note 3, at 63. See also Huntington, supra note 162, at 443.
89
90
done a step in this direction. The second feature that distinguishes the NAFTA and the
WTO is the number of signature states. The WTO currently counts 130 members, the
NAFTA "only" three. For a system that relies heavily on negotiations, it is easier to
reach an agreement between three than between 130 states. 538 The need for a strict rule-
based system is not as urgent for the NAFTA as it was for the WTO." 9
A yet unresolved issue is the problem of how to deal with a recalcitrant party that
refuses to comply with a ruling. On the level of international economic treaties, it seems
difficult to coerce a country to respect the provisions. 540 The suspension of benefits is the
usual sanction, which, however, does not work effectively. 541 The imposition of a
monetary fine is a new approach which still has to prove its effectiveness. Nevertheless,
there are serious doubts if such a fine can force a violator to "play by the rules". 542 A
third (and the strictest) possibility is simply to cancel the membership of that country. 543
But it seems that politicians do not want to go so far, fearing that it might be their own
country which, for whatever reason, cannot — or does not want to ~ comply with a ruling
and then finds itself excluded. 544
It is interesting to see how countries are dealing with the introduction of new,
formerly "trade-unrelated" issues into an international trade agreement as it was the case
" It is easier to use personal influence and to exercise political pressure with a small number of
countries. And it makes a difference whether it is 129 or two partners who have to be convinced. See
Oelstrom, supra note 245, at 788-89; Straight, supra note 291, at 78. One might also remember that, in the
first years, with fewer members and less complex matters, the GATT 1947 system worked well.
539 See Huntington, supra note 162, at 443.
540 Cocuzza & Forabosco, supra note 85, at 188.
541 Bello & Holmer, supra note 191, at 1 103; Gastle, supra note 33, at 81 1.
542 See those authors referred to in note 463.
543 Cocuzza & Forabosco, supra note 85, at 188.
544 None of the analyzed treaties contains a provision that allows other member states to exclude a
recalcitrant party. And this author does not know of any treaty that provides a possibility of canceling the
membership of another party.
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with the NAAEC and the NAALC. The parties were very cautious in choosing a "soft
law" approach where they retain considerable on the whole procedure. 545 Also, the scope
of the agreements is very limited. In such "new" fields, the parties obviously did not
want to give up their power. Therefore, the settlement system is very much based on
negotiations.
Another question is, of course, whether the pragmatic approach or the legalistic
approach is preferable. Without a doubt, the adjudicatory way is the more effective
process. On the other hand, it always results in a "winner and loser" situation, which can
generate friction. 546 Furthermore, it becomes more difficult to amend or change any
provision in the agreements because the parties are unable to make "adjustments" during
the dispute settlement procedure.
Nevertheless, even if effectiveness is only one aspect of evaluating a conflict
resolution system, it is one of the major aspects. It is very important that the system
works in order not to create frustration just because of its non-functioning. With this
respect, the WTO seems well equipped even to accept more member states, to govern
more agreements, and still to provide an effective mechanism to conflict resolution. In
the event that significantly more countries become parties to the NAFTA (or a
succeeding agreement), however, the treaty will have to change its general dispute
settlement system and put more emphasis on a legalistic approach; otherwise it is very
likely that whole system will block and fail.
545 See Reisman & Wiedman, supra note 55, at 33.
546 Manley O. Hudson, International Tribunals: Past and Future 213 (1944).
BIBLIOGRAPHY
A $510 Billion Boost to World Income, Focus: GATT Newsletter, Nov. 1994, at 2
(Information and Media Relations Division ofGATT publ.)
Frederick M. Abbott, Integration Without Institutions: The NAFTA Mutation of the EC
Model and the Future of the GATT Regime, 40 Am. J. Comp. L. 917 (1992)
Kenneth W. Abbott, The Uruguay Round and Dispute Resolution: Building a Private-
Interests System of Justice, 1992 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 1 1
1
Tracy M. Abels, The World Trade Organization's First Test: The United States-Japan
Auto Dispute, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 467 (1996)
William J. Aceves, Lost Sovereignty? The Implications of the Uruguay Round
Agreements, 19 Fordham Inti L.J. 427 (1995)
Roy J. Adams & Parbudyal Singh, Early Experience with NAFTA' s Labour Side
Accord, 18 Comp. Lab. L.J. 161 (1997)
Philip A. Akakwam, The Standard of Review in the 1994 Antidumping Code:
Circumscribing the Role of GATT Panels in Reviewing National Antidumping
Determinations, 5 Minn. J. Global Trade 277 (1996)
92
93
Barry Appleton, Navigating NAFTA (1994)
Asean Trade Zone Nears, Fin. Times, Feb. 25, 1997, at 1
Peter Backes, Die neuen Streitbeilegungsregeln der Welthandelsorganisation (WTO)
[The New Dispute Settlement Provisions of the WTO], 1995 Recht der intemationalen
Wirtschaft[RIW]916
Stewart A. Baker & Jeffrey P. Bialos (eds.), The North American Free Trade Agreement:
Issues, Options, Implications (1992)
Michael Barber, NAFTA Dispute Resolution Provisions: Leaving Room for Abusive
Tactics by Airlines Looking Southward, 61 J. Air L. & Com. 991 (1996)
John H. Barton & Barry E. Carter, International Law and Institutions for a New Age, 8
1
Geo. L.J. 535(1993)
Judith H. Bello, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: Less is More, 90 Am. J.
Int'lL. 416 (1996)
Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, Guide to the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement
(1990)
Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, U.S. Trade Law and Policy Series No. 24: Dispute
Resolution in the New World Trade Organization: Concerns and Net Benefits, 28 Inti
Law. 1095(1994)
94
Judith H. Bello et al. (eds.), The North American Free Trade Agreement (1994)
Judith H. Bello et al., U.S. Trade Law and Policy Series No. 18: Midterm Report on
Binational Dispute Settlement under the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement,
25 Inti Law. 489(1991)
Bob Beneson, With Health Care Receding, GATT Pact Gains Urgency, 52. Cong. Q.
2661 (1994)
Ivan Bernier & Benoit Lapointe, Free Trade Agreement between Canada and the United
States Annotated (1990)
Zsolt K. Bessko, CFTA-NAFTA Dispute Resolution on the Rocks?: The Softwood
Lumber Case, 15 J.L. & Com. 335 (1995)
Jagdish Bhagwati, Regionalism versus Multilateralism, 15:5 World Economy 535 (1992)
Jagdish Bhagwati, Trade Liberalisation and "Fair Trade" Demands: Addressing the
Environmental and Labour Standards Issues, 18:6 World Economy 745 (1995)
Raj Bhala, International Trade Law (1996)
Jeffrey P. Bialos & Deborah E. Siegel, Dispute Resolution under the NAFTA: The
Newer and Improved Model, 27 Int'l Law. 603 (1993)
95
Robert E. Burke & Brian F. Walsh, NAFTA Binational Panel Review: Should it be
Continued, Eliminated or Substantially Changed?, 20 Brook. J. Inti L. 529 (1995)
R. H. Campbell et al. (eds.), Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the
Wealth of Nations (1976) (1776)
James R. Cannon, Resolving Disputes under NAFTA Chapter 19 169-70 (1994)
Robert J. Carbaugh, International Economics (2nd ed., 1985)
J.G. Castel, The Settlement of Disputes under the 1988 Canada-United States Free Trade
Agreement, 83 Am. J. Int'l L. 1 18 (1989)
Karen Vossler Champion, Who Pays for Free Trade? The Dilemma of Free Trade and
International Labor Standards, 22 N.C. J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 181 (1996)
Steve Chamovitz, Environmental and Labour Standards in Trade, 15:3 World Economy
335(1992)
Steve Chamovitz, The NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement: Implications for
Environmental Cooperation, Trade Policy, and American Treatymaking, 8 Temp. Inti &
Comp.LJ. 257 (1994)
W.R. Cline (ed.), Trade Policy in the 1980s 159 (1983)
96
Commission for Environmental Cooperation (visited July 12, 1997) <http://www.
cec.org>
Claudio Cocuzza & Andrea Forabosco, Are States Relinquishing their Sovereign Rights?
The GATT Dispute Settlement Process in a Globalized Economy, 4 Tul. J. Int'l &
Comp. L. 161(1996)
Steven P. Croley & John H. Jackson, WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures, Standard of
Review, and Deference to National Governments, 90 Am. J. Inti L. 193 (1996)
John Croome, Reshaping the World Trading System: A History of the Uruguay Round
(1995)
John Croome, The Results of the Uruguay Round: A Guide (1996)
Kenneth W. Dam, The GATT: Legal and International Economic Organization (1970)
Joseph Darby, Legal and Economic Aspects of the NAFTA (1995)
William J. Davey, Dispute Settlement in GATT, 1 1 Fordham Int'l J. 51 (1987)
William F. Davey et al. (eds.), Handbook of GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement, Part One
(1996); Part Two (1996)
Paul Demaret, The Metamorphoses of the GATT: From the Havana Charter to the
World Trade Organization, 34 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 123 (1995)
97
Robert P. Deyling, Free Trade Agreements and the Federal Courts: Emerging Issues, 27
St. Mary's L.J. 353(1996)
Thomas J. Dillon, Jr., The World Trade Organization: A New Legal Order for World
Trade?, 16 Mich. J. IntT L. 349 (1995)
Dispute Panels Jump from 1 to 11, Focus: GATT Newsletter, Nov.-Dec. 1991, at 1
(Information and Media Relations Division ofGATT publ.)
Nancy Dunne, Chile's NAFTA Hopes Fade as Trade Pacts Lose US Favour, Fin. Times,
Feb. 26, 1997, at 6
Geoff Dyer, Americas Free Trade Talks Get Green Light, Fin. Times, May 19, 1997, at 4
Carsten Thomas Ebenroth, Visionen fur das internationale Wirtschaftsrecht [Visions
concerning International Economic Law], 1995 Recht der internationalen Wirtschaft
[RIW] 1
Erwin P. Eichmann, Procedural Aspects of GATT Dispute Settlement: Moving towards
Legalism, 8 Int'l Tax & Bus. Law. 38 (1990)
Harry B. Endsley, Dispute Settlement under the CFTA and NAFTA: From Eleventh-
hour Innovation to Accepted Institution, 18 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 659 (1995)
John P. Fitzpatrick, The Future of the North American Free Trade Agreement: A
Comparative Analysis of the Role of Regional Economic Institutions and the
98
Harmonization of Law in North America and Western Europe, 19 Hous. J. Int'l L. 1
(1996)
Forum: Binational Dispute Resolution Procedure under the Canada-United States Free
Trade Agreement - Experiences to Date and Portents for the Future, Washington, D.C.,
April 23, 1991 (Panel Discussion), 24 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 341 (1991)
Noemi Gal-Or, Multilateral Trade and Supranational Environmental Protection: The
Grace Period of the CEC, or a Well-Defined Role?, 9 Geo. Int'l. Envti. L. Rev. 53
(1996)
Jack I. Garvey, Trade Law and Quality of Life - Dispute Resolution under the NAFTA
Side Accords on Labor and the Environment, 89 Am. J. Int'l L. 439 (1995)
Charles M. Gastle, Policy Alternatives for Reform of the Free Trade Agreement of the
Americas: Dispute Settlement Mechanisms, 26 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 735 (1995)
Charles M. Gastle & Jean-G. Castel, Q.C., Should the North American Free Trade
Agreement Dispute Settlement Mechanism in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty
Cases Be Reformed in the Light of Softwood Lumber III?, 26 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus.
823 (1995)
GATT, Focus: GATT Newsletter, Sept. 1992, at 2 (Information and Media Relations
Division ofGATT publ.)
99
GATT Dispute Settlement Stymied by Non-Implementation of Reports, Focus: GATT
Newsletter, May-June 1991, at 1, 12-13 (Information and Media Relations Division of
GATT publ.)
Steven Globerman and Michael Walker (eds.), Assessing NAFTA: A Trinational
Analysis (1993)
Marc Gold & David Leyton-Brown (ed.), Trade-Offs on Free Trade (1988)
Jorge A. Gonzalez, Jr., The North American Free Trade Agreement, 30 Int'l Law. 345
(1996)
William C. Graham, Dispute Resolution in the Canada-United States Free Trade
Agreement: One Element of a Complex Relationship, 37 McGill L.J. 544 (1992)
J. Ernesto Grijalve and Patrick T. Brewer, Monitoring and Managing North American
Free Trade: The Administrative Bodies of the North American Free Trade Agreement, 2
San Diego Just. J. 1 (1994)
Robert Hage, Dispute Settlement under the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement,
1990 Can. Y.B. Int'l L. 361
Susana Hernandez Puente, Section 301 and the New WTO Dispute Settlement
Understanding, 2 ILSA J. Int'l & Comp. L. 213 (1995)
100
Robert E. Herzstein, The Labor Cooperation Agreement among Mexico, Canada and the
United States: Its Negotiations and Prospects, 3 U.S.-Mex. L.J. 121 (1995)
James R. Holbein & Gray Carpentier, Trade Agreements and Dispute Settlement
Mechanisms in the Western Hemisphere, 25 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 531 (1993)
Gary N. Horlick, The U.S.-Canada FTA and GATT Dispute Settlement Procedures - The
Litigant's View, 26 J. World Trade 5 (1992)
Gary N. Horlick & F. Amanda DeBusk, Dispute Resolution Panel of the U.S.-Canada
Free Trade Agreement: The First Two and One-half Years, 37 McGill L.J. 575 (1992)
Gary N. Horlick and F. Amanda DeBusk, Dispute Resolution under NAFTA, 27:1 J.
World Trade 21 (1993)
Robert F. Housman, The Treatment of Labor and Environmental Issues in Future
Western Hemisphere Trade Liberalization Efforts, 10 Conn. J. Int'l L. 301 (1995)
Robert E. Hudec, GATT Dispute Settlement after the Tokyo Round: An Unfinished
Business, 13 Cornell Int'l L.J. 145 (1980)
Robert E. Hudec, The GATT Legal System and World Trade Diplomacy (2d ed., 1989)
Manley O. Hudson, International Tribunals: Past and Future (1944)
101
David S. Huntington, Symposium on the North American Free Trade Agreement:
Settling Disputes under the North American Free Trade Agreement, 34 Harv. Inti L.J.
407(1993)
Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order
(1996)
John H. Jackson, Reflections on International Economic Law, 17 U. Pa. J. Inti Econ. L.
17(1996)
John H. Jackson, Regional Trade Blocs and the GATT, 16:2 World Economy 121 (1993)
i
John H. Jackson, Restructuring the GATT System (1990)
John H. Jackson, World Trade and the Law ofGATT (1969)
John H. Jackson & William J. Davey, Legal Problems of International Economic
Relations (Supp. 1986)
John H. Jackson et al., Implementing the Tokyo Round: Legal Aspects of Changing
International Economic Rules, 81 Mich. L. Rev. 267 (1982)
Jon R. Johnson, The North American Free Trade Agreement: A Comprehensive Guide
(1994)
Jon R. Johnson & Joel S. Schachter, The Free Trade Agreement (1988)
102
O. Thomas Johnson, Jr., Alternative Dispute Resolution in the International Context:
The North American Free Trade Agreement, 46 SMU L. Rev. 2175 (1993)
Joint ABA/CBA/BM Working Group on Dispute Settlement, American Bar Association
Section of International Law and Practice Reports to the House of Delegates, 26 IntT
Law. 855 (1992)
Joint ABA/CBA/BM Working Group on Dispute Settlement, The Joint Working Group
of the American Bar Association, the Canadian Bar Association, and the Barra Mexicana
Report on Dispute Settlement Procedures in the North American Free Trade Agreement,
27Int'lLaw. 831 (1993)
Guy de Jonquieres, WTO Urged to Act on Regional Pacts, Fin. Times, Feb. 6, 1997, at
10
Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace and Other Essays (Ted Humphrey trans., Hackett
Publishing publ., 1983) (1795)
Michael J. Kelly, Bringing a Complaint Under the NAFTA Environmental Side Accord:
Difficult Steps Under a Procedural Paper Tiger, but Movement in the Right Direction, 24
Pepp. L. Rev. 71 (1996)
Peter B. Kenen (ed.), Managing the World Economy (1994)
Azar M. Khansari, Searching for the Perfect Solution: International Dispute Resolution
and the New World Trade Organization, 20 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 183 (1996)
103
Harold H. Koh, The Legal Markets of International Trade: A Perspective on the
Proposed Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, 12 Yale J. IntT L. (1987)
Philip Kunig et al. (eds.), Volkerrecht, Teil 1: Allgemeine Lehren und besondere
Gebiete [International Law, Part I: General Doctrines and specific Fields] (W. Mauke
Sonne publ., 1994)
Jeffrey M. Lang, Full Committee Hearing on the World Trade Organization, Federal
News Service, June 10, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLNEWS File
Library of Congress, Global Legal Information Network (GLIN), The North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (visited July 12, 1997) <http://lcweb2.1oc.
gov:808 l/glin/nafta.html>
Oliver Long, Law and its Limitations in the GATT Multilateral Trade System (1985)
David Lopez, Dispute Resolution Under NAFTA: Lessons from Early Experience, 32
Tex. Int'l L.J. 163(1997)
Sarah Lowe, The First American Case under the North American Agreement for Labor
Cooperation, 51 U. Miami L. Rev. 481 (1997)
Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Binational Dispute Settlement under Chapter 19 of the Canada-
United States Free Trade Agreement: An Interim Appraisal, 24 NYU J. Inti L. & Pol.
269(1991)
104
Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Remedies along with Rights: Institutional Reform in the New
GATT, 88 Am. J. Inti L. 477 (1994)
Martin Lukas, The Role of Private Parties in the Enforcement of the Uruguay Round
Agreements, 29:5 J. World Trade 181 (1995)
Daniel B. Magraw, Jr., Trade Agreements, C990 ALI-ABA 193 (1995)
Kevin W. Patton, Dispute Resolution under the North American Commission on
Environmental Cooperation, 5 Duke J. Comp. & Inti L. 87 (1994)
Gabrielle Marceau, Transition from GATT to WTO: A Most Pragmatic Operation, 29:4
J. World Trade 147 (1995)
Ted L. McDorman, The Dispute Settlement Regime of the Free Trade Agreement, 2
Rev. Inti Bus. 303(1988)
Robert W. McGee, The Fatal Flaw in NAFTA, GATT and all other Trade Agreements,
14 Nw. J. Inti L. & Bus. 549 (1994)
Robert McGee, The Trade Policy of a Free Society, 19 Cap. U.L. Rev. 301 (1990)
Michael McGuiness, The Protection of Labor Rights in North America: A Commentary
on the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, 30 Stan. J. Inti L. 579 (1994)
105
Joseph A. McKinney, Dispute Settlement under the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement,
8J. IntiArb. 89(1991)
Donald M. McRae & Debra P. Steger (eds.), Understanding the Free Trade Agreement
(1988)
Miquel Montana i Mora, A GATT with Teeth: Law Wins over Politics in the Resolution
of International Trade Disputes, 31 Colum. J. TransnatT L. 103 (1993).
Patrick M. Moore, The Decisions Bridging the GATT 1947 and the WTO Agreement, 90
Am. J. Int'lL. 317(1996)
John Moss, Summary of Proceedings of the Seminar on Dispute Resolution under the
Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (Symposium), 26 Stan. J. Int'l L. 153
(1989).
Homer E. Moyer, Chapter 19 of the NAFTA: Binational Panels as the Trade Courts of
Last Resort, 27 Int'l Law. 707 (1993)
Philip M. Nichols, GATT Doctrine, 36 Va. J. Int'l L. 379 (1996)
Daniel E. Nolle (ed.), The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (1990)
Joseph J. Norton & Thomas L. Bloodworm (eds.), NAFTA and Beyond (1995)
106
Kristin L. Oelstrom, A Treaty for the Future: The Dispute Settlement Mechanisms of
the NAFTA, 25 Law & Pol'y Inti Bus. 783 (1994)
Office for Official Publications of the European Communities (ed.), The Uruguay
Round: Global Agreement - Global Benefits 27 (1994)
Thomas Oppermann, Die Europaische Gemeinschaft und Union in der
Welthandelsorganisation (WTO) [The European Community and Union in the World
Trade Organization], 1995 Recht der internationalen Wirtschaft [RIW] 919
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Trade, Employment and
Labour Standards: A Study of Core Workers' Rights and International Trade (1996)
Paul et al., North American Free Trade Agreement: Summary and Analysis (1993)
Scott Pendleton, Clinton, Mexican President Endorse Free Trade Agreement in First
Foreign Summit, Christian Sci. Mirror, Jan. 11, 1993, at 9
Jorge F. Perez-Lopez & Eric Griego, The Labor Dimension of the NAFTA: Reflections
on the First Year, 12 Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 473 (1995)
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Constitutional Functions and Constitutional Problems of
International Economic Law (1991)
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, International Trade Law and International Environmental Law,
27:1 J. World Trade 43 (1993)
107
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The Dispute Settlement System of the World Trade
Organization and the Evolution of the GATT Dispute Settlement System since 1948, 31
Common Mkt. L. Rev. 1 157 (1994)
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The Mid-Term Review Agreements of the Uruguay Round and
the 1989 Improvements to the GATT Dispute Settlement Procedures, 32 Ger. Y.B. Inti
L. 280(1989)
Heinz G. Preusse, Regional Integration in the Nineties - Stimulation or Threat to the
Multilateral Trading System, 28:4 J. World Trade 147 (1994)
Michael Reisman and Mark Wiedman, Contextual Imperatives of Dispute Resolution
Mechanisms, 29:3 J. World Trade 5 (1995)
Curtis Reitz, Enforcement of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 17 U. Pa. J.
Int'lEcon.L. 555(1996)
John M. Robson (ed.), 3 Collected Works of John Stuart Mill (Univ. of Toronto Press
publ., 1965) (1884)
Hector Rojas V., The Dispute Resolution Process under NAFTA, 1 U.S.-Mex. L.J. 19
(1993)
Andrew Kayumi Rosa, Old Wine, New Skins: NAFTA and the Evolution of
International Trade Dispute Resolution, 15 Mich. J. Inti L. 255 (1993)
108
Benjamin Rozwood & Andrew R. Walker, Side Agreements, Sidesteps, and Sideshows:
Protecting Labor from Free Trade in America, 34 Harv. Int'l L.J. 333 (1993)
Rules-Based Dispute Settlement Called Useless without Enforcement, 12 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) No. 30, at 1267 (July 26, 1995)
Alicia A. Samios, NAFTA's Supplemental Agreement: In Need of a Reform, 9 N.Y.
IntiL. Rev. 49 (1996)
David E. Sanger, Clinton Pledges to Push for Vote on Trade Accord, N.Y. Times, Nov.
17, 1994, at Al.
David A. Sanger, Senate Approves Pact to Ease Trade Curbs: A Victory for Clinton,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1994, at Al & A 22.
Andre Sapir, The Interaction between Labour Standards and International Trade Policy,
18:6 World Economy 791 (1995)
J. Owen Saunders, NAFTA and the North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation: A New Model for International Collaboration on Trade and Environment,
5 Colo. J. Int'l Envtl. L. & Pol'y 273 (1994)
Thomas J. Schoenbaum, The International Trade Laws and the New Protectionism: The
Need for a Synthesis with Antitrust, 19 N. C. J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 393 (1994)
109
Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Trade and Environment: Free International Trade and
Protection of the Environment - Irreconcilable Conflict?, 86 Am. J. Int'l L. 700 (1992)
Thomas J. Schoenbaum, The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA): Good
for Jobs, for the Environment, and for America, 23 Ga. J. IntT & Comp. L. 461 (1993)
Walter Sengenberger & Duncan Campbell (eds.), International Labour Standards and
Economic Interdependence (1994)
Several Disputes resolved "out of court", Focus: WTO Newsletter, Aug./Sept. 1996, at 4
(Information and Media Relations Division of the WTO publ.)
G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An Analysis of
the World Trade Organization, 44 Duke L.J. 829 (1995)
Jared R. Silverman, Multilateral Resolution over Unilateral Retaliation: Adjudicating
the Use of Section 301 before the WTO, 17 U. Pa. J. IntT Econ. L. 233 (1996)
Jose Luis Siqueiros, NAFTA Institutional Arrangements and Dispute Settlement
Procedures, 23 Cal. W. IntT L.J. 383 (1993)
Murray G. Smith & Frank Stone (eds.), Assessing the Canada-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement (1987)
T. Bradbrooke Smith, Comments on Dispute Resolution under a North American Free
Trade Agreement, 12 Can.-U.S. L.J. 337 (1987)
110
Louis B. Sohn, An Abundance of Riches: GATT and NAFTA Provisions for the
Settlement of Disputes, 1 U.S.-Mex. L.J. 3 (1993)
Louis B. Sohn, Comments on Dispute Resolution, 1 U.S.-Mex. L.J. 31 (1993)
Statistisches Bundesamt [Federal Census Bureau], Deutschland als Handelspartner
[Germany as Trade Partner] (visited April 14, 1997) <http://www.statistik-bund.de/basis/
d/bdl8.htm>
Statistisches Bundesamt [Federal Census Bureau], Gesamtwirtschaft [Economy in its
entirety] (visited April 14, 1997) <http://www.statistik-bund.de/basis/aVbdl2.htm>
Debra P. Steger, A Concise Guide to the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement
(1988)
Paulette L. Stenzel, Can NAFTA' s Environmental Provisions Promote Sustainable
Development?, 59 Alb. L. Rev. 423 (1995)
Terence P. Stewart (ed.), The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History (1986-
1992) (1994) (3 vols.)
Terence P. Stewart (ed.), The World Trade Organization: The Multilateral Trade
Framework (1996)
Kendall W. Stiles, The New WTO Regime: The Victory of Pragmatism, 4 J. Int'l L. &
Prac. 3 (1995)
Ill
Peter-Tobias Stoll, Die WTO: Neue Welthandelsorganisation, neue
Welthandelsordnung [The WTO: New World Trade Organization, New World Trade
Order], 54 Zeitschrift fur auslandisches offentliches Recht und Volkerrecht [ZaoRV] 241
(1994)
Samuel S. Straight, GATT and NAFTA: Marrying Effective Dispute Settlement and the
Sovereignty of the Fifty States, 45 Duke L.J. 216 (1995)
Frank W. Swacker et al., World Trade Without Barriers (Vol.1): The World Trade
Organization (WTO) and Dispute Resolution (1995); World Trade Without Barriers
(Vol. 2): Comparative Dispute Resolution - Public and Private 49-691 (1995)
David K. Tarullo, Logic, Myth and International Economic Order, 26 Harv. IntT L. J.
533(1985)
C. O'Neal Taylor, Fast Track, Trade Policy, and Free Trade Agreements: Why the
NAFTA Turned into a Battle, 28 Geo. Wash. J. Inti L. & Econ. 1 (1994)
C. O'Neal Taylor, The Limits of Economic Power: Section 301 and the World Trade
Organization Dispute Settlement System, 30 Vand. J. Transmit' 1 L. 209 (1997)
The World is Born, Focus: GATT Newsletter, May 1994, at 1 (Information and Media
Relations Division ofGATT publ.)
Christopher Thomas & Greg A. Tereposky, The Evolving Relationship Between Trade
and Environmental Regulation, 27:4 J. World Trade 23 (1993)
LAW LIBRARY
rjNIVERSiTv
112
Christopher Thomas & Gregory A. Tereposky, The NAFTA and the Side Agreement on
Environmental Co-operation, 27:6 J. World Trade 5 (1993)
Trade Policies for a Better Future: The "Leutwiler Report", the GATT and the Uruguay
Round (Kluwer Academic Publishers publ.,1987)
Michael J. Trebilcock & Robert Howse, The Regulation of International Trade (1995)
Philip R. Trimble, International Trade and the "Rule of Law", 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1016
(1985)
Peter P. Uimonen, Trade Rules and Environmental Controversies During the Uruguay
Round and Beyond, 18:1 World Economy 71 (1995)
United States Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, U.S.
Aggregate Foreign Trade Data (visited April 14, 1997) <http://www.ita.gov/industry/
otea/usfth/t05.prn>
United States International Trade Commission, Trade, Employment and Labor
Standards, Inti Economic Review, Dec. 1994, at 18
Ivo Van Bael, The GATT Dispute Settlement Procedure, 22:4 J. World Trade 67 (1988)
113
Edwin Vermulst & Bart Driessen, An Overview of the WTO Dispute Settlement System
and its Relationship with the Uruguay Round Agreements, 29:2 J. World Trade 131
(1995)
Jeffrey M. Waincymer, Revitalizing GATT Article XXIII - Issues in the Context of the
Uruguay Round, 12:1 World Competition 5 (1988)
Lei Wang, Some Observations on the Dispute Settlement System in the World Trade
Organization, 29:2 J. World Trade 173 (1995)
Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language (Gramercy
Books publ., 1996)
John H. Weeks, Procedures for Dispute Settlement under the World Trade Organization -
GATT 1994 and under Chapter 19 of the North American Free Trade Agreement, 18
HamlineL. Rev. 343(1995)
Gilbert R. Winham, Trading with Canada (1988)
Gilbert R. Winham, The Evolution of International Trade Agreements (1992)
World Trade Organization (visited July 12, 1997) <http://www.wto.org>
World Trade Organization (ed.), GATT Activities 1994-1995 (1996)
World Trade Organization, Members of the WTO multilateral trading system must
respect it and use it properly - says director-general Ruggiero (Address delivered by
114
WTO Director General Renato Ruggiero to the Herbert Quandt Foundation on June 22,
1995) (visited July 12, 1997) <http://www.wto.org/archives/3_17.htm>
World Trade Organization, Overview of the State-of-play of WTO Disputes (visited on
April 27, 1997) <http://www.wto.org/wto/dispute/bulletin.htm>
World Trade Organization (ed.), Regionalism and the World Trading System (1995)
World Trade Organization, World Trade Expanded Strongly in 1995 for the Second
Consecutive Year (visited April 3, 1997) <http://www.wto.org/wto/Pressrel/
press44.htm>
World Trade Organization, WTO Membership (visited April 11, 1997) <http://www.
wto.org/wto/memtab2_wpf.html>
John W. Wright (ed.), The Universal Almanac (1996)
Dickson Yeboah, Regional Economic Integration, 17:1 World Competition 33 (1993)
Michael K. Young, Dispute Resolution in the Uruguay Round: Lawyers Triumph over
Diplomats, 29 Inti Law. 389 (1995)
Konrad Zweigert & Hein Kotz, An Introduction to Comparative Law, Volume I: The
Framework ( 1 977)
